Harris, In re

• Decision Date: 29 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. S022130,S022130
• Citation: 855 P.2d 391,21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373,5 Cal.4th 813
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 855 P.2d 391 In re Charles HARRIS on Habeas Corpus.

Page 373

21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373

5 Cal.4th 813, 855 P.2d 391

In re Charles HARRIS on Habeas Corpus.

No. S022130.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 29, 1993.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 30, 1993.

Fern M. Laethem, State Public Defender, Michael Tanaka and Kent Barkhurst, Deputy State Public Defenders, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Wendelin Pollack, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Marc E. Turchin and Stephen M. Kaufman, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, for respondent.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

Charles Harris was convicted of second degree murder (Pen.Code, §§ 187, 189; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated), seven counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187), and two counts of robbery (§ 211). ¹ He seeks a writ of habeas corpus, claiming inter alia that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because he had not attained the age of 16 at the time the offenses were committed. Although we conclude the superior court possessed subject matter jurisdiction, we find that, for other reasons, the writ should issue, but that petitioner's relief should be limited to a remand for a determination of a new disposition consistent with his status as a juvenile at the time of the crime.

Facts ²

Petitioner was born on October 21, 1968. The homicide-related crimes for which he was convicted occurred on October 20, 1984, the day before his 16th birthday. Unrelated robberies occurred on October 5, 1984. The People initially proceeded against petitioner in juvenile court, but sought a fitness hearing to have him tried as an adult. (See Welf. & Inst.Code, § 707.) Petitioner filed a motion prior to the fitness hearing and claimed he could not be tried as an adult because he was not "16 years of age or older" when the crimes were committed, as required by statute. (Ibid.) He made the same argument at the fitness hearing. The juvenile court found petitioner was unfit for trial as a juvenile and certified him to adult court. By so certifying petitioner, the juvenile court necessarily rejected his contention that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over him because he had not turned 16 years old at the time of the crimes.

In superior court, petitioner was convicted of the charged crimes and sentenced to a term of 15 years to life plus a determinate term of 7 years, said term to be served in state prison. On appeal, he renewed the contention that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over him based on his age when the homicide-related crimes were committed. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim as to the murder and attempted murder counts and affirmed that part of the judgment. The appellate court reversed petitioner's two robbery convictions, however, because they were committed on October 5, 1984, and, thus, when petitioner was only fifteen years old. This court denied a petition for review on November 12, 1987. (People v. Harris (Aug. 28, 1987) B020567 [nonpub. opn.].)

Petitioner then filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court, again raising the question of his age. We issued an order to show cause and directed the parties to address the following two questions: "(1) whether petitioner is entitled to raise the issue of his age in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such issue having been raised and rejected on direct appeal, and (2) whether petitioner had not yet attained the age of 16 at the time of his crime, thereby divesting the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction."

Discussion

A. Availability of Relief on Habeas Corpus

Petitioner contends the trial court that convicted him lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because he was only 15 years old when the offenses were committed. Because he raised that precise issue on direct appeal, however, we must decide initially whether a writ of habeas corpus is available under these circumstances.

1. The Waltreus Rule

The right to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed by the state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11), and regulated by statute (§ 1473 [5 Cal.4th 825] et seq.). Although there is no explicit legislative limitation on postappeal petitions for the writ, this court developed one many years ago, declaring that as a general rule, "[h]abeas corpus will not serve as a second appeal." (In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930, 112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073; see also, In re Terry (1971) 4 Cal.3d 911, 927, 95 Cal.Rptr. 31, 484 P.2d 1375 [habeas corpus "ordinarily" will not serve as second appeal]; In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001 [hereafter Waltreus] [same]; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Extraordinary Writs, § 3346, p. 4150.) Accordingly, when a criminal defendant raises in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus an issue that was raised and rejected on direct appeal, this court usually has denied the petition summarily, citing Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d 218, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001. In that case, we noted the petitioner's arguments "were rejected on appeal, and habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal." (Id. at p. 225, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001.) By citing Waltreus in our summary denial orders, we have intended to communicate that because the issue was previously raised and rejected on direct appeal, and because the petitioner does not allege sufficient justification for the issue's renewal on habeas corpus, the issue is procedurally barred from being raised again. ³

