Gaines v. The Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 20 October 1864
• Citation: 50 Pa. 319
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Gaines <I>versus</I> The Commonwealth.

50 Pa. 319

Gaines versus The Commonwealth.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 20, 1864.

ERROR to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Clinton county.

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John H. Orvis, S. R. Peale, and H. N. McAllister, for plaintiff in error.

G. O. Deise (with whom were Mayer & Ball), for the Commonwealth.

The opinion of the court was delivered, October 20th 1864, by STRONG, J.

This case has been argued with great zeal and ability on behalf of the plaintiff in error, and for the Commonwealth with much candour and fairness. Assisted by the argument we have carefully reviewed the record, and have come to the conclusion that but one of the assignments of error can be sustained.

William Gaines, the defendant below, now plaintiff in error, was indicted for the murder of Robert Gaines. That the deceased had been murdered was not controverted at the trial. The thing in contest was whether the defendant was the person who had perpetrated the crime. That he was, the Commonwealth sought to establish, not by direct evidence, but by proof of circumstances inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis. To the existence of some of these circumstances, one Absalom Smoke was called to testify, and, as preparatory to an assault on his credibility he was asked on cross-examination whether, in a conversation with Susan Potter, shortly before the death of Robert Gaines, he had not complained of illicit intercourse between Robert Gaines and his (the witness's) wife, and whether he had not stated that he would watch his opportunity to catch Gaines in the act, and take his revenge. In answer to this question he denied having had any such conversation with Susan Potter, and declared that he did not recollect ever saying anything to her, or to anybody else, about Gaines having intercourse with his wife. When the evidence in chief for the Commonwealth was closed, Susan Potter was called by the defendant, and she testified that Absalom Smoke had made to her the complaints and had uttered the threats which he had disavowed on his cross-examination. It was then proposed to follow this evidence by the testimony of one Susan Smoke, that he had made similar declaration to her. The offer was made avowedly for the purpose of contradicting and discrediting him. Several objections were made to it, and the offer was overruled by the court. The reason assigned for its rejection was, that "as Absalom Smoke had been cross-examined as to collateral matter, his answer was conclusive on the defendant and could not be contradicted." It is very necessary to a correct decision of the question whether the court was right in overruling this offer, that the avowed purpose for which the evidence was submitted should be kept steadily in view. To that the plaintiff in error must be confined. The relevancy of the evidence to the issue, had it been offered generally, need neither be affirmed nor denied. A party cannot offer evidence for a specified purpose, and complain when it has been rejected that it was legitimate for another and distinct object. In Carpenter v. Wall, 11 A. & E. 803, it was ruled that where evidence had been offered in contradiction of a witness which was inadmissible, because the witness had not been cross-examined particularly respecting the matter, it was not error to reject it, though it would have been competent generally in the cause. Here Susan Smoke's testimony was tendered to show that Absalom Smoke had testified to what was untrue, and to discredit him generally, not to prove that he was himself the murderer. The question, therefore, is not whether the fact that he made complaints of Robert Gaines and threatened to be revenged was admissible in evidence for any purpose, but whether it was competent as a means of impeaching his testimony. If it was collateral to the issue, the court was right in overruling the offer of Susan Smoke's testimony, for the rule is settled that a witness may not be cross-examined as to a distinct collateral fact for the purpose of afterwards impeaching his testimony by contradicting him: 1 Stark. Ev. 134-5. The same writer asserts the doctrine, that should such questions be answered, evidence cannot afterwards be adduced for the purpose of contradiction. He adds that the same rule obtains if a question as to a collateral fact be put for the purpose of discrediting his testimony: "his answer must be taken as conclusive, and no evidence can afterwards be admitted to contradict it."

Now that the proposed testimony of Susan Smoke was to some extent contradictory to the answer made by Absalom Smoke to the question put to him on his cross-examination, is manifest. In his answer he denied any recollection of having made to Susan Potter, or anybody else, such complaints or threats as the rejected witness was called to prove he had made. Was, then, the fact that he had made such statements and threats immaterial and collateral? The court below thought it was, and therefore refused to permit Susan Smoke to contradict him. In this we think there was error. Throwing out of consideration the inquiry, as not raised by the record, whether the fact was not pertinent, as an independent circumstance, tending to show that some other than the defendant, to wit, Smoke himself, had perpetrated the murder, had it not a direct bearing upon the motives operating upon the mind of Absalom Smoke when he testified? It surely had a tendency to show ill feeling in him towards the deceased. It would have been a circumstance to be considered, had the question been directly whether he was guilty of the murder, especially when taken in connection with other evidence which had been given. It furnished an additional ground of suspicion, though it may have been slight, that he might have had something to do with the crime, perpetrated as it was by an unseen hand. All this he must have known. And if so, he must have testified with the knowledge that there were suspicious circumstances pointing more or less distinctly at him. Was this no motive to make the case as strong as possible against another, and thus divert suspicion from himself? The motives which operate upon the mind of a witness when he testifies are never regarded as immaterial or collateral matters. They may, therefore, be proved: 1 Whart. Crim. Law, 5th ed., § 817; People v. Austin, 1 Parker's C. C. R. 154. It is for this reason that the feelings of a witness towards one of the parties to an issue may be proved. Partiality and hostility are no more cogent motives to untruthfulness than is the common and natural desire to ward off suspicion of guilt from one's self,...