Anspach v. Philadelphia, Dept. of Public Health

• Citation: 503 F.3d 256
• Decision Date: 21 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-3632.,05-3632.
• Parties: Melissa L. ANSPACH, a Minor, by and through her Parents and Natural Guardians, Kurt A. ANSPACH and Karen E. Anspach; Kurt A. Anspach; Karen E. Anspach, in their own right, Appellants v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; John F. Domzaliski, Health Commissioner; Louise Lisi; Maria Fedorova; Mary Gilmore, R.N.; Jitendra N. Shah, M.D.; City of Philadelphia.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

503 F.3d 256

Melissa L. ANSPACH, a Minor, by and through her Parents and Natural Guardians, Kurt A. ANSPACH and Karen E. Anspach; Kurt A. Anspach; Karen E. Anspach, in their own right, Appellants v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; John F. Domzaliski, Health Commissioner; Louise Lisi; Maria Fedorova; Mary Gilmore, R.N.; Jitendra N. Shah, M.D.; City of Philadelphia.

No. 05-3632.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued January 16, 2007.

Filed: September 21, 2007.

Joseph P. Stanton, Esq., (Argued), Law Offices of Joseph P. Stanton Jenkintown, PA, Attorney for Appellants.

Jane Lovitch Istvan, Esq., (Argued), Senior Attorney, Appeals, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Romulo L. Diaz, Jr., City Solicitor, Philadelphia, PA, Arthur B. Keppel, Esq., Charles A. Fitzpatrick, Esq., Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellees.

Terry L. Fromson, David S. Cohen, Women's Law Project, Philadelphia, PA, Susan Frietsche, Women's Law Project, Pittsburgh, PA, Paul Messing, Kairys, Rudovsky, Epstein & Messing, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Amici Curiae.

Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Melissa Anspach and her parents brought this action against the city of Philadelphia (the "City") and certain of its employees and agents, including the City's Health Department and the Commissioner of Public Health. Melissa is a 16-year-old unemancipated minor. They allege that agents of the City violated Melissa's constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity and parental guidance, as well as her parents' constitutional right to familial privacy and their parental liberty, by providing Melissa with emergency contraception without notifying her parents, or encouraging her to consult with them.¹ Both Melissa and her parents also allege a violation of their First Amendment right of religious freedom, and several causes of action under state law.

The District Court dismissed the federal constitutional claims pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and remanded the remaining state claims to state court.² This appeal followed.

For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

On January 26, 2004, Melissa Anspach visited a health center operated by the City's Department of Public Health (the "Center"). Melissa had recently engaged in sexual intercourse and feared she may be pregnant. Upon arriving at the Center, she requested a pregnancy test, but a receptionist informed her that pregnancy tests were not being administered that day. Melissa then left the Center but returned a short time later after a friend prompted her to "ask for the morning after pill." Upon her return, Melissa was directed to the pediatric ward where she provided her name and date of birth, thereby disclosing that she was sixteen years of age.

Plaintiffs allege that Melissa then spoke with defendant Maria Fedorova, a social worker, for approximately ten minutes. They discussed sexually transmitted diseases, birth control, and emergency contraception. During the conversation, Fedorova confirmed that the Center could provide pills "that would prevent [Melissa] from getting pregnant," and Melissa requested the pills.

Defendant Mary Gilmore, a registered nurse, next took Melissa's temperature and blood pressure, and gave her four tablets of "Nordette."³ Gilmore told Melissa to take four pills right away and then four more in twelve hours.⁴ Before Melissa took the pills, Gilmore consulted with Fedorova' "to find out how Melissa should take the pills." She also asked Dr. Jitendra Shah if she wanted to examine Melissa. After determining that the doctor did not want to examine Melissa, Gilmore returned to Melissa, who asked if the pills would make her sick. Gilmore consulted with the doctor once again, and the doctor advised Gilmore to tell Melissa to drink ginger ale. Melissa then took the four Nordette pills in the nurse's presence, and went home.

Melissa took the second dose of pills at home at approximately 4:00 A.M. as she had been instructed. After taking the second dose, she experienced severe stomach pains and began vomiting. Melissa's father came to her room and found her lying on the floor. Upon learning that Melissa had taken emergency contraception, Mr. Anspach called their family physician and the poison control center, and then took Melissa to the emergency room of a nearby hospital. Melissa was treated there and released the same day, but subsequently returned because of sub-conjunctive hemorrhaging in her eye that was apparently caused by excessive vomiting.

B.

Plaintiffs thereafter filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia County. They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various claims arising under state law. The suit was subsequently removed to federal court where the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

The parents' § 1983 claims are premised on their contention that Defendants violated their constitutional rights of parental guidance by providing Melissa with medication without parental consent. Melissa alleges that the same conduct violated her constitutional right to bodily integrity and parental guidance under the Fourteenth Amendment. Each of the Plaintiffs claims violations of his or her right to the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.⁵

The District Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. This appeal of the dismissal of the federal constitutional claims followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the order granting the motion to dismiss is plenary. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, id., and view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.2002). In a § 1983 action, "the plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution." Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 847 (3d Cir. 2000).

Although we view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not credit "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir.1997). "[L]egal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Morse, 132 F.3d at 906 n. 8 (quoting Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a cause of action under § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege the deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980); see also Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858, 116 S.Ct. 165, 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995). The Anspachs contend in Count I of their Complaint that Defendants' conduct deprived them of their fundamental right to direct Melissa's rearing and education. In Count II, Melissa alleges that Defendants deprived her of her right to parental guidance and advice in matters relating to medical care. Both counts arise out of the liberty interests guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by providing Melissa with medication that could abort a pregnancy in violation of their religious objections to abortion.

A. Substantive Due Process

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right of parents to care for and guide their children is a protected fundamental liberty interest. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). That constitutional protection is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. 205).

Nevertheless, the parental liberty interest is not absolute. It is well-established that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)). Accordingly, parental interests must be balanced with the child's right to privacy, which is also protected under the Due Process Clause.

This delicate balance is only implicated, however, if the constitutional rights of both the parent and child are involved. "In a typical § 1983 action, a court must initially determine whether the plaintiff has even alleged the deprivation of a right that either federal law or the Constitution protects." Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) ("The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit ... is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.") (quotation omitted)). As we shall explain, the allegations here do not establish the constitutional violation required to maintain an action under § 1983. Thus, we need not decide which...