Marten v. Godwin

Decision Date22 August 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-5520.,05-5520.
PartiesCraig MARTEN, Appellant, v. Harold GODWIN, Jack E. Finchuam, Ronald Regan, David Scholewburger, The University of Kansas, and James Kleoppel.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Stanley B. Cheiken (Argued), Jenkintown, PA, Counsel for Appellant.

Steven K. Ludwig (Argued), Fox Rothschild, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellee.

Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

After being accused of plagiarism and expelled from an internet-based educational program, Craig Marten filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging defamation in violation of state law and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He appeals from an order of the District Court granting defendants' motion for summary judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because Marten has not established that the nonresident defendants expressly aimed their conduct at Pennsylvania, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal of Marten's claims.

I.

The University of Kansas School of Pharmacy offers a Non-Traditional Pharm.D. (NTPD) Program in which licensed pharmacists can pursue advanced degrees. The course work for the program is completed online. Students communicate with their professors, who are primarily located in Kansas, by phone and email.

While living and working in Pennsylvania, Marten learned about the University of Kansas NTPD program from his coworkers. He visited the University of Kansas' website, which provided information about the program. Marten then submitted an application to the program and was accepted in August of 2001. He deferred the start of his course work until the following spring.

During the time Marten was enrolled, defendant Ronald Regan was Director of the program, defendant Harold Godwin was a professor, and defendant James Kleoppel was an associate clinical professor.1 The defendants never visited Pennsylvania and never recruited Pennsylvania pharmacists to enroll in the University's program.

Marten communicated with his professors via email, frequently complaining about the grades he received. He sent email messages to defendant Regan, appealing disputes he had with professors. Marten also exchanged emails with Regan regarding concerns he had about the program's three-year time limit for completing course work.

Marten alleges he complained to a "Dean Sorenson" that Regan was not responding adequately to his complaints. Defendants assert that the School of Pharmacy does not have an administrator by the name "Sorenson." Shortly after purportedly speaking with Sorenson, Marten claims he received a call from Regan, in which Regan threatened to have Marten expelled from the NTPD program. According to Marten's Amended Complaint, Marten brought these threats to the attention of the University Ombudsman and the Better Business Bureau of Northeast Kansas.

The following fall, Marten took a course taught by defendant Kleoppel. The course required students to complete several written assignments. After reviewing one of Marten's assignments, Kleoppel accused Marten of academic misconduct because his assignment included text copied directly from a website without any indication that the language was not Marten's own. A few months later, Kleoppel alerted his colleagues that he received a second problematic assignment from Marten—this one appeared to include word-for-word passages from a reference book without quotation marks or proper citations. Following these two instances of suspected academic misconduct, Kleoppel recommended to Regan that Marten be expelled from the NTPD program. Regan agreed with Kleoppel's recommendation and he so informed defendant Godwin. Godwin also agreed and he forwarded his recommendation for expulsion to the Dean of the School of Pharmacy, Jack Finchuam. Soon thereafter, Dean Finchuam sent Marten a letter informing him that he was expelled from the NTPD program on the grounds of academic misconduct.

Marten filed a two-count complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged defamation in violation of state law and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Marten's Amended Complaint, Kleoppel, Godwin and Regan retaliated against Marten because he complained about defendant Regan's conduct. Their retaliatory action allegedly consisted of making false accusations of plagiarism and then recommending his expulsion. Marten separately alleged defendants' accusations of plagiarism constituted defamation under state law.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District Court denied the motion without issuing an opinion. After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, explaining that Marten did not meet his burden to establish jurisdiction as he relied "on bare, unsubstantiated allegations without proffering evidence" of jurisdictional significance. Marten v. Godwin, No. 03-6734, 2005 WL 3307084, at *3 (E.D.Pa. December 6, 2005); see Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule [with sworn affidavits], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."); Connors v. Fawn Min. Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 489 (3d Cir.1994).

II.

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's final order granting summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment we exercise plenary review and apply the same standard as the District Court. Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir.2007). Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).2 Marten's evidence "is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III.

If an issue is raised as to whether a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that personal jurisdiction exists. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir.2001). Pursuant to Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of that state." See Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.1987); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A). In Pennsylvania, state law provides for jurisdiction "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States" and "based on the most minimum contact with [the] Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5322(b).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that nonresident defendants have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Having minimum contacts with another state provides "`fair warning'" to a defendant that he or she may be subject to suit in that state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).

These basic due process principles are reflected in the two recognized types of personal jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has maintained systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Specific jurisdiction exists when the claim arises from or relates to conduct purposely directed at the forum state. See id. at 414-15 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868. Marten does not argue that the District Court had general jurisdiction over these defendants. Accordingly, we are only concerned with whether the court had specific jurisdiction. See Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Associates, Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 200-01 (3d Cir.1998) ("[N]o party in this case contends that there is a basis for general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania—so we are free to consider solely whether the alternative form of personal jurisdiction is present: specific personal jurisdiction.").

Determining whether specific jurisdiction exists involves a three-part inquiry. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir.2007). First, the defendant must have "`purposefully directed' his activities" at the forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984)). Second, the plaintiff's claim must "arise out of or relate to" at least one of those specific activities. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct....

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