502 U.S. 9 (1991), 91-311, Mireles v. Waco

• Citation: 502 U.S. 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9, 60 U.S.L.W. 3304, 60 U.S.L.W. 3307
• Party Name: Mireles v. Waco
• Case Date: October 21, 1991
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

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502 U.S. 9 (1991)

112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9, 60 U.S.L.W. 3304, 60 U.S.L.W. 3307

Mireles

v.

Waco

No. 91-311

United States Supreme Court

Oct. 21, 1991

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Respondent Waco, a public defender, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages from, inter alios, petitioner Mireles, a California Superior Court judge, for ordering the police, forcibly and with excessive force, to seize and bring him into the courtroom when he failed to appear for the calling of the calendar. The Federal District Court dismissed the complaint against the judge, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), on the grounds of complete judicial immunity. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the judge was not acting in his judicial capacity when he requested and authorized the use of excessive force.

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Mireles' alleged actions were not taken in his judicial capacity. Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and it can be overcome only if a judge's actions are nonjudicial or were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Here, the judge's function of directing police officers to bring counsel in a pending case before the court is a general function normally performed by a judge. That he may have made a mistake or acted in excess of his authority does not make the act nonjudicial. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227. His action was also taken in the very aid of his jurisdiction over the matter before him, and thus it cannot be said that the action was taken in the absence of jurisdiction.

Certiorari granted; reversed.

Per curiam opinion.

PER CURIAM.

A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson

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v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).^[1] Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion,

it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.

Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872).

In this case, respondent Howard Waco, a Los Angeles County public defender, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against petitioner, Raymond Mireles, a judge of the California Superior Court, and two police officers, for damages arising from an incident in November, 1989, at the Superior Court building in Van Nuys, Cal. Waco alleged that, after he failed to appear for the initial call of Judge Mireles' morning calendar, the judge, "angered by the absence of attorneys from his courtroom," ordered the police officer defendants "to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring plaintiff into his courtroom." App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3, 11 7(a). The officers allegedly "by means of unreasonable force and violence seize[d] plaintiff and remove[d] him backwards" from another courtroom where he was waiting to appear, cursed him, and called him "vulgar and offensive names," then "without necessity, slammed" him through the doors and swinging gates into Judge Mireles' courtroom. Id. at B-4, ¶ 7(c). Judge Mireles, it was alleged, "knowingly and deliberately approved and ratified each of the aforesaid acts" of the police officers. Ibid. Waco demanded general and punitive damages. Id. at B-5 and B-6.

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Judge Mireles moved to dismiss the complaint as to him, pursuant to Civil Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court dismissed the claim against the judge and entered final judgment as to him, pursuant to Civil Rule 54(b), on grounds of "complete judicial immunity." App. to Pet. for Cert. D-2. On Waco's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that judgment. Waco v. Baltad, 934 F.2d 214 (1991). The court determined that Judge Mireles was not immune from suit because his alleged actions were not taken in his judicial capacity. It opined that Judge Mireles would have been acting in his judicial capacity if he had "merely directed the officers to bring Waco to his courtroom, without directing them to use excessive force." Id. at 216. But "[i]f Judge Mireles requested and authorized the use of excessive force, then he would not be acting in his judicial capacity." Ibid.

[112 S.Ct. 288] Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, as we do upon a motion to dismiss, we grant the petition for certiorari and summarily reverse.

Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity).

Rather, our cases make clear that the immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for...