Schradski v. Albright

• Decision Date: 01 October 1887
• Citation: 5 S.W. 807,93 Mo. 42
• Parties: SCHRADSKI v. ALBRIGHT and others.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

5 S.W. 807

93 Mo. 42

SCHRADSKI v. ALBRIGHT and others.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1887.

1. MORTGAGES — DEED ABSOLUTE.

In Missouri, a conveyance absolute in form, if it be made clearly to appear that at the time of its execution it was intended only as a security for a debt, will be treated in equity as a mortgage.

2. EQUITY — LACHES — CLAIM THAT DEED ABSOLUTE WAS A MORTGAGE.

Plaintiff had, by deed absolute in form, conveyed land which was afterwards purchased by defendants, who had built on it. During the six years since his conveyance, plaintiff had paid no taxes on the property, nor made any protest while improvements were being made, and had encouraged defendants in their purchase, but now claimed that his deed was given only by way of mortgage to secure a debt. Held, that a court of equity will not interfere when a party has slept on his rights, and induced others to act on the belief that he has abandoned them.

3. DEED — QUITCLAIM — SUBJECT TO EQUITIES.

In Missouri, a purchaser under a quitclaim deed acquires only his vendor's title, and the land remains subject to equities attaching to it in the hands of the grantor.¹

4. EVIDENCE — RELEVANCY — FOR IMPEACHMENT.

Evidence, otherwise irrelevant, may be admissible for the purpose of impeaching testimony.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; F. M. BLACK, Judge.

Marcy K. Brown and W. H. Leavitt, for appellant. John W. Wofford, for respondent.

NORTON, C. J.

This is a suit in equity, begun on the twenty-eighth of March, 1884, in which the plaintiff substantially avers in his petition that, being the owner in fee of lot 6, in block 3, in Mumford & Fancher's addition to Kansas City, he, on the tenth day of November, 1877, conveyed the same by general warranty deed to Alexander and Albert Frankenthal for the expressed consideration of $200; that at the time said conveyance was executed it was understood and agreed that said deed, though conveying an absolute estate, was in fact merely given to secure the payment by plaintiff to said Frankenthals of the sum of $50 when demanded by them, and that, upon payment of said sum, the Frankenthals were to reconvey the lot to plaintiff, and that the deed was made on the express condition that the grantees therein were to hold the premises only as security for said sum. It is then averred that thereafter, on the twenty-eighth of April, 1879, said Frankenthals, without plaintiff's consent, executed a deed of quitclaim to one Scott, releasing all their right, title, and interest in said lot, and in full satisfaction of the deed made by plaintiff to them; that afterwards defendant acquired the interest of said Scott with full knowledge that he had no right to convey the same freed from the equity claimed by plaintiff. The petition then asks for an accounting, and that he be allowed to redeem. The answer was a general denial. On the trial, judgment was rendered for defendant, and the bill dismissed.

Plaintiff, on his appeal from the judgment, assigns for error the action of the court in receiving improper evidence, and in rendering judgment on the evidence in favor of defendant. The evidence showed that plaintiff, by his deed of general warranty, dated the tenth day of December, 1877, conveyed the lot in controversy, absolutely and unconditionally, to Albert and Alexander Frankenthal. The consideration expressed in the deed was $200, and at the time of the conveyance the lot was vacant and unimproved. The evidence on the part of plaintiff tends further to show that the $200 mentioned as a consideration was not paid, and that plaintiff executed the conveyance to relieve his father, then in bankruptcy, and to enable him to get his discharge, and to secure the payment of a debt of $50, which his father owed the Frankenthals, which they demanded should be secured before they would consent to the discharge of his father; and that it was verbally agreed at the time the deed was executed between plaintiff and the agent of the Frankenthals that if plaintiff paid the said debt, when demanded of him, that they were to reconvey the lot to plaintiff.

The evidence also showed that on the twenty-ninth of April, 1879, the said Frankenthals conveyed said lot by quitclaim deed for the expressed consideration of $200 to one Scott, which contained the following recital: "This deed of quitclaim being made in release and satisfaction for a certain deed, dated the tenth day of December, 1877, recorded in the recorder's office, within and for the county of Jackson, aforesaid, in Deed Book B, No. 15, at page 328." The...