McEvily v. District of Columbia, 84-979.
| Decision Date | 27 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-979.,84-979. |
| Citation | 500 A.2d 1022 |
| Parties | Robert E. McEVILY, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Intervenor. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Peter J. Vangsnes, with whom James F. Green, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for petitioner.
Edward E. Schwab, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Inez Smith Reid, Corp. Counsel, John H. Suda, Principal Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on Memorandum in Lieu of Brief, for respondent.
Patricia A. Brannan, with whom Vincent H. Cohen, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for intervenor.
Before NEBEKER and FERREN, Associate Judges, and PAIR, Senior Judge.
Petitioner Robert E. McEvily appeals a decision of the Department of Employment Services (DOES) denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits. He contends that the Director erred in adopting the conclusion of the hearing examiner that petitioner's depression did not arise out of his employment and consequently should be denied benefits. We disagree and affirm.
Petitioner was employed in the personnel department of the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority (WMATA) as head of the employee benefits branch from 1974 until he stopped working on December 1, 1982. Petitioner initially had a positive working experience at WMATA and generally enjoyed a good relationship with his supervisor, the Director of Personnel. In 1980, however, petitioner began to experience frustrations at work after an outside management consultant recommended that several managerial changes be made in the personnel department. Although the consultant's report did not make any negative comments about petitioner's performance, there is some indication that his supervisor resigned as a result of the report.
Subsequent to this reorganization, petitioner reported directly to the Assistant General Manager for Administration, Mrs. Carmen Turner. Although petitioner was not criticized or embarrased by Mrs. Turner, he became frustrated by her failure to respond promptly to his work products and by what he perceived as her inattentiveness to his professional needs. Specifically, petitioner felt that Mrs. Turner disregarded or forgot to review most of his work, declined to act on or approve any of his recommendations or proposals, and intervened in his longstanding practice of dealing directly with the Board of Directors. Believing that it was necessary for his mental health to give up his job, petitioner stopped working on December 1, 1982.1
Subsequently, petitioner filed a claim pursuant to The Workers Compensation Act (Act), D.C.Code § 36-301, et seq. (1981), seeking compensation benefits for a psychiatric disability in the form of a depressive reaction. Following a hearing at which petitioner testified on his own behalf, the hearing examiner concluded that petitioner's depression did not arise out of his employment and recommended that the claim be denied.2 In the Final Compensation order dated July 18, 1984, the Director adopted the recommendation of the examiner, concluding that petitioner's evidence did not give a "rationalized account of the causal relationship between the depression and [petitioner's] work." On appeal, petitioner claims that such a causal relationship exists and that it was error to find otherwise. We disagree and affirm.
Our review of administrative proceedings is limited. We should not disturb a decision if it rationally flows from the facts relied upon and those facts or findings are substantially supported by the evidence of record. Selk v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 497 A.2d 1056, 1058 (D.C.1985); Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, 377 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C. 1977); see D.C.Code § 1-1510(a)(3)(E) (1981). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison. Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct, 206, 216, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938). The hearing examiner in this case had substantial evidence to support his conclusion that petitioner's depression did not arise out of his employment...
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Mccamey v. Dept. of Employment Services, No. 04-AA-211.
...law involving the application of an objective test to psychological disability claims begins with McEvily v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 500 A.2d 1022 (D.C. 1985). In McEvily, the claimant served as head of WMATA's employee benefits branch. Despite initially having a po......
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SPARTIN v. DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
...(quoting School Dist. v. ILHR Dep't, 62 Wis.2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974)).7 This court's decision in McEvily v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 500 A.2d 1022 (D.C. 1985), is also arguably consistent with the Dailey In any event, neither the Hearing Examiner nor the Directo......
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Pierce v. POLICE & FIREFIGHTERS'RET. BD., No. 03-AA-504.
...This standard is in accord with decisions of this court in the worker's compensation arena, see McEvily v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 500 A.2d 1022, 1023 (D.C. 1985) (affirming the denial of worker's compensation benefits where the claimant alleged employment harassmen......
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Jones v. D.C. Dept. of Employment Services
...Hoage, we perceive no reason why the definition is susceptible of such an exception.5 Indeed, in McEvily v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 500 A.2d 1022 (D.C. 1985), in which we sustained DOES' determination that petitioner's psychiatric disability was not caused by......