Taylor v. Horn

Decision Date20 September 2007
Docket NumberNo. 04-9016.,04-9016.
Citation504 F.3d 416
PartiesPaul Gamboa TAYLOR, Appellant v. Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Gregory R. White, Superintendent of SCI Pittsburgh; Joseph Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of SCI Rockview.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Stuart Suss, Esq. (Argued), Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General, Appeals and Legal Services Section, Norristown, PA, for Martin Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Gregory White, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh; and Joseph P. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Rockview.

BEFORE: BARRY, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Paul Gamboa-Taylor ("Taylor") is a Pennsylvania inmate sentenced to death by a Pennsylvania state court for murdering his wife, Valerie, their two children, and his mother-in-law's child. He is also serving a life sentence for murdering his mother-in-law, Donna Barshinger. On federal habeas review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the District Court concluded that none of Taylor's guilt or penalty-phase claims merited a writ of habeas corpus.1 We agree with the District Court, and will affirm.

I. Background And Procedural History

Taylor pleaded guilty to five murders on December 19, 1991. A hearing was conducted on January 10, 1992 to determine Taylor's degree of guilt and penalty. At this hearing, Taylor was found guilty of five counts of murder in the first degree by the Honorable John H. Chronister, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania. Judge Chronister also determined the sentence, without objection from Taylor, which was imposed on January 23, 1992.

A.

The murders took place on the evening of May 18, 1991. Under the influence of alcohol and cocaine, Taylor, who had no apparent prior history of domestic violence, hammered the skull of his mother-in-law and slit her throat with a knife. He then hammered the skulls of her two-year-old son Lance, and his own children, four-year-old Paul and two-year-old Jasmine. When his wife Valerie returned home twelve hours later, he also hammered her skull until she died. Taylor did not harm his five-month-old daughter, Rachelle, who was present during the killings. After killing his wife, Taylor attempted suicide by slashing his wrists with a hacksaw and stabbing himself in the abdomen. He then called 911 (because he was worried about Rachelle) before trying to electrocute himself in the bathtub with a hair dryer. When the police arrived, they found him alive in the bathtub and took him to York Hospital.

At the hospital Taylor made incriminating statements after the police questioned him about the killings without advising him of his right to counsel or to remain silent. Doctors stabilized Taylor physically and on May 22, 1991, transferred him to York Hospital's psychiatric inpatient unit. There, Mohamed I. Elyan, M.D., Taylor's treating physician, recorded Taylor's account of what happened the night of the murders in his hospital records. When Dr. Elyan concluded that Taylor was psychiatrically stabilized, on May 24, 1991, he discharged Taylor to the state's custody.

Attorney Robert Bruce Evanick, Chief Public Defender, was appointed to represent Taylor. Evanick prepared a suppression motion, seeking to exclude the statements that Taylor made to police at the hospital. Taylor, however, wrote a letter of confession to the police, dated June 15, 1991, which states the following:

On May 18, 1991, I, Paul G. Taylor, came home, went to the third floor, and to check on the kids. Jasmine was sleeping with Donna. I picked her up and put her in my bed, and no voice made me do it. I did it. Paul G. Taylor, on my own. I was so mad or bad about me to turn back to drugs, and my wife didn't care no more that I wasn't going to leave my family for no one. If I couldn't have my kids, no one will. So I went downstairs and got the ball-peen hammer and killed Donna, Lance, Jasmine and Paul with it. After I dropped the hammer, I ran downstairs and washed my hands and went outside and walked around and cried. And I knew what I had done. It was my turn and my wife's turn to die. I came back, went to the third floor, and covered them up. The baby was asleep. Rachelle and I went downstairs. And I called about 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. I called Tina Markle to see if she was there. The phone rang and Tina picked it up and I said, is Val there. She said, yes. But she never got on the phone, and the phone went dead. I called back, but I got a busy sound, and tried a half hour later, and got the same thing. Val called back around 11:30 and said she be home around 12, or 12:30, and she hung up. When she got home she did not look or say anything but went to the dining room, and said, I'm going out tonight. And I killed her with the hammer, too, and went outside and said to Tina, she'll see you tonight, and she went. I carried my wife up the stairs and laid her in bed with my daughter, and went downstairs and got a hacksaw and a knife, and went back upstairs to kill myself. That's what happened to my family. I don't want mercy from the Court. I want the maximum sentence. God said that this was the truth. Amen. P.S., I'm not a sick man. I'm a man that went over and came back. P.S. It was out of love that no one was going to take them away, my wife and my kids. Truly sorry, Mr. Paul G. Taylor.

