Connecticut v. Doehr

Citation111 S.Ct. 2105,501 U.S. 1,115 L.Ed.2d 1
Decision Date06 June 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-143,90-143
PartiesCONNECTICUT and John F. Digiovanni, Petitioners, v. Brian K. DOEHR
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

A Connecticut statute authorizes a judge to allow the prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing upon the plaintiff's verification that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of his or her claim. Petitioner DiGiovanni applied to the State Superior Court for such an attachment on respondent Doehr's home in conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery that he was seeking to institute against Doehr in the same court. The application was supported by an affidavit in which DiGiovanni, in five one-sentence paragraphs, stated that the facts set forth in his previously submitted complaint were true; declared that the assault by Doehr resulted in particular injuries requiring expenditures for medical care; and stated his "opinion" that the foregoing facts were sufficient to establish probable cause. On the strength of these submissions, the judge found probable cause and ordered the attachment. Only after the sheriff attached the property did Doehr receive notice of the attachment, which informed him of his right to a postattachment hearing. Rather than pursue this option, he filed a suit in the Federal District Court, claiming that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That court upheld the statute, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the statute violated due process because, inter alia, it permitted ex parte attachment absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances, see, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406, and the nature of the issues at stake in this case increased the risk that attachment was wrongfully granted, since the fact-specific event of a fist fight and the question of assault are complicated matters that do not easily lend themselves to documentary proof, see id., at 609-610, 94 S.Ct., at 1901.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

898 F.2d 852 (CA 2 1990), affirmed.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, concluding that:

1. Determining what process must be afforded by a state statute enabling an individual to enlist the State's aid to deprive another of his or her property by means of prejudgment attachment or similar procedure requires (1) consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure; (2) an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards; and (3) principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18. Pp. 9-11.

2. Application of the Mathews factors demonstrates that the Connecticut statute, as applied to this case, violates due process by authorizing prejudgment attachment without prior notice and a hearing. Pp. 11-18.

(a) The interests affected are significant for a property owner like Doehr, since attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause. That these effects do not amount to a complete, physical, or permanent deprivation of real property is irrelevant, since even the temporary or partial impairments to property rights that such encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protection. See, e.g., Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85, 108 S.Ct. 896, 899, 99 L.Ed.2d 75. Pp. 11-12.

(b) Without preattachment notice and a hearing, the risk of erroneous deprivation that the State permits here is too great to satisfy due process under any of the interpretations of the statutory "probable cause" requirement offered by the parties. If the statute merely demands inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint, or, still less, the plaintiff's good-faith belief that the complaint is sufficient, the judge could authorize deprivation of the defendant's property when the claim would fail to convince a jury, when it rested on factual allegations that were sufficient to state a cause of action but which the defendant would dispute, or in the case of a good-faith standard, even when the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Even if the provision requires a finding of probable cause to believe that judgment will be rendered in the plaintiff's favor, the reviewing judge in a case like this could make no realistic assessment based on the plaintiff's one-sided, self-serving, and conclusory affidavit and complaint, particularly since the issue does not concern ordinarily uncomplicated matters like the existence of a debt or delinquent payments that lend themselves to documentary proof. See Mitchell, supra, 416 U.S., at 609, 94 S.Ct., at 1901. Moreover, the safeguards that the State does afford—an "expeditious" postattachment notice and an adversary hearing, judicial review of an adverse decision, and a double damages action if the original suit is commenced without probable cause—do not adequately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation under Mitchell, since none of the additional factors that diminished the need for a predeprivation hearing in that case—that the plaintiff had a vendor's lien to protect, that the likelihood of recovery involved uncomplicated, documentable matters, and that the plaintiff was required to post a bond—is present here. Although a later hearing might negate the presence of probable cause, this would not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented. Pp. 12-15.

(c) The interests in favor of an ex parte attachment, particularly DiGiovanni's interests, are too minimal to justify the burdening of Doehr's ownership rights without a hearing to determine the likelihood of recovery. Although DiGiovanni had no existing interest in Doehr's real estate when he sought the attachment, and his only interest was to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy his judgment if he prevailed on the merits of his action, there were no allegations that Doehr was about to transfer or encumber his real estate or take any other action during the pendency of the suit that would render his property unavailable to satisfy a judgment. Absent such allegations, there was no exigent circumstance permitting the postponement of notice or hearing until after the attachment was effected. Moreover, the State's substantive interest in protecting DiGiovanni's de minimis rights cannot be any more weighty than those rights themselves, and the State cannot seriously plead additional financial or administrative burdens involving predeprivation hearings when it already claims to provide an immediate post-deprivation hearing. P. 16.

