500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), 72-2518, Imbler v. Pachtman
|Citation:||500 F.2d 1301|
|Party Name:||Paul Kern IMBLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard PACHTMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||July 12, 1974|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Roger S. Hanson (argued) of Hanson & Milman, Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard G. Brungard, Deputy County Counsel (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Before KOELSCH, HUFSTEDLER and KILKENNY, Circuit Judges.
KOELSCH, Circuit Judge:
This matter has a long history. In 1961 plaintiff-appellant Imbler was convicted on a murder charge in Los Angeles Superior Court and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed. People v. Imbler, 57 Cal.2d 711, 21 Cal.Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304 (1962). Thereafter, Imbler's state habeas corpus petition was denied following an evidentiary hearing. In re Imbler, 60 Cal.2d 554, 35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6 (1963). A subsequent writ set aside the death penalty, In re Imbler, 61 Cal.2d 556, 39 Cal.Rptr. 375, 393 P.2d 687 (1964); and when the state declined to prosecute another 'penalty trial,' Imbler was given a life sentence.
In 1969 the United States District Court, concluding that Imbler's conviction was secured in part by testimony the prosecution knew, or had strong reason to know, was perjured, granted him a writ of habeas corpus. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F.Supp. 795, 809 (1969). We affirmed, Imbler v. Craven, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865, 91 S.Ct. 100, 27 L.Ed.2d 104.
Imbler then brought this suit for damages. So far as need be noticed, his allegations in substance are that the defendant Pachtman, the district attorney who prosecuted the criminal charges on behalf of the State of California, had knowingly, maliciously, etc., used perjured testimony to secure a conviction and hence was liable in damages for violation of his, Imbler's, civil rights. The district judge dismissed Imbler's complaint as to Pachtman without leave to amend; he ruled that Pachtman, as a prosecuting attorney, enjoyed an immunity from suit for acts committed 'in the performance of duties constituting an integral part of the judicial process . . .', Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968); see Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965); and that as a matter of law the acts complained of came within a quasi-judicial prosecutorial function to which immunity attached. Imbler appeals. 1 We affirm.
The district court's dismissal of appellant's claim was consistent with our prior decisions. Ney v. State of California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970); Marlowe v. Coakley, supra; Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966); Robichaud v. Ronan, supra; Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1964); Harmon v. Superior Court, 329 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1964); Sires v. Cole,320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963). The acts of the defendant which allegedly harmed appellant occurred during prosecutorial activities which can only be characterized as an 'integral part of the judicial process.' 2 All involved the questioning of
a witness during the 1961 criminal prosecution. 3
Appellant, in effect, urges us to reject the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity and overrule a long line of this court's decisions. We decline to do so. The protection given a prosecutor acting in his quasi-judicial role protects not simply the prosecutor, but, more importantly, the effective operation of the judicial process, and hence the 'common good.' Because both the honest and dishonest are insulated, on occasion an injury without redress inevitably results; but, as well expressed by Judge Learned Hand:
'It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The jurisdiction for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. Judged as res nova, we should not hesitate to follow the path laid down in the books.' Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
As indicated earlier, the issue is not 'res nova' in this circuit. 4 The 'balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative' has consistently been struck in...
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