Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Ass'n

• Decision Date: 19 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-2073.,05-2073.
• Citation: 503 F.3d 217
• Parties: Linda LEBOON, Appellant. v. LANCASTER JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER ASSOCIATION.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

503 F.3d 217

Linda LEBOON, Appellant. v. LANCASTER JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER ASSOCIATION.

No. 05-2073.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued on September 26, 2006.

Opinion Filed September 19, 2007.

J. Michael Considine, Jr., Esquire (Argued), West Chester, PA, for Appellant.

Daniel J. Brennan, Esquire, Christine N. Schultz, Esquire (Argued), Susanin, Widman & Brennan, P.C., King of Prussia, PA, for Appellee.

Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

In this employment discrimination case, a former employee of the Lancaster Jewish Community Center claimed discrimination on the basis of religion (evangelical Christianity) and retaliation for protected EEO activity. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.

We first find that we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal although it was filed over 30 days after the docketing of the District Court's summary judgment opinion and order; because the District Court did not comply with the separate-document rule, the employee had 180 days from the date of docketing to file her appeal. Second, we affirm the District Court because (a) during the relevant period the Lancaster Jewish Community Center qualified as a "religious corporation, organization, or institution" exempted from the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII; and (b) the employee has not produced sufficient evidence of a causal link between her alleged EEO activity and her termination. Finally, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the employee's motion to reopen discovery after she had filed a motion for summary judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff-appellant Linda LeBoon, an evangelical Christian, was employed as a bookkeeper by the Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association (LJCC) from November, 1998, until August 30, 2002, when she was terminated.¹

The LJCC was a non-profit corporation located in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Its stated mission was to "enhance and promote Jewish life, identity, and continuity." During the relevant time period it was managed by a Board of Trustees, a number of committees, and an executive director. Its bylaws provided that the rabbis of the three area synagogues serve ex officio as non-voting members of the Board.

The LJCC operated a variety of programs, including a summer camp and preschool, and published a newspaper, the Lancaster Jewish News. It held events for various Jewish holidays, including a Hanukkah dinner. Its funding came from a variety of sources, including an average of 16.5% annually from the Lancaster Jewish Federation during the time of LeBoon's employment. It also received aid from the United Way for certain programs. The remaining sources of revenue were membership dues, program fees, rents, and donations from individuals and synagogues. Membership was open to Jews and Gentiles alike.

At the beginning of 2002, the LJCC hired Natalie Featherman as the new interim Executive Director. It is essentially undisputed that the LJCC was in serious financial trouble when Featherman took over—just one month later, the LJCC held a retreat to discuss money issues.² LeBoon admits to not trusting Featherman and also stated that her relationship with Featherman began to deteriorate in the spring of 2002 because of a memo Featherman wrote directed at two other LJCC employees. LeBoon further stated that Featherman had generally poor relations with the entire LJCC staff.

In March, 2002, a custodian named Troy Rollman was terminated. LeBoon testified she opposed his termination because she believed it was motivated by a disability that resulted in a speech impediment. On May 30, 2002, Featherman terminated Sandy Simms, an African-American employee at Lancaster's Office of Aging, who performed receptionist duties at the LJCC. Simms had failed to arrive at work the previous day and never alerted the LJCC that she would be absent. LeBoon claims, with the support of a coworker's affidavit, that she complained to Featherman that Simms was fired because of her race.

As the spring of 2002 turned to summer, the LJCC's financial prospects did not get any warmer. According to the LJCC, Featherman concluded that LeBoon's position (a full-time bookkeeper) was unnecessary and could be performed by another co-worker. On August 30, 2002, three months after Simms' discharge and six months after Rollman's, Featherman fired LeBoon.

LeBoon filed suit in federal court alleging religious discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful discharge in violation of Pennsylvania's public policy. As relevant for our purposes, she claimed that she was terminated because she is a Christian and Featherman learned that LeBoon had attended a Jews for Jesus concert a few days before her termination, or, alternatively, in retaliation for LeBoon's complaints about the terminations of Rollman and Simms.

With the consent of the parties, the District Court referred this case to the Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R.Civ.P. 73. On December 16, 2004, the Magistrate Judge granted the LJCC's motion for summary judgment and denied LeBoon's cross motion for summary judgment. As to LeBoon's claim of religious discrimination, the Magistrate Judge found that it was precluded by Title VII's exemption of religious corporations from the prohibition against religious discrimination. The Magistrate Judge also dismissed LeBoon's retaliation claim because she failed to establish evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer causality. Finally, the Magistrate Judge dismissed the state law claim for lack of federal jurisdiction.

On December 23, LeBoon filed a motion for reconsideration. In its response, the LJCC conceded that the decision had been based in part on a manifest error of fact regarding the percentage of the LJCC's funding that came from the Lancaster Jewish Federation Campaign. On January 14, 2005, the Magistrate Judge entered an order vacating the order of December 16, "so that the Court may reconsider this matter." After reconsidering the case in light of the correct facts, the Magistrate Judge once again determined that the LJCC was a religious organization exempted from the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII and reissued an order on February 17, 2005, granting the LJCC the same relief it provided in its December 16, 2004, order.

Approximately a week later, LeBoon filed a second motion for reconsideration. The motion was a verbatim copy of the motion for reconsideration filed after the Magistrate Judge's December 16, 2004, ruling. The Magistrate Judge denied this second motion for reconsideration on March 11, 2005. LeBoon filed her notice of appeal on April 4, 2005.

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The LJCC contests our jurisdiction of the appeal, however, on the grounds that LeBoon's notice of appeal was untimely. We have jurisdiction to review our own jurisdiction when it is in doubt, see Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir.1995), and find that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The LJCC argues that we lack jurisdiction of LeBoon's appeal because LeBoon did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the Magistrate Judge's February 17, 2005, order granting, for a second time, the LJCC's motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R.App. P. 4. LeBoon responds that her appeal is timely because her second motion for reconsideration, filed on February 25, 2005, tolled the 30-day limit to file an appeal; since the Magistrate Judge did not rule on that second motion until March 11, 2005, her April 4, 2005, notice of appeal was within the 30-day deadline. Although we question whether a litigant can toll the time for appeal by filing a second, essentially identical motion for reconsideration of a final order, we need not decide the issue. The reason for this is the Magistrate Judge's failure to comply with the separate-order requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Under Rules 58(b) and 79(a), LeBoon had 180 (not 30) days to appeal from the order of February 17, 2005; thus her appeal, noticed on April 4, was timely.

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), notices of appeal must generally be filed "within 30 days after the ... order appealed from is entered." However, "if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1) requires a separate document," the judgment is considered entered "when the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a) and when the earlier of these events occurs: [1] the judgment or order is set forth on a separate document, or [2] 150 days have run from entry of the judgment or order in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)." Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Thus, if a certain order is subject to the separate-document requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and no separate document exists, an appellant has 180 days to file a notice of appeal—150 for the judgment to be considered "entered," plus the usual 30 days from the entry of judgment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1) requires every judgment and amended judgment to be set forth in a separate document unless it is "an order disposing of a motion... (D) for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment, under Rule 59; or (E) for relief under Rule 60." Fed. R.Civ.P. 58(a)(1). To summarize the convoluted procedural history again, the Magistrate Judge initially ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment on December 16, 2004. On December 23, LeBoon filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out a factual error in the court's opinion; in its response, the LJCC conceded that the decision had been based in part on a manifest error of fact. Consequently, on January 14, 2005, the...