People v. Clark

• Decision Date: 05 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. S004662,No. 24342,S004662,24342
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 789 P.2d 127 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William John CLARK, Defendant and Appellant. Crim.

Page 399

268 Cal.Rptr. 399

50 Cal.3d 583, 789 P.2d 127

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William John CLARK, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S004662.

Crim. No. 24342.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

April 5, 1990.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

June 7, 1990.

[789 P.2d 133] [50 Cal.3d 593] Eric S. Multhaup and Melissa W. Johnson, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White and Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst Attys. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Acting Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dane R. Gillette and Josanna Berkow, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

EAGLESON, Justice.

Defendant was convicted by a jury in the Los Angeles County Superior Court of the rape of his former wife, in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (2) ¹ (count I); the first degree murder of David Gawronski (§§ 187/189) (count II); the attempted second degree murder of Ava Gawronski and Sara Gawronski (§§ 664/187) (counts III & IV); and arson (§ 451, subd. (a)) (count V). The jury also found true allegations that the murder had been committed under special circumstances as a murder by means of explosives (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(6)) and in the commission of arson (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(viii)), and an allegation that defendant inflicted great bodily injury on Ava Gawronski (§§ 12022.7 & 1203.075) in the attempted murder.

The jury was excused when it deadlocked on the appropriate penalty and was unable to return a verdict. A second jury was empaneled (§ 190.4, subd. (b)), which returned a verdict of death. The court denied defendant's application for modification of the verdict and imposed the penalty of death for the murder; a consecutive upper term of eight years (§ 667.6, subd. (c)) for the rape of his former wife; the upper term of nine years with a three-year enhancement for the attempted murder of Ava Gawronski and the great-bodily-injury finding; two years, representing one-third of the middle term, for the attempted murder of Sara Gawronski; and two years and four months, one-third of the middle term, for the arson. The terms were to be consecutive, the rape term was designated a subordinate term, and the determinate terms were stayed pending imposition of the death penalty and permanently thereafter.

This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)

Having considered defendant's many claims of error, we find merit only in his assertions that the delivery-of-explosives special circumstance may not be applied to his conduct, and that one determinate term must be stayed. We shall strike the special circumstance found under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(6), and modify the judgment insofar as it fails to stay the arson term pursuant to section 654. In all other respects the judgment will be affirmed.

SUMMARY

The rape of defendant's former wife occurred on the evening of November 19, 1981. She admitted defendant to her apartment when he told her that his mother was very ill. He then forced her to submit to sexual intercourse.

The other offenses were committed on January 6, 1982, when defendant threw gasoline into the home occupied by David and Ava Gawronski and their infant daughter Sara, and ignited the gasoline vapors with highway flares. David, who suffered second- and third-degree burns over 90 percent of his body, died on January 14, 1982. Ava was so seriously burned that she was hospitalized for 10 months, lost her fingers and nose, and suffered additional permanent injuries. The child was rescued unharmed by a neighbor's heroic action.

The evidence, which was more than sufficient to support conviction of defendant of each of the substantive offenses, will be discussed in greater detail below in addressing his specific contentions. Although disputing details regarding the manner in which the arson was committed, defendant did not and does not deny the commission of rape, arson, and murder. He denies any intent to kill the attempted murder victims, however.

Defendant surrendered to authorities and confessed shortly after the offenses occurred. He claimed that his purpose in committing the arson was to drive the family out of the home so that he could kill David Gawronski, shooting him with a shotgun, as Ava watched. His avowed purpose was to cause her to suffer the same emotional pain that he claimed to have suffered when she abruptly discontinued counseling that she had been giving him. The People sought to prove that, at the time defendant actually ignited the gasoline vapor in the Gawronski home, his intent was to kill the entire Gawronski family.

Defendant was represented by appointed counsel throughout the guilt and special circumstance phases of the trial and the first penalty trial. When the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict and was discharged, however, he elected to represent himself in future proceedings, accepting the assistance of his former attorneys as standby counsel. ²

Between the two penalty trials, defendant wrote letters to Ava Gawronski and others in which he threatened that if he were allowed to live he would continue to cause Ava to suffer by harming her relatives. He testified that his purpose was not to upset the recipients, but to provoke the prosecutor, whose competence he had belittled in the letters, into seeking the second penalty trial because he felt that final determination of the penalty by a jury was "appropriate."

Defendant presented substantially the same mitigating evidence that had been presented at the first penalty trial. He chose, however, to withhold evidence heard by the first penalty jury which suggested that the quality of counseling and the manner in which it was terminated by Ms. Gawronski did not meet professional standards of competence and may have contributed to an emotional and mental turmoil that precipitated defendant's conduct. Instead, defendant stipulated that she had given him the highest possible quality of treatment, and urged the jury to consider only what he did and not whether any emotional or mental state may have affected his actions.

JURY SELECTION--SECOND PENALTY TRIAL

1. Restriction on Voir Dire.

Defendant's claim that the trial court improperly restricted the scope of voir dire during the initial examination of prospective penalty phase jurors lacks merit.

After considering requests for hardship exemptions by the prospective jurors, the court conducted a sequestered voir dire of those remaining (see Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301), limiting that initial examination to "death qualification"--i.e., to determination of whether any prospective juror had such conscientious or religious scruples about capital punishment that his views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." (Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581. See also Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 765, 251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260.) In an effort to determine whether the evidence of serious burn injuries suffered by the victims would cause a jury to automatically vote for the death penalty, defendant sought to inquire about the prospective jurors' attitudes toward such injuries. The People objected and, at that stage of the examination, ³ the court ruled that the jury would not be told of the injuries suffered by Ava Gawronski, and defendant would not be permitted to ask the prospective jurors if knowledge of the extent of those injuries would affect their ability to perform their duties.

It is true that counsel must be permitted to ask questions of prospective jurors that might lead to challenges for cause. (People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 407, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869.) The inquiry that defendant sought to make was not relevant to the death qualification process, however. The Witherspoon- Witt (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844; Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776) voir dire seeks to determine only the views of the prospective jurors about capital punishment in the abstract, to determine if any, because of opposition to the death penalty, would "vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence produced at trial." (People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 250, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906; Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 416, 105 S.Ct. 844, 848.) Such a juror may be excused because he or she would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. The inquiry is directed to whether, without knowing the specifics of the case, the juror has an "open mind" on the penalty determination. There was no error in ruling that questions related to the jurors' attitudes toward evidence that was to be introduced in this trial could not be asked during the sequestered Witherspoon- Witt voir dire. ⁴

The power of the judge to control the proceedings includes the exercise of discretion over the manner in which the voir dire will be conducted. (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 542-544, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) No abuse of that discretion occurred here. Defendant was not precluded from attempting to show in the subsequent general voir dire that a juror harbored any specific bias that would cause him to vote for the death penalty without regard to mitigating evidence, and thus should be excused for cause. Since defendant did not do so, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, he is precluded from arguing on appeal that the jury was not properly constituted. (People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 749, 770, 251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260.)

2. Death Qualification.

We also reject, as we have in past cases, the suggestion that the death qualification process is impermissible because...