Zeigler Coal Co. v. Marshall

Decision Date16 December 1980
Docket NumberCiv. No. 80-4494.
Citation502 F. Supp. 1326
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
PartiesZEIGLER COAL COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. F. Ray MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, et al., Defendants.

Charles D. Winters and John S. Brewster, Winters, Brewster, Brown & Permar, Marion, Ill., Alvin J. McKenna and D. Michael Miller, Alexander, Ebinger, Fisher, McAlister & Lawrence, Columbus, Ohio, J. Halbert Woods and John J. Adams, Zeigler Coal Co., Des Plaines, Ill., for plaintiff.

James R. Burgess, Jr., U. S. Atty., East St. Louis, Ill., Frederick W. Moncrief, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Arlington, Va., for defendants.

ORDER

FOREMAN, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff, Zeigler Coal Company, has brought this action seeking a preliminary injunction or in the alternative, a temporary restraining order. The basis of Zeigler's claim for relief lies in its allegations of due process deprivations and the constitutional invalidity of 30 U.S.C. § 815(c), if not facially, at least as applied to Zeigler. These contentions are more fully developed below.

I.

The relevant facts are as follows:

1. Plaintiff, Zeigler Coal Company, is an Illinois corporation engaged in the business of underground mining operations. The mine here involved is its No. 11 Mine in Randolph County, Illinois.

2. On or about December 21, 1979, defendant Gene Hand, who was, prior to that date, a full-time employee of Zeigler, was discharged for insubordination and poor work performance.

3. Mr. Hand soon thereafter filed a complaint with the Mine Safety and Health Administration1 (hereinafter MSHA) alleging that his firing was discriminatory, and, therefore, unlawful. In support of this averment, Hand offered his account of the incidents which he felt contributed to his termination.2

4. By letter dated February 19, 1980, MSHA advised Zeigler of Hand's claim. This letter also stated that MSHA had commenced investigation of the claim as required by statute.3

5. On May 19, 1980, the Secretary of Labor filed an application for temporary reinstatement of Gene Hand in the position from which he was terminated by Zeigler. The application contained a finding by MSHA for the Secretary of Labor that Hand's claim was "not frivolously brought."4 Defendant James A. Broderick, who is the Chief Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter, the "ALJ") for the U. S. Department of Labor, entered an order on May 20, 1980, temporarily reinstating Hand, effective immediately. The ALJ's order noted that the Secretary's finding was not facially arbitrary or capricious.

6. Zeigler then requested hearing on the reinstatement, as was its right pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2700.44 (Revised as of July 1, 1979).5

7. The hearing requested by Zeigler was convened on June 9, 1980, in St. Louis, Missouri, Judge Broderick presiding. The ALJ concluded that the Secretary's decision regarding the frivolousness of Hand's complaint was not arbitrarily or capriciously made.

In addition to the above mentioned motion for injunctive relief filed by Zeigler, the following issues are before the Court for disposition:

A. Zeigler's assertion that defendants are without jurisdiction to consider Hand's claim of discrimination because Hand is not a "miner" within the meaning of 30 U.S.C. § 815(c).

B. Defendants' claim that this Court is without jurisdiction to decide Zeigler's request for injunctive relief. This is contained in defendant Federal Mine Safety and Health Commission's Motion to Dismiss.

The latter mentioned disputes will be addressed prior to proceeding to Zeigler's request for injunctive relief.

II.
A. Defendants' jurisdiction to consider Hand's claim of discrimination.

30 U.S.C. § 815(c) protects "any miner or applicant for employment or representative of miners ..." who believes he has been discharged or reprimanded in violation of the Act. Zeigler has maintained that Hand, who is admittedly a section foreman,6 is not a "miner" as contemplated by the Act and as such has no right to redress through its provisions.

The law is clear that a determination regarding Mr. Hand's status as a "miner" envisioned by the Act is properly left to agency expertise. In the Matter of Sauget Industrial Research and Treatment Association, 477 F.Supp. 88, 90 (S.D.Ill.1979). Following MSHA's investigation of Hand's complaint, an application for his temporary reinstatement was submitted. Paragraph 3 of that application contains the administrative finding that Hand was a "miner" as defined in Section 3(g) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 802(g).

