501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974), 73-1655, Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n (AAA)

• Docket Number: 73-1655.
• Date: 16 July 1974
• Citation: 501 F.2d 25
• Parties: Larry E. WRIGHT, Appellee, v. ARKANSAS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION (AAA), Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

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501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974)

Larry E. WRIGHT, Appellee,

v.

ARKANSAS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION (AAA), Appellant.

No. 73-1655.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

July 16, 1974

Submitted Jan. 17, 1974.

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Eugene R. Warren, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.

Robert M. Ford, Killough & Ford, Wynne, Ark., for appellee.

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Before MEHAFFY, Chief Judge, and LAY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Larry E. Wright, a teacher and coach at the Blytheville, Arkansas, Senior High School, brought this action against the Arkansas Activities Association (AAA), challenging a disciplinary ruling of the Executive Committee of the AAA.

The AAA is a voluntary association, the membership of which consists of public and parochial schools in Arkansas which maintain competitive athletic programs. The disciplinary ruling grew out of 'off-season' football practices conducted at Blytheville in violation of AAA regulations. The challenged ruling placed Blytheville High School on probation for one year conditioned upon the school's not employing Wright as head football coach for the 1973-74 school year. Blytheville was notified that if it failed to accept the terms of the probation, it would not be allowed to participate in football games with other member schools. Wright was accordingly requested to resign from his $11,994.93 per year coaching and teaching position with the school.

The district court held that the AAA's 'off-season' football practice regulation did not give Wright fair notice of the possible sanction for its violation, i.e., the impairment of his employment contract as a teacher and coach. ¹ In view of Wright's property interest, the district court held the particular regulation upon which the penalty was based overly broad and unconstitutional. Jurisdiction was found to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

At oral argument before this court, the AAA challenged the finding of jurisdiction under § 1983 in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973). In reliance on the holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), that municipalities are not 'persons' under § 1983 for purposes of damage suits, the Court in Bruno concluded that the generic word 'person' was not 'intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them.' Bruno, supra at 513, 93 S.Ct. at 2226. Thus, the Court held that municipal corporations are not 'persons' for purposes of equitable relief under § 1983.

It is now urged by the Activities Association that it should enjoy the same immunity granted to municipal corporations and other political subdivisions, and therefore that it is not amenable to suit under § 1983. The district court recognized that the State of Arkansas and its regularly constituted agencies are not subject to suit. It concluded, however, that the AAA is not a 'regularly constituted agency.' The trial judge wrote:

The Court finds that the Association was not created by the Constitution or by any statute of the State of Arkansas, and that it is not 'the State' or an 'agency of the State' as are agencies like the Arkansas State Highway Department, or the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, or other administrative or regulatory agencies of a similar nature. Rather, the Association is a regulatory agency established and supported by local school systems in the State on a voluntary basis. Thus, it is not immune from suit, and any decree that may be entered against it will operate upon its Executive Committee and Executive Director. ²

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We find the district court's characterization of the AAA correct and therefore conclude that the Association does qualify as a 'person' under § 1983 and jurisdiction is vested under § 1343(3) as alleged. However, assuming this conclusion wrong and that the AAA is a political subdivision of the state as it is urged, nevertheless, under the complaint filed, the defendant would still be subject to the equitable decree of the federal court since jurisdiction can be found under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ³

The AAA's original ruling specifically directed that Blytheville High School suspend Wright from his coaching position for one year. It later revised its order and gave the school district the choice of suspension or probation conditioned on Wright's dismissal. Regardless of the formal phraseology of its order, it is clear that the AAA's action was directed against Wright personally and sought his dismissal from the position of teacher-coach at Blytheville High School. The charges were directed against Wright; notice was given to him personally and he was accorded a hearing before the Committee. There can be little argument that the Executive Committee's main purpose was to take punitive action against Wright. Whether the AAA acted directly or indirectly against Wright has little relevance under the circumstances. Its stranglehold over the school district caused the latter to terminate Wright's contract. If that termination was the result of coercion improperly applied by the AAA, the AAA is guilty of a wrongful interference with Wright's coaching contract and the latter has standing to sue for vindication of his injury.

This brings us to the fundamental question of whether the conduct of the AAA denied Wright due process of law. Wright was found to have violated the 'off-season' practice rule, found in Article VII of the Association By-Laws. Article VII prescribes no penalty or sanction for a violation of its terms. The AAA relied, however, on § 22 of Article I to impose the penalty against Wright. ⁴ The difficulty posed is that Article I deals exclusively with the subject of player eligibility. Under the circumstances, the district court found that Wright could not know that the sanctions existing under § 22 of Article I could be invoked against him for a violation of Article VII.

One of the fundamental requirements of fairness implicit within due process is 'warning . . . in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.' McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931)

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(per Justice Holmes). Legal notice to those affected has always been a prerequisite to lawful punitive action. Cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 n. 4, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). ⁵

In the present case Wright was given notice by the AAA rules that a member school was prohibited from engaging in football practice before a specific date each year. However, there was no warning that the AAA could decree punitive sanctions directly affecting his contract of employment if that rule was broken. We agree with the district court that the attempt by the Association's Executive Committee to punish Wright without fair notice that his employment contract could be coercively terminated if he violated the AAA's rules was fundamentally wrong. ⁶ Wright's employment was and must continue to be a matter of concern solely between him and his school. Even though it might be argued that Wright had fair notice that certain conduct was prohibited and that it might subject the school to punitive sanctions, there has been no showing that he had notice the AAA could directly or indirectly punish him personally. The regulation itself must provide specific notice; its scope cannot depend upon the subjective appraisals of those involved. Bouie v. City of...