Jarmie v. Troncale

• Decision Date: 17 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18358.,18358.
• Citation: 50 A.3d 802,306 Conn. 578
• Parties: John JARMIE v. Frank TRONCALE et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

306 Conn. 578

50 A.3d 802

John JARMIE

v.Frank TRONCALE et al.

No. 18358.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 16, 2012.

Decided Sept. 17, 2012.^*

Steven D. Ecker, with whom, on the brief, was Peter M. Haberlandt, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eugene A. Cooney, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Kay A. Williams, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.^**

ZARELLA, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether a physician who fails to advise an unaware patient of the potential driving risks associated with her underlying medical condition breaches a duty to the victim of the patient's unsafe driving because of the failure to advise. The plaintiff, John Jarmie, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Frank Troncale, a physician and gastroenterology specialist, and Gasteroenterology Center of Connecticut, P.C., Troncale's employer. Troncale diagnosed and treated his patient, Mary Ann Ambrogio, for various liver and kidney ailments, including hepatic encephalopathy, but failed to warn her of the latent driving impairment associated with her condition. After leaving Troncale's office, Ambrogio blacked out while operating her motor vehicle and struck the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, in granting the defendants' motion to strike his complaint, improperly ruled that a third party is categorically barred from bringing an action against a physician for professional negligence and that Troncale owed no duty to the plaintiff to warn Ambrogio of the driving risks associated with her medical condition. The defendants argue that the trial court properly ruled that Troncale owed no duty to the plaintiff. As an alternative ground for affirmance of the trial court's decision, the defendants also argue that the plaintiff failed to plead the requisite causal connection between Troncale's alleged deviation from the standard of care and the plaintiff's claimed injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in the trial court's memorandum of decision. “On June 20, 2008, the plaintiff ... filed a one count negligence complaint against the defendants.... The plaintiff also attached a good faith certificate,which, under General Statutes § 52–190a, is a prerequisite to filing a medical malpractice action.¹ ...

“Troncale is a licensed Connecticut physician and specialist in gastroenterology and an agent or employee of Gastroenterology Center of Connecticut, P.C. On June 22, 2006, Troncale diagnosed and treated [Ambrogio] ... for various liver and kidney ailments, including hepatic encephalopathy.

“It is generally known in Troncale's medical specialty that those suffering from hepatic encephalopathy are unable to safely operate a motor vehicle due to their impaired mental state. While operating a motor vehicle after leaving Troncale's offices on June 22, 2006, [Ambrogio] lost consciousness due to the hepatic encephalopathy and crashed into the plaintiff, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The [plaintiff alleged that his] injuries were caused by [Troncale's deviation from the accepted standard of care applicable to the treatment of Ambrogio] in that [he] failed to ... advise and warn [her] not to drive a vehicle.²

“On July 24, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to comply with General Statutes § 52–190a in that the written opinion supporting the good faith certificate [failed] to specify the specialty of its author, and there [was] no basis to conclude that the author is a similar health care provider to ... Troncale and, therefore, qualified to determine whether there is evidence of medical negligence.

“On August 7, 2008, the plaintiff filed his first amended complaint, attaching a substitute copy of the good faith certificate. The plaintiff also filed an objection to the defendants' motion to dismiss in which he argued that the ... motion ... should be denied because the plaintiff over-redacted the specialty and board certification of the reviewer in the initial good faith certificate. On August 13, 2008, the defendants filed a claim for apportionment under General Statutes § 52–102b against [Ambrogio], claiming that she was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and damages.

“On September 2, 2008, the defendants withdrew their motion to dismiss. On November 21, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's second amended complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim [was] legally insufficient. On December 10, 2008, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion.”

On December 31, 2008, the trial court granted the motion to strike on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to allege a physician-patient relationship, as required under Connecticut medical malpractice law, and that Connecticut authority indicates that physicians have no common-law duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by patients. The court thus found it unnecessary to address the defendants' argument that the plaintiff had failed to plead the required causal connection between Troncale's alleged deviation from the standard of care and the claimed injury. This appeal followed.³

“The standard of review in an appeal challenging a trial court's granting of a motion to strike is well established. A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court. As a result, our review of the court's ruling is plenary.... We take the facts to be those alleged in the [pleading] that has been stricken and we construe the [pleading] in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lestorti v. DeLeo, 298 Conn. 466, 472, 4 A.3d 269 (2010).

IPROCEDURAL ISSUES

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that a third party who is not a patient is categorically barred from bringing a cause of action against a health care provider for professional negligence. The plaintiff specifically claims that this court's precedent establishes that a proper “duty” analysis requires a particularized examination of foreseeability and public policy under the relevant circumstances and that the plaintiff's attachment of a good faith certificate to the complaint does nothing to change that analysis. The defendants respond that the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff's complaint sounded in medical malpractice and should be stricken because it failed to allege a physician-patient relationship, which is a necessary component of a medical malpractice complaint. We conclude, in light of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint and the parties' arguments, that the trial court properly considered, as two separate issues, whether the plaintiff's complaint was legally insufficient under Connecticut's medical malpractice law and whether Troncale owed a duty to the plaintiff under common-law principles of negligence.

The following procedural background is relevant to our resolution of this claim. When the defendants filed their motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, which they characterized as sounding in medical “malpractice,” they argued that the plaintiff had failed to plead a physician-patient relationship and the required causal connection between Troncale's alleged deviation from the standard of care to the patient and the plaintiff's claimed injuries. The defendants also moved to strike the complaint on the ground that Troncale owed no duty to the plaintiff as a matter of law. The defendants thus discussed the “malpractice” and “duty” issues separately in the memorandum in support of their motion to strike.

In his memorandum in opposition to the motion, the plaintiff ignored the defendants' characterization of the complaint as sounding in medical malpractice and argued that Troncale owed him a legal duty, that the complaint properly alleged proximate cause and that there was no statutory authority prohibiting third parties from bringing an action in negligence against a health care provider. With respect to this last point, the plaintiff specifically argued that limiting medical malpractice claims against health care providers to their patients “turns the malpractice statute into a sword precluding negligence claims by third parties,” a result that never was intended under the medical malpractice statutes.

In deciding the motion, the trial court rejected the plaintiff's contention that he had brought a common-law action in negligence. The court instead concluded that the complaint sounded in medical malpractice and granted the motion to strike because the plaintiff had failed to allege a physician-patient relationship with Troncale. The court nonetheless addressed the defendants' argument that Troncale owed no duty to the plaintiff “because duty and the physician-patient relationship requirement in medical malpractice actions are intertwined....”

The parties' arguments must be understood in light of this procedural history. The plaintiff maintains that the complaint is legally sufficient because it was brought under common-law principles of negligence, to which the good faith certificate was attached as a precautionary measure to “avoid ... procedural wrangling,” whereas the defendants contend that the complaint is legally insufficient because it sounds in medical malpractice. The complaint, however, does not purport to be grounded in either medical malpractice or common-law negligence. It merely describes the relevant facts and alleges that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by Troncale's “deviation from the accepted standard of care applicable to the treatment of the patient in that [he] failed to advise and warn the patient...