Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc.

Decision Date19 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-316.,00-316.
Citation2002 WY 113,50 P.3d 697
PartiesCatherine A. VALANCE, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jeanne V. Miles, deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. VI-DOUG, INCORPORATED, a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a Village Inn Restaurant, Appellee (Defendant).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, WY, Representing Appellant.

Peter S. Dusbabek and Steven G. Greenlee of Montgomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio, Dusbabek & Parker, L.L.P., Fort Collins, CO, Representing Appellee.

Before HILL, C.J.; GOLDEN, LEHMAN,1 and KITE, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. (Ret.). KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Jeanne Miles, age seventy-five, was opening the front door of a restaurant when the wind forcefully caught the door. A sign posted on the door instructed: "Please Hold Door Tight Due to Wind." Mrs. Miles claimed she did what the sign instructed her to do. The force of the wind on the door caused her to fall onto the concrete walkway, breaking her hip. In her personal injury action against VI-Doug, Incorporated, a Wyoming corporation doing business as Village Inn Restaurant, Mrs. Miles alleged this event was caused by VI-Doug's failure to provide a reasonably safe entryway for its patrons. VI-Doug moved for summary judgment, contending, just as a restaurant does not owe a duty to protect its patrons from the effects of natural accumulations of snow and ice on its premises, it does not owe a duty to protect them from the effects of naturally occurring wind on its premises. In addition to disputing application of the "open-and-obvious-danger" exception in the context of wind, Mrs. Miles contended the sign instructing patrons to tightly hold the door also violated VI-Doug's duty to maintain the restaurant's premises in a reasonably safe condition. Simply stated, Mrs. Miles claimed the sign as worded, if heeded by a patron, created a hazardous condition.

[¶ 2] The district court ruled, first, that the open-and-obvious-danger exception applies to naturally occurring forces of wind just as it does to natural accumulations of snow and ice. Secondly, it determined reasonable minds could not differ that VI-Doug did not violate its duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for its patrons by placing the sign as worded on the restaurant's front door.

[¶ 3] Affirming the district court's first ruling, we hold the open-and-obvious-danger exception does apply to naturally occurring forces of wind. Reversing the district court's second ruling, we hold genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the sign violated VI-Doug's duty to maintain the restaurant's premises in a reasonably safe condition for its patrons.

ISSUES

[¶ 4] Catherine A. Valance, personal representative of the Estate of Jeanne V. Miles (the personal representative),2 presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the district court erroneously revive the absolute defenses of act of God and assumption of risk?
2. Did the district court err when it held that the open and obvious danger rule eliminates liability for dangers which exist on premises?
3. Did the district court err when it determined as a matter of law that a restaurant owner has no responsibility for any hazard or injury involving wind?
4. Did the district court err when it created an "open-and-obvious-natural-accumulation-of-wind" immunity rule; if not, was the incident in question really a "natural accumulation of wind" case when the record shows that manmade objects, such as a door and a building, were intimately involved in the injury?
5. Did the district court err when it ruled that a restaurant owner has no duty to guard against wind-related injuries on its premises?
6. Did the district court err in holding as a matter of law that no reasonable juror could find that a danger was created by a sign which instructed customers to bind themselves to a powerful wind blown door?
7. Did the district court err when it ruled that restaurant owners have no duty [to] minimize dangers created by the effect of wind on the doors of their premises?
8. Did the district court err in determining that [there] were no disputed issues of material fact?
9. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment against the plaintiff?

VI-Doug phrases the issues as:

1. Did the district court properly rule as a matter of law that VI-Doug, Incorporated had no duty to protect Ms. Miles against harm caused by the wind?
2. Did the district court properly rule as a matter of law that VI-Doug did not breach any duty by placing a sign on or near the door of its restaurant which stated "Please hold door tight due to wind["?]
FACTS

[¶ 5] We view the record on appeal in the light most favorable to Mrs. Miles who opposed VI-Doug's motion for summary judgment, affording her all the favorable inferences which can be drawn from the record. On March 5, 1999, Mrs. Miles went to the Village Inn Restaurant in Douglas with her grandson. She recalled that it was a terribly windy day. Her grandson let her off in front of the entrance to the restaurant, and he parked the car. Mrs. Miles testified she saw a sign posted on the door instructing patrons to hold the door tightly due to possible high winds. She maintained she followed the sign's directions and held on tightly to the door. Mrs. Miles claimed that, as she opened the door, a strong gust of wind caught it and caused her to fall to the ground. As a result of her fall, she suffered a broken hip that required surgery. The owner of VI-Doug testified that, three or four months prior to Mrs. Miles' accident, another woman was slightly injured under very similar circumstances. Subsequent to this incident, VI-Doug sought bids to construct an effective windbreak although one was not constructed until after Mrs. Miles was injured.

[¶ 6] Mrs. Miles alleged VI-Doug was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe entry for its patrons and claimed damages for her resulting severe physical injuries. On October 16, 2000, the district court granted VI-Doug's motion for summary judgment concluding the same policy reasons that support the open-and-obvious-danger exception and the natural-accumulation-of-ice-and-snow rule, which immunize defendants from liability, applied equally to wind. The district court also concluded the wind that caused Mrs. Miles' injuries was naturally occurring. It granted summary judgment because (1) VI-Doug had no duty to protect Mrs. Miles from harm inflicted by the wind and (2) VI-Doug's placement of the sign on the restaurant's front door did not violate its duty to maintain a reasonably safe premises. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 7]

Summary judgment is proper, even in negligence cases, when there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When we review a motion for summary judgment, we view the record on appeal in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and accept all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the record in favor of that party.

Paulson v. Andicoechea, 926 P.2d 955, 957 (Wyo.1996) (citations omitted). "Summary judgment is not favored in negligence actions and is subject to more exacting scrutiny. However, even in negligence actions, summary judgment may be appropriate, especially if a plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a duty on the part of a defendant." Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted); see also McCoy v. Crook County Sheriff's Department, 987 P.2d 674, 676 (Wyo.1999). Consequently, to prevail on her negligence claim, Mrs. Miles had to show VI-Doug owed her a duty of care. Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, Ltd., 990 P.2d 491, 495 (Wyo.1999); Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo.1995).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] The elements a plaintiff must establish to maintain a negligence action are: (1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached the duty of care, (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money damages. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County by Teton County Sheriff's Department v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1086 (Wyo. 2000). In this case, we are required to address the first element: whether a duty exists. The application of the natural accumulation rule and the open-and-obvious-danger exception determines whether the defendant has a duty. Selby, 990 P.2d at 494. This is a question of law that the courts normally determine. Id. We have, however, recognized that in certain instances the question of the existence of a duty hinges upon the initial determination of certain basic facts and, in those circumstances, the initial determination of those basic facts is properly placed before the trier of fact. Id.

[¶ 9] "As a general rule, a possessor of land owes a duty to his business invitees to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition." Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 895 (Wyo.1994). VI-Doug, as the possessor of land in this case, relies on the recognized open-and-obvious-danger exception and posits that wind is like a natural accumulation of ice or snow in that it is a force of nature, an element of weather, and a naturally occurring phenomenon which a business invitee encounters off the business premises as well as when entering the business premises. The issues in this appeal are whether the natural accumulation rule and the open-and-obvious-danger exception are applicable to injuries resulting from naturally occurring wind and, if so, whether VI-Doug created a hazard on the restaurant's premises by posting a sign on its door directing patrons to take specific action when they encountered the natural effect of the wind on the restaurant's door.

[¶ 10] It is important to note that one of the underlying principles of the...

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