Even if this Court felt the administrative characterization of Hand as a "miner" within the purview of the Act was so arbitrarily made as to require reversal, it would be precluded from disturbing the agency ruling by 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). That subsection specifically designates review of factual determinations to the Court of Appeals for the district in which the violation is alleged to have occurred or in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A person aggrieved by an MSHA Review Commission ruling has 30 days in which to file its objections in the appropriate Court of Appeals. In view of this Court's inability to comment on Hand's status as a "miner" and the passage of more than 30 days since MSHA's findings, it can only be concluded that the defendants' jurisdiction to consider Hand's complaint is unassailable.

B. Defendants' claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Zeigler's Motion for Injunctive Relief.

As noted above, § 816(a)(1) mandates that review of MSHA orders is solely with Circuit Courts of Appeal. Defendants suggest, therefore, that Zeigler's only forum in this matter would have been the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Judicial Circuit. This Court does not agree with defendants.

The intent embodied in the legislative history of MSHA7 viewed in conjunction with restraints generally placed upon the scope of an administrative body's adjudicatory functions compels determination that jurisdiction to decide Zeigler's due process allegations lies properly in this Court.

Under § 816(a)(1), appellate courts are limited in their scope of review to those determinations of the Commission which appear of record. Even then, a court of appeals may not interpose its own judgment regarding the facts presented, but is restricted to ruling whether the Commission's decision is based upon substantial evidence of the record as a whole. The case of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1950), is cited as a guideline. It appears to this Court that the restrictions on judicial review were not implemented for any reason other than to foster two paramount tenets of MSHA; those being minimal judicial interference with the administrative fact finding process and expeditious handling of claims under the Act. To hold that Zeigler's due process claims are within the restrictions of § 816(a)(1) would be wholly inconsistent with MSHA's expressed purposes.

In addition, a curious situation would develop if the Court were to rule with defendants on the issue of jurisdiction. It is well established that as a general rule, federal administrative agencies have no power to pass upon the constitutionality of administrative or legislative action. Spiegel, Inc. v. F. T. C., 540 F.2d 287, 294 (7th Cir. 1976). Resolution of Zeigler's due process claim would then be first dealt with in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This is, of course, untenable as it violates both the letter and intent of MSHA. Under the Act, judicial review of Commission rulings is restricted to the record. When judicial review of agency action is statutorily created, the court's jurisdiction with respect to such review extends as far and no further than the statute authorizes. S. E. C. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 353 U.S. 368, 77 S.Ct. 855, 1 L.Ed.2d 897 (1957); Martin Marietta Corporation v. FTC, 376 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1967).

Accordingly, this Court knows of no reason why it should not entertain Zeigler's due process claim.

III.

As noted above, Zeigler's motion for injunctive relief is predicated upon assertions that it was denied fundamental due process at various stages of the Commission investigation and hearings regarding Mr. Hand's claim that he was terminated in violation of 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1). It is important to note at this juncture that a final decision on the merits of Mr. Hand's claim has not been conducted. That is scheduled for February, 1981. Zeigler's protest centers on the ex parte nature of Hand's temporary reinstatement pursuant to § 815(c) and the manner in which the post-reinstatement hearing held pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2700.44, transpired.

The Court does not feel a lengthy reiteration of the facts will be necessary or helpful.

Since the Court has detected no substantial deviations from statutory mandate committed by defendants in the processing to date of Mr. Hand's claim, such scrutiny would obfuscate the real issue. That issue is whether the temporary reinstatement procedures and subsequent review hearings created by 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) violate the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court thinks not.

To understand properly the problem at hand, it is necessary to examine the legislative history of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 in conjunction with the concept of due process.

The mining of coal and other minerals as well as its concomitant hazards have long been the subjects of legislative concern. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act Amendments Act of 1977 "the Act" represents the latest congressional reaction to the series of tragic disasters which have occurred annually in our nation's mines. A primary objective of the Act is to facilitate claims against noncompliant mine operators and encourage individual miners to aid the enforcement of safety regulations without fear of reprisal. The provision of which Zeigler complains, 30 U.S.C. § 816(c), is so...

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