3. Historical and contemporary practice support the foregoing analysis. Attachment measures in both England and this country have traditionally had several limitations that reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation, including requirements that the defendant had taken or threatened some action that would place satisfaction of the plaintiff's potential award in jeopardy, that the plaintiff be a creditor, as opposed to the victim of a tort, and that the plaintiff post a bond. Moreover, a survey of current state attachment provisions reveals that nearly every State requires either a preattachment hearing, a showing of some exigent circumstance, or both, before permitting an attachment to take place. Although the States for the most part no longer confine attachments to creditor claims, this development only increases the importance of the other limitations. Pp. 16-18.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and III, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Henry S. Cohn, Hartford, Conn., for petitioners.

Joanne S. Faulkner, New Haven, Conn., for respondent.

Justice WHITE delivered an opinion, Parts I, II, and III of which are the opinion of the Court.**

This case requires us to determine whether a state statute that authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing, without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, and without a requirement that the person seeking the attachment post a bond, satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that, as applied to this case, it does not.

I

On March 15, 1988, Petitioner John F. DiGiovanni submitted an application to the Connecticut Superior Court for an attachment in the amount of $75,000 on respondent Brian K. Doehr's home in Meridan, Connecticut. DiGiovanni took this step in conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery that he was seeking to institute against Doehr in the same court. The suit did not involve Doehr's real estate nor did DiGiovanni have any pre-existing interest either in Doehr's home or any of his other property.

Connecticut law authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without affording prior notice or the opportunity for a prior hearing to the individual whose property is subject to the attachment. The State's prejudgment remedy statute provides, in relevant part:

"The cou...

To continue reading

Request your trial
440 cases
  • Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • 28 March 2012
    ...a total or physical seizure of a property can deprive an owner of a property interest. Id.; see, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11–12, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991);United States v. 408 Peyton Rd. S.W., Atlanta, Fulton Cnty., Ga., 162 F.3d 644, 649 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc).......
  • Rideout v. Riendeau
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 13 November 2000
    ...the natural and fundamental rights of parents to the custody of their children). 13. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10-11, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (noting that prejudgment remedy statutes enable a party to utilize state procedures with the "overt, significant assi......
  • General Elec. Co. v. Jackson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 27 January 2009
    ...by EPA itself and indisputably constitute state action. Hence, neither O'Bannon nor Blum is applicable here. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), on the other hand, does apply, and it requires this Court to reject EPA's argument. In Doehr, a statute provid......
  • U.S. v. Welch, No. 01-4170.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 22 April 2003
    ...and dispose of that thing." Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6, 67 S.Ct. 1047, 91 L.Ed. 1301 (1947); cf. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (noting the intangible "property interests that attachment affects are significant"). Consistent with this vi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
19 books & journal articles
  • Schoolhouse Property.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 No. 5, March 2022
    • 1 March 2022
    ...(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Court has repeated this pronouncement in several cases since. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (285.) Parkin, supra note 26, at 1117. (286.) WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FOOD, NUTRITION, AND HEALTH: FINAL REPORT 216 (1969) ("As a delive......
  • Demystifying antitrust state action doctrine.
    • United States
    • Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol. 24 No. 1, September 2000
    • 22 September 2000
    ...Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377 n.6 (1991) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30 (1968)). (85.) See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10, 14 (1991); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605, 609-10, 6......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • The Path of Constitutional Law Suplemmentary Materials
    • 1 January 2007
    ...51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), 883 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926), 1298 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), 1308 Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 96 S.Ct. 170, 46 L.Ed.2d 152 (1975), 1271 Connick v. Myers, 461 ......
  • Future prospects for mining and public land management: the federal 'retention-disposal' policy enters the twenty-first century.
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Vol. 26 No. 2, June 1996
    • 22 June 1996
    ...deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented." James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 520 quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 15 (1991)). A less expensive remedy for the holder of a valid mining claim seeking access over R.S. 2477 routes might be a state court acti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT