502 F.3d 47 (2nd Cir. 2007), 06-3128, In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation

Docket Nº:06-3128-cv.
Citation:502 F.3d 47
Party Name:In re ELEVATOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION. Transhorn, Ltd., 1775 Housing Associates, Rochdale Village, Inc., Birmingham Building Trades Towers, Inc., Triangle Housing Associates, L.P., Bay Crest Condominium Association, Olen Commercial Realty Corp., Riverbay Corp., 181 Maple Avenue Associates, D.F. Chase, Inc., Lenox Road Associates and Towers of Coral S
Case Date:September 04, 2007
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
 
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502 F.3d 47 (2nd Cir. 2007)

In re ELEVATOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION.

Transhorn, Ltd., 1775 Housing Associates, Rochdale Village, Inc., Birmingham Building Trades Towers, Inc., Triangle Housing Associates, L.P., Bay Crest Condominium Association, Olen Commercial Realty Corp., Riverbay Corp., 181 Maple Avenue Associates, D.F. Chase, Inc., Lenox Road Associates and Towers of Coral Springs Ltd., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Joseph M. Bennardi, doing business as Building Supers of Camden, Inc., doing business as Nedmac Management, Inc., Consolidated-Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

United Technologies Corporation, Otis Elevator Company, Kone Corporation, Kone, Inc., Schindler Holding, Ltd., Schindler Elevator Corporation, ThyssenKrupp AG, ThyssenKrupp Elevator Capital Corp., and ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-3128-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Sept. 4, 2007

         Argued: June 14, 2007.

         Appeal from a judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Griesa, J.) on June 6, 2006, granting defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint and denying leave to re-plead. We affirm.

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         Eric Alan Isaacson (Mark Solomon, Christopher M. Burke, David W. Mitchell, Tami Falkenstein Hennick, on the brief), Lerach, Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

         Mary Jane Fait, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

         Nadeem Faruqi, Antonio Vozzolo, Beth A. Keller, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

         Mark Leddy (Leah Brannon, on the brief), Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees United Technologies Corporation and Otis Elevator Company.

         Kenneth M. Kramer (Jerome S. Fortinsky, Paula Howell, on the brief), Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees Schindler Holding Ltd. and Schindler Elevator Corporation.

         Gerald Zingone (Michael Evan Jaffe, on the brief), Thelen Reid Brown Raysman & Steiner LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees Kone Corporation and Kone, Inc.

         Terry Myers (Anthony A. Dean, on the brief), Gibbons Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee ThyssenKrupp AG.

         Scott Martin (Christopher V. Roberts, on the brief), Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees ThyssenKrupp Elevator Capital Corp., and ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp.

         A. Paul Victor, Dewey Ballantine LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees ThyssenKrupp Elevator Capital Corp., and ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp.

         Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, STRAUB and B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.

         PER CURIAM:

         This appeal is taken from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Griesa, J.), dismissing a complaint alleging that defendant elevator companies conspired to engage in anticompetitive conduct in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (the "conspiracy claims"), and that they unilaterally monopolized and attempted to monopolize the maintenance market for their elevators, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (the "unilateral-monopolization claims"). We affirm. The conspiracy claims provide

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no plausible ground to support the inference of an unlawful agreement, and the allegations of unilateral monopolization fail to allege a prior course of dealing. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing leave to amend the complaint.

         I

         Plaintiffs represent a putative class of persons who "purchased elevators and/or elevator maintenance and repair services from defendants," sellers of elevators and maintenance services.1 2d Am. Compl. pp 5, 20-28. The complaint alleges that:

(1)Defendants conspired to fix prices for the sale and the continuing maintenance of elevators, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Count I);

(2)Defendants conspired to monopolize the markets for the sale and maintenance of elevators, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Count II); and

(3)Each defendant unilaterally monopolized and attempted to monopolize the maintenance market for its own elevators by making it difficult for independent maintenance companies (and each other) to service each defendant's elevators, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Counts III - X).2

         As to the conspiracy claims, plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2000, defendants agreed:

to suppress and eliminate competition in the sale and service of elevators by fixing the price of elevators [and] replacement parts and services, rigging bids for contracts for elevator sales, allocating markets and customers for elevator sales and maintenance services, and rigging bids for contracts for elevator maintenance and repair services.

2d Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Plaintiffs assert that the conspiracy was undertaken (and its effects felt) in Europe as well as in the United States, and that the conspiracy was effected by price fixing, bid rigging, and collusion to drive independent repair companies out of business. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 41-43. The complaint references various investigations into alleged antitrust violations by defendants and their affiliates, one in Italy (1998) and another by the European Commission (2004). 2d Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 62-69.

         As to the unilateral-monopolization claims, plaintiffs assert that each defendant monopolized the maintenance market for its own elevators by such measures as interfering with delivery of replacement parts and intentionally designing their elevators to require proprietary maintenance tools which are not made available to competing service companies (e.g., embedded computer systems that can only be interfaced with defendant-controlled handheld units). 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-57.

         The district court granted defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that the claims lacked the requisite factual predicate. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., No. 04 Civ. 1178, 2006 WL 1470994 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2006). The court denied leave to re-plead and entered

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judgment in favor of defendants. Id. at *12. This appeal followed.

         II

         We review the district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo, see In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir.2006), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 3001, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2007), "draw [ing] all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor," Freedom Holdings Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2004) and accepting as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, see Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 501 (2d Cir.2007).

         We affirm the district court's dismissal of the conspiracy claims because plaintiffs are unable to allege facts that would provide "plausible grounds to infer an agreement," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ---U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "Considerable uncertainty" surrounds the breadth of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Twombly. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2007). But we need not draw fine lines here; our precedents support application of Twombly to the conspiracy claims asserted under both Section 1 and Section 2. 3 To survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly, it is not enough to make allegations of an antitrust conspiracy that are consistent with an unlawful agreement; to be viable, a complaint must contain "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement [to engage in anticompetitive conduct] was made." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to "nudge [plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." 4 Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974.

         Plaintiffs...

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