United States v. City of Parma

• Decision Date: 04 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. C73-439.,C73-439.
• Citation: 504 F. Supp. 913
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PARMA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

504 F. Supp. 913

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PARMA, Defendant.

No. C73-439.

United States District Court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.

December 4, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert R. Soltis, Andrew Boyko, Parma, Ohio, for defendant.

Avery Friedman, Cleveland, Ohio, amicus curiae.

Robert J. Reinstein, Brian F. Heffernan, Michael L. Barrett, Theodore M. Shaw, Civil Rights Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

REMEDIAL ORDER

BATTISTI, Chief Judge.

The United States of America instituted this civil rights action on April 27, 1973, alleging that the City of Parma, Ohio was engaging in practices violative of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.

A trial on the issue of liability in this action was held between the period of November 7, 1979 and December 14, 1979, at which twenty witnesses testified and the depositions of eleven witnesses and over 250 exhibits were admitted into evidence. The issue of remedy was pretermitted for a subsequent proceeding if liability were found.

On June 5, 1980, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion, 494 F.Supp. 1049, finding the City of Parma liable for violations of Sections 804(a) and 817 of the Fair Housing Act. The Court specifically found that the actions of Parma which were challenged by the government, namely, the rejection of a fair housing resolution, the consistent refusal to sign a cooperation agreement with the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, the adamant and longstanding opposition to any form of public or low-income housing, the denial of a building permit for the Parmatown Woods low-income housing development, the passage of a 35 foot residential height restriction ordinance, the passage of an ordinance requiring voter approval for low-income housing, and the refusal to submit an adequate housing assistance plan in its Community Development Block Grant application, individually and collectively, were motivated by a racially discriminatory and exclusionary intent and had foreseeable segregative effects. In sum, the Court found that Parma, the largest suburb of Cleveland, has had and continues to follow a long-standing policy and practice of excluding black persons from residing in Parma in any substantial numbers.

The Court ordered the parties in this action to consult with one another in an effort to agree upon the terms of a remedy that will so far as possible eliminate the effects of Parma's past discriminatory practices and ensure future compliance with the Fair Housing Act. On August 4, 1980, the parties met and were unable to reach agreement on the terms of a remedial order to be entered as a final judgment in this litigation. Subsequently, at the request of the United States, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the remedy in this action.

On September 24-26, 1980, a hearing was held in this Court at which both parties presented witnesses and documentary testimony concerning a possible remedy for this litigation. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court ordered the parties to submit final recommendations concerning a remedial order.

Pursuant to the Court Order requesting remedial recommendations, the government submitted a proposed remedial order, a brief in support of the proposed remedy with a study and recommendations prepared by Paul Davidoff, Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Institute in New York who testified as an expert witness at the September hearings a proposed order appointing a Special Master, and a final proposed remedial order. The City of Parma submitted a brief (1) in opposition to this Court's jurisdiction over a remedy and (2) in opposition to the government's proposed remedial order. Pursuant to recent Sixth Circuit decisions,¹ the jurisdiction of this Court is not in question. In addition, Parma submitted objections to the proposed appointment of a Special Master. Parma never submitted a remedial proposal to the Court. Not only were Parma's submissions not helpful to the Court,² but the briefs filed by Parma quoted inapposite cases and employed racially incendiary language. Such a use of documents within the public record could be expected to, and in fact did, reach the press.³ The Court has admonished the defendant's present lawyers, both in chambers and from the bench, not to traumatize and incite those who may be affected by the delicate and necessary steps that the Court must take to remediate the statutory violations which were found in Parma.

The Court has reviewed the recommendations and remedy submissions of the parties and the record of the remedy proceeding held herein. Based on this review, the Court has formulated a comprehensive remedial plan to be implemented in this action.

I.

As in any equity proceeding, the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and the scope of the legal violation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Accordingly, the remedy in this case must address this Court's overall findings that Parma has had a longstanding policy of deliberate racial exclusion, in addition to addressing the specific unlawful actions which Parma took in furtherance of this exclusionary design.

Section 813 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613, pursuant to which the United States brought this lawsuit, provides in pertinent part that, in cases of this kind, the Attorney General may request "such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or persons responsible" for the violation of the rights guaranteed by the Act. This section requires the Court to exercise its powers to fashion affirmative equitable relief designed to eliminate, to the extent possible, the discriminatory effects of Parma's actions. See Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979). Courts should not be grudging with respect to the entry and scope of injunctive relief under a statute where Congress expressly authorized it. Hodgson v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County, Florida, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972) (age discrimination in employment); United States v. Hayes International Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969) (employment).

This Court has already recognized its duty to grant relief in this action which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of Parma's past actions and ensure Parma's future compliance with the Fair Housing Act. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 822, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965); Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, supra; United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 1971). In determining appropriate equitable relief to eliminate such discriminatory effects, courts must be guided by the provisions and purposes of the Fair Housing Act. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006 at 1011 (7th Cir. 1980); Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, supra, at 1036; Cf. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1869, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (Title VII); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2371, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (Title VII).

The purpose of the Fair Housing Act is to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 3601. The primary objective of Title VIII is, in the words of then Senator Mondale, to replace "the ghettos ... by