Waltreus in turn cites and relies on In re Winchester (1960) 53 Cal.2d 528, 2 Cal.Rptr. 296, 348 P.2d 904. In that case, the petitioner was convicted of willfully failing to provide for his child; he was ultimately incarcerated for a probation violation. He unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the judgment should be overturned because three jurors were permitted by the bailiff to make unsupervised telephone calls during a break in deliberations. The petitioner also claimed a partisan atmosphere pervaded the courtroom during his trial. After the judgment was affirmed on appeal, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court, raising the same issues he raised on appeal.

Before addressing the merits, we explained the limited grounds for relief in such situations. "Habeas corpus has become a proper remedy in this state to collaterally attack a judgment of conviction which has been obtained in violation of fundamental constitutional rights. [Citations.] The denial of a fair and impartial trial amounts to a denial of due process of law [citation] and is a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of that phrase as used in section 4 1/2, article VI, of the Constitution of this state. [Citations.] Fundamental jurisdictional defects, like constitutional defects, do not become irremediable when a judgment of conviction becomes final, even after affirmance on appeal. [Citation.] However, the petitioner must show that the defect so fatally infected the regularity of the trial and conviction as to violate the fundamental aspects of fairness and result in a miscarriage of justice. [Citation.]" (In re Winchester, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 531-532, 2 Cal.Rptr. 296, 348 P.2d 904.)

Although we thus held a habeas corpus petitioner could raise jurisdictional and constitutional issues to collaterally attack a final judgment, we further clarified that the grounds for obtaining relief were quite limited. We explained that the writ would not lie to review questions concerning the admissibility of evidence or to correct "mere errors of procedure," where the trial court acted within its jurisdiction. (In re Winchester, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 532, 2 Cal.Rptr. 296, 348 P.2d 904.) Of particular importance to the present case, we opined that habeas corpus "will not lie ordinarily as a substitute for an appeal ... nor as a second appeal." (Ibid.)

This latter rule is now firmly established and often repeated without much explication. (In re Foss, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 930, 112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073; In re Terry, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 927, 95 Cal.Rptr. 31, 484 P.2d 1375; Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 225, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001; In re Spears (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1208, 204 Cal.Rptr. 333; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 102, 173 Cal.Rptr. 766.) As with many rules of law, multiple repetitions over time may tend to obscure the original purpose of the rule. (See People v. Superior Court (Mendella) (1983) 33 Cal.3d 754, 759, 191 Cal.Rptr. 1, 661 P.2d 1081, quoting Hyde v. United States (1912) 225 U.S. 347, 391, 32 S.Ct. 793, 811, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (dis. opn. of Holmes, J.) [" '[I]deas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.' "].) With the large number of petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in the courts of this state ⁴ and the concomitant burden on the judiciary to evaluate the hundreds of petitions ultimately barred on procedural grounds, it is important to reexamine and reiterate the purpose of the Waltreus rule.

A review of earlier cases reveals the Waltreus rule evolved from pronouncements that a litigant could not forgo a direct appeal in favor of seeking relief on habeas corpus. Thus, we explained that habeas corpus is not a "substitute for a writ of error" (In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 492, 122 P.2d 22), and that "It is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus ordinarily may not be employed as a substitute for an appeal." (In re Byrnes (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824, 827, 161 P.2d 376; see also In re Seeley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 294, 296, 176 P.2d 24 [habeas corpus generally unavailable where there exists a remedy by appeal]; 36 Cal.Jur.3d, Habeas Corpus, § 6, p. 11 [same].)

The wisdom of the judicially created Waltreus rule is manifest: the Legislature has established an elaborate appellate system in which a criminal defendant may...