(App. at 238-39.)

Before Taylor's plea hearing, two experts—Edward J. Briercheck, M.S., a licensed psychologist, and Robert L. Sadoff, M.D., a psychiatrist—evaluated Taylor and opined that he was competent to participate in legal proceedings. Moreover, Mr. Briercheck concluded that Taylor "was capable of formulating intent" at the time of the murders and Dr. Sadoff found that Taylor would not be able to prove an insanity defense. (App. at 317.)

At Taylor's guilty-plea hearing on December 19, 1991, about seven months after the murders, defense counsel reported to the trial judge that Taylor had directed him "not to contact any witnesses or to call any medical personnel who have interviewed and talked with him. He understands that there are statutory aggravating circumstances and that the likely result will be imposition of the death penalty." (App. at 137.) Taylor agreed with counsel's statement in a colloquy on the record, after which the court accepted his plea.

Twenty-two days later, at Taylor's degree-of-guilt and penalty hearing, the trial judge granted Taylor's suppression motion, ruling that the hospital statements were unlawfully obtained. The court next asked Taylor if he wished to let his guilty plea stand, and Taylor answered affirmatively.

The Commonwealth presented several witnesses' testimony, including police and pathologists. Defense counsel presented no evidence, and made no argument on Taylor's behalf. The trial judge concluded that all five murders were intentional and thus in the first degree.

The penalty phase commenced immediately, and the court asked Taylor whether he wanted to present any mitigating evidence. Taylor declined. Nevertheless, the District Attorney, H. Stanley Rebert, stated that, as an officer of the court, he felt obliged to mention that Taylor could claim the mitigating circumstance set forth in 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9711(e)(1) because he had no significant history of prior criminal convictions.2

The trial judge next heard argument on the aggravating circumstances, and the Commonwealth conceded that none applied to the murder of Taylor's mother-in-law. Taylor murdered the three children and Valerie after his mother-in-law, however, which satisfied 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9711(d)(11) (requiring that a defendant be convicted of another murder committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue). And the three children were under the age of twelve, which satisfied 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9711(d)(16) (requiring that the victim be a child under the age of twelve).

As the hearing came to an end, Taylor's counsel added:

Your Honor, just so we're clear for the record, the only other additional mitigating factor is the Defendant's remorse. That has been passed on by the Supreme Court and found to be a legitimate mitigating factor. Whether or not you conclude from his letter [of June 15, 1991] that he is genuinely sorry for what occurred, of course, is your decision, but there is certainly evidence to support it of record.

(App. at 247-48.)

The judge sentenced Taylor to life in prison for his mother-in-law's murder, after finding that there were no aggravating circumstances and at least one mitigating circumstance (no prior criminal record). With respect to the three children, the court found that both aggravating circumstances had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that there were two mitigating circumstances: no prior criminal record and genuine remorse. The court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones, and imposed three death sentences for the childrens' murders. For Valerie's murder, only one aggravating circumstance had been proven since she was an adult, and there were two mitigating circumstances: no prior record and remorse. Nevertheless, the judge found that the single aggravating circumstance outweighed the two mitigating circumstances and imposed a death sentence. The court explained:

The Court draws this conclusion on the fact that there were multiple homicides which occurred. Also in the fact that a substantial period of time passed after the first four victims were killed, and the wife, Valerie Taylor came home, so that this lying in wait, and this further opportunity to plan and premeditate the situation creates an additional weight to the...

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