State v. Patton
| Decision Date | 26 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. And–11–262. |
| Citation | 50 A.3d 544,2012 ME 101 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Aaron J. PATTON. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Donald S. Hornblower, Esq. (orally), Hornblower Lynch Rabasco & Van Dyke, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant Aaron Patton.
Norman R. Croteau, District Attorney, and Nicholas S. Worden, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Office of the District Attorney, Auburn, for appellee State of Maine.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
[¶ 1] Aaron J. Patton appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Marden, J.) following a jury trial at which he was found guilty of four counts of gross sexual assault (Class B), 17–A M.R.S. § 253(2)(H) (2011); one count of unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 255–A(1)(M) (2011); and two counts of sexual abuse of a minor (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A–2) (2011). Patton contends that the court erred in several respects, including (A) a constitutional error resulting from the court's decision to permit a State's witness, a police officer, to testify over Patton's objection about Patton's assertion of his right to remain silent shortly before his arrest, (B) the admission of evidence of Patton's use of hypnosis, (C) the admission of police officer testimony that contained inadmissible hearsay evidence and was unfairly prejudicial, and (D) the misstatement of jury instructions regarding section 253(2)(H). We disagree and affirm the judgment.
[¶ 2] Aaron Patton was charged by indictment in Androscoggin County with four counts of gross sexual assault (Class B), 17–A M.R.S. § 253(2)(H); one count of unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 255–A(1)(M); and one count of sexual abuse of a minor (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A–2). Patton was also charged separately in Franklin County with one count of sexual abuse of a minor (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A–2). The charges were consolidated for a jury trial on all seven counts. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the record supports the following facts. See State v. LaVallee–Davidson, 2011 ME 96, ¶ 2, 26 A.3d 828.
[¶ 3] Patton married the victim's mother in 1999 and moved to Maine from California shortly thereafter. At the time, the mother had two young daughters from a previous relationship, including the victim, who was then six or seven years old. Patton and the mother had one child, a daughter, during their marriage. The mother and the children considered Patton to be a father figure within the household. He helped with homework, set rules for the household, and imposed discipline as needed. Although the victim maintained a good relationship with her biological father, she called Patton “Daddy.”
[¶ 4] The victim testified that Patton first began touching her in a sexual manner when she was twelve years old, and that he continued to touch her breasts and genitals about once a week. She testified that she and Patton first had sexual intercourse when she was fourteen years old, in her bedroom at their home in Livermore Falls.1 The victim testified that between that first incident and May 2009, she and Patton engaged in sex, including vaginal, oral, and anal sex, in the family home at least once a week.
[¶ 5] In February 2009, when the victim was fifteen years old, the victim's mother and Patton divorced. Patton continued to live in the Livermore Falls home for a few months following the divorce and continued to help the children with homework and oversee household chores. In May 2009, Patton moved to an apartment in Jay, where the victim visited him regularly, both after school and on some weekends. The victim testified that she and Patton had sex every time she visited him at the Jay apartment, but she did not remember the specific dates. Although the victim considered herself to be in a romantic relationship with Patton at that time, she also considered him to be her stepfather.
[¶ 6] A number of the sexual encounters between Patton and the victim occurred when other children were in the house. When he went into the bedroom alone with her to have sex, Patton told the other children that he was performing hypnotherapy on the victim. Patton practiced hypnotherapy and he advertised his availability as a hypnotist in the local newspaper and through a sign posted on the front lawn of the Livermore Falls home. He used hypnosis to assist people in breaking bad habits, such as smoking, and as a form of entertainment at parties.
[¶ 7] Patton first hypnotized the victim when she was eight years old to help her stop biting her nails. The victim believes that this hypnotism worked. Patton also hypnotized her the day after they first had sexual intercourse, and Patton told her not to tell anyone about the sexual relationship. The victim believes that Patton continued to hypnotize her when they had sex during her visits to his apartment in Jay and that the hypnotism helped to calm her.
[¶ 8] At trial, Patton's attorney objected to the State's continued reference to hypnosis, arguing that there was no scientific basis for the State's apparent theory that Patton used hypnosis to control the victim and that this evidence was “highly and unfairly prejudicial.” The court overruled the objection.
[¶ 9] In May 2010, the victim, when confronted by her mother, admitted that she and Patton had had sex. The victim wrote a statement for the police describing her sexual relationship with Patton and the police obtained a search warrant to search Patton's apartment in Jay. At trial, one of the officers testified that, when he went to Patton's apartment to execute the search warrant and told Patton that he wanted to ask him some questions about Patton's relationship with the victim, Patton responded that he “needed to talk to his attorney.” Patton objected to this testimony, but the court allowed it.
[¶ 10] Patton testified as the only witness for the defense. During his testimony, Patton conceded that he had acted as a father to the victim during his marriage to her mother. He also admitted that he had a sexual relationship with the victim and that they had had sex “numerous times,” but he maintained that the sexual relationship started when the victim was sixteen years old. He admitted that he purchased lingerie for the victim after she turned sixteen. Patton testified that he had certification in hypnotherapy and used hypnosis for behavior modification, but he denied that he ever used hypnosis on the victim for sexual reasons.
[¶ 11] The jury found Patton guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to six years' imprisonment for one count of gross sexual assault. For another count of gross sexual assault, the court sentenced Patton to a consecutive term of six years' imprisonment, all suspended, with four years of probation. Patton's sentences for the remaining counts were all suspended and ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for the first count of gross sexual assault. This appeal followed.
A. Patton's Statement That He Needed to Speak to His Attorney
[¶ 12] Patton contends that the court erred by allowing a police officer to testify that Patton said he “needed to talk to his attorney” in response to the officer's request to speak with him about the victim. At trial, Patton objected to this expected testimony, arguing that his assertion of his constitutional rights cannot be used against him. The court concluded that there was nothing unduly prejudicial or inadmissible about the testimony and overruled Patton's objection. As a result, the officer provided the following testimony:
Q. Pick up where we left off, officer. You were at the door, you knocked on the door, I believe. Did he come to the door?
A. He did.
Q. I realize I am backing up a little bit here but what did you say to him?
A. I identified myself as an officer with Livermore Falls Police Department, I explained to him that I wanted to ask him some questions about his relationship with [the victim].
Q. What was his response?
A. That he needed to talk to his attorney.
Q. After that did any questions to him cease on your part?
Q. All right. After that, officer, what in fact did you do?
A. We informed Mr. Patton that we had a search warrant for his residence. We executed that search warrant.
[¶ 13] Patton cited the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when making his objection. On appeal, Patton again cites to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, arguing that his right to due process, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated when the officer was permitted to testify “that the Defendant had invoked his 6th Amendment constitutional right to counsel.” The State concedes error, noting: “The admission of [the officer's] statement is in direct contravention to the widely held notion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the prosecution from introducing testimony or making reference at trial to defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent.” Both parties reference the rule announced in Doyle v. Ohio, in which the United States Supreme Court held that “the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). However, the State urges us to conclude that the error was harmless.
[¶ 14] We disagree with both parties' characterizations of the constitutional right at stake here. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not at issue when judicial proceedings have not yet been initiated against a defendant. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) ...
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