Anderson v. Celebrezze

• Citation: 499 F. Supp. 121
• Decision Date: 17 July 1980
• Docket Number: No. C-2-80-400.,C-2-80-400.
• Parties: John B. ANDERSON, George H. Hetrick, Leslie Laufman, M.D. and Gerald M. Eisenstat, Plaintiffs, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Jr., Secretary of State of Ohio, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

499 F. Supp. 121

John B. ANDERSON, George H. Hetrick, Leslie Laufman, M.D. and Gerald M. Eisenstat, Plaintiffs, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Jr., Secretary of State of Ohio, Defendant.

No. C-2-80-400.

United States District Court, S. D. Ohio, E. D.

July 17, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James E. Pohlman, Columbus, Ohio, Mitchell Rogovin, George T. Frampton, Jr., Washington, D. C., Arthur Eisenberg, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York City, Bruce A. Campbell, ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiffs.

Joel S. Taylor, Thomas V. Martin, Adrienne C. Lalak, Asst. Attys. Gen., State of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio, for defendant.

OPINION

DUNCAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff John B. Anderson is an independent candidate for the office of President of the United States. He declared his independent candidacy on April 24, 1980. On May 16, seeking to place his name on the November ballot in Ohio, Anderson tendered to defendant Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Secretary of State of Ohio, those documents required by Ohio law to effect Anderson's nomination as a candidate for that office. The defendant rejected Anderson's filing, citing as the sole ground therefor Anderson's failure to file by the deadline set by Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) ? 3513.257. That deadline requires an independent to file his nomination papers 75 days before the primary election in June.

In this election year, the filing deadline falls on March 20, 1980, some 229 days prior to the general election. Upon the rejection of his nominating petition, plaintiff Anderson and three of his supporters filed this lawsuit seeking injunctive relief to place his name on the ballot as well as a declaration that R.C. 3513.257 operates to violate the constitutional rights of Anderson and of electors and voters supporting him in Ohio and across the nation.

Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Article II, ? 1, Article VI, and the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States; 28 U.S.C. ?? 1331, 1343(3), and 2201-02; and 42 U.S.C. ? 1983.

The case is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The parties have submitted this case on a lengthy stipulation of facts which is appended to this opinion. Following an expedited briefing schedule, the matter was argued to the Court on June 26, 1980. Because there appears to be no genuine issue as to any material fact, the Court finds this case appropriate for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Upon careful consideration of the important issues here presented to it, the Court holds that R.C. 3513.257 imposes a substantial burden on plaintiffs' fundamental rights and is not justified by any compelling state interest. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the statute is unconstitutional and the defendant must accept plaintiffs' nominating petition and other documents for processing.¹

Discussion of Law

Defendant Celebrezze concedes that the sole reason for rejecting Anderson's filing was that it was not tendered by March 20. Therefore, the sole statutory provision at issue in this case is the first sentence of R.C. 3513.257² which establishes the time deadline for the filing of a declaration of candidacy and nominating petitions necessary to qualify an independent for candidacy.

This filing deadline has emerged virtually unscathed from the rather tumultuous course the Ohio election laws have taken since the Supreme Court subjected them to thorough examination in the landmark case of Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). In Williams the Court held that the Ohio electoral scheme, taken as a whole, burdened voting and associational rights, working an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.³ The statutory scheme required an unusually high number of signatures (15% of the ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election), a highly structured state political organization, a primary election conforming to detailed and rigorous standards, and an early filing deadline. It made no provision for independents or for write-in candidates. Finding that the electoral scheme effectively excluded minor parties from the electoral process and operated to preserve the position of the two major parties as the only meaningful contenders on the Ohio ballot, the Court upheld a challenge by two minor parties seeking access to the presidential election ballot.

Since that time, Ohio has significantly lowered its signature requirement to 5,000, which in this election year amounts to about twelve one-hundredths of one percent of the vote in the last presidential contest. It now permits write-in votes for candidates filing a declaration of candidacy and a slate of presidential electors 20 days before the election. R.C. 3513.041. It permits independents to run for President and minor parties to qualify without primary elections.

Viewing the present statutory scheme as a whole it is arguable that these changes softened the restrictive impact of the filing deadline. In addition, the deadline itself has since been amended to fall later in the election year. In 1968 the filing date fell on February 7. Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S. at 26, 89 S.Ct. at 8. Thus the precise issue presented here, namely, whether the present Ohio filing deadline works an unconstitutional deprivation, was not decided by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Rhodes.

On the other hand, and notwithstanding the changes noted, the deadline remains substantially the same as the deadline forming part of the restrictive statutory scheme enacted between 1948 and 1952 after the Henry Wallace campaign in 1948, see Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F.Supp. 1262, 1269 and n.11 (S.D.Ohio 1970) (three-judge court); Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S. at 47 n.9, 89 S.Ct. at 19 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring), and expressly included by the Supreme Court among the laws comprising the restrictive scheme it held unconstitutional in Williams. 393 U.S. at 27, 89 S.Ct. at 8.

The First Amendment and Fundamental Rights Implicated by R.C. 3513.257

Ballot access jurisprudence has undergone considerable development in the 12 years since the Court decided Williams v. Rhodes. The appropriate starting point in this analysis is, therefore, the most recent Supreme Court opinion in the area of ballot access laws, Illinois Board v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979). While that case dealt with a different type of restriction-signature requirements-than is at issue here, it summarizes succinctly the fundamental rights implicated by restrictions on ballot access:

Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, "the rights of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." Citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). The freedom to associate as a political party, a right we have recognized as fundamental, see 393 U.S. at 30-31, 89 S.Ct. at 10, has diminished practical value if the party can be kept off the ballot. Access restrictions also implicate the right to vote because, absent recourse to referendums, "voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both." Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 94 S.Ct. 1315, 1320, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974). By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters' ability to express their political preferences. And for reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have often reiterated that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 84 S.Ct. 526, 534, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

Id. at 184, 99 S.Ct. at 990.

R.C. 3513.257 does abridge fundamental rights of the plaintiffs. The deadline prevents plaintiff Anderson from appearing as a candidate on the Ohio ballot in the November election. It likewise prevents plaintiff George H. Hetrick from qualifying as a candidate for presidential elector pledged to support Anderson in that election. In so doing, the law clearly burdens these plaintiffs' rights of expression and association secured by the First Amendment. It implicates an individual's "important interest in the continued availability of political opportunity," Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 1320, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974), and his right "to associate for the advancement of political beliefs." Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S. at 30, 89 S.Ct. at 10. Denying these plaintiffs access to the ballot may not directly penalize the exercise of their right to associate, but it does diminish the effectiveness of their exercise of the right.

While Anderson may still participate in the election by virtue of Ohio's write-in procedure, it requires little discussion to recognize that a write-in candidacy is an inadequate alternative to ballot placement. As the Supreme Court observed in Lubin v. Panish, supra, 415 U.S. at 719, n.5, 94 S.Ct. at 1321, n.5 "the realities of the electoral process ... strongly suggest that `access' via write-in votes falls far short of access in terms of having the name of the candidate on the ballot."

The First Amendment associational rights implicated by the deadline are inextricably bound up with a candidate's First Amendment rights of expression, which are also abridged by the filing deadline. As the Supreme Court recognized in Illinois Board, supra, 440 U.S. at 186, 99 S.Ct. at 991, "an election campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political office. ... Overbroad restrictions on ballot access jeopardize this form of political...