In re Long Island North Shore Passenger & Freight Transp. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1881
• Citation: 5 F. 599
• Parties: IN re PETITION of THE LONG ISLAND NORTH SHORE PASSENGER & FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

5 F. 599

IN re PETITION of THE LONG ISLAND NORTH SHORE PASSENGER & FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 12, 1881

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

W. D Shipman and J. Larocque, for petitioners.

F. R Coudert, Leo. C. Dessar, Albert Cardozo, Bush & Clark, H. B. Kinghorn, Geo. Wilcox, and W. De F. Edwards, for sundry claimants.

CHOATE D. J.

This is a petition filed by the owner of the steam-boat Seawahnaka for the benefit of the acts of Congress for limiting the liability of owners of vessels.

The original petition alleged that the petition is a New York corporation owning and running a line of steam-vessels for the carriage of freight and passengers between the city of New York and Roslyn, and intermediate points and places all in the state of New York, and that its vessel the Seawahnaka was one of said line, and was duly enrolled at the office of the collector of New York; that on the twenty-eighth day of June, 1880, while said vessel was on her regular trip from New York to Roslyn with a large number of passengers, and a large and valuable cargo belonging to several persons, and when near Hell Gate, she was found to be on fire, and it became necessary to beach her, which was done on Randall's island, where she burnt to the water's edge and became an utter wreck; that the cargo and other property on board were thereby lost and destroyed, and many of the passengers were killed or drowned or seriously injured, and that no freight had been received on said cargo; that the fire happened, and the loss and damage was done and incurred, without the design, neglect, or fault of the petitioner, and without its privity or knowledge; that certain claims have been made and certain suits have been commenced against the petitioner by persons claiming to have sustained damage as owners, shippers, or consignors of cargo, or as passengers, or representatives or relatives of passengers killed by said disaster, and that said claims far exceed the value of said wreck.

The prayer of the petition is for the appointment of a trustee to receive a transfer of the said wreck, for a monition to all parties having claims to come in and make proof thereof and answer, for a decree determining the liability of the petitioner and limiting its liability, if found liable at all, to the value of said wreck, for the distribution of its proceeds among the claimants if entitled thereto, and for an order restraining all suits pending the final determination of this proceeding.

Upon filing the petition a trustee was appointed, to whom the wreck was transferred, a monition as prayed for was issued, and an order was made restraining the prosecution of suits pending this proceeding.

Upon the return-day of the monition several parties appeared, who filed exceptions to the petition, or moved to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction in the court, or to set aside the monition and vacate the restraining order on various grounds, some of which are of general application to all the claims and some are applicable to particular claims. One of the points made against the jurisdiction of the court was that the petition showed that the vessel was engaged only in commerce between ports of the state of New York. The petitioner, upon the hearing of the motions and exceptions, asked leave to amend the petition, and aver that although the service of said steam-boat was between ports all in the state of New York, yet it formed a link in the chain of commercial intercourse between this state and other states and foreign countries, and that said vessel was engaged in the transportation over the waters of Long Island sound of merchandise coming from foreign countries and from other states, and destined to points in this state on the route of said steam-boat, and in the transportation over said waters of goods shipped within this state, destined for and addressed to ports and places in other states of the United States and foreign countries, and also in the transportation of passengers destined to and coming from other states.

Some of the claimants who have appeared have answered the amended petition, and, upon the hearing, the right of all parties appearing to answer was reserved till a day to be fixed after the decision of the court upon the motions and exceptions. So far as the question of jurisdiction rests upon the point that the vessel was, upon the averments of the petition, engaged exclusively in the commerce of the state of New York, and therefore that the limited liability act, considered as a regulation of commerce, has no application to the case, on the conceded principle that the power of congress to legislate for the regulation of commerce is limited to the passage of laws for the regulation of commerce between the states and with foreign countries and the Indian tribes, the defect is clearly cured by the amendment, and the amended petition states a case of interstate commerce such as has been authoritatively held to be within the power of commercial regulation of the United States. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 565; The Thomas Swan, 6 Ben. 42; The Sunswich, Id. 112. The case of The Bright Star, 1 Woolw. 266, is not inconsistent with this conclusion, upon the very distinct and positive averments of the amended petition in respect to the business in which this steam-boat was engaged. This amendment, however, does not relieve the court from the necessity of determining the question as to the jurisdiction of the court upon the case made by the original petition, since, if that petition did not state a case within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the court, it would be proper, if not necessary, in view of the decree which the court may make, being operative upon parties who have not appeared, that an alias monition should be issued upon the amended petition; and it is, perhaps, questionable whether the transfer of the wreck already made, which was sold before the amendment of the petition, would be available to the petitioners in this proceeding, if the court had not then jurisdiction of the case made by the petition. The question, therefore, whether the original petition stated a case within the jurisdiction of the court must be considered. The question thus raised is one of the greatest importance, involving questions of the respective rights and powers of the United States and of the states. The questions are--First, whether congress has the constitutional power to pass an act limiting the liability of the owners of vessels engaged only in commerce between ports of the state of New York, but carried on upon the high seas or navigable waters of the United States; and, secondly, whether, if congress has this power, it has exercised it in the act known as the limited liability act, (St. 1851, c. 43, now Rev. St. 4282 et seq.;) and, thirdly, if congress has not that legislative power, or has not exercised it, whether in this case, by the maritime law of the United States as it now is, the petitioner is entitled to a decree limiting its liability in a case not within the terms of the statute referred to. The contention of the claimants who appear to object to the jurisdiction is that this act is merely a regulation of commerce, so intended by congress, and to be so construed, and therefore inapplicable to vessels engaged exclusively in the commerce of a state, though carried on upon the navigable waters of the United States; and that, if not so intended, but if the act must be construed as applying to such vessels, that it is unconstitutional in respect to such vessels for want of authority in congress to pass it. The question of the constitutional power of congress to pass the act as applied to such vessels is obviously the first question to be considered, because this assumed want of power is urged as one of the strongest reasons bearing on the further question of the proper construction to be given to the statute. The contention on the part of the petitioner is that, while in its application to vessels of the United States engaged in foreign and interstate commerce the act may be justified by and based upon the power granted to congress to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign countries, yet the act was the adoption by congress of a principle of the general maritime law not before expressly recognized or adopted as part of the maritime law of the United States, but which it was competent for congress to adopt and make a part of the maritime law of the United States; that thereupon it became operative over all the navigable waters of the United States, and applicable to all vessels of the United States, or of any of the states engaged in navigating such waters or the high seas, except so far as such waters or particular classes of such vessels are expressly excepted from its operation. The exception in the act is that it shall not apply to 'the owners of any canal-boat, barge, or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever used in rivers or inland navigation. ' The effect of this exception will be more properly considered hereafter in discussing the construction of the act.

Article 3, Sec. 2, of the constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to 'all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. ' Two of the principal classes of 'cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' everywhere recognized and acknowledged to be such, are cases for breach of maritime contracts and cases for damages growing out of marine torts. The admiralty jurisdiction in cases of maritime contracts depends on the nature of the contract,-- its maritime character,-- not on the place where it is made or to be performed. While it is often a difficult question whether a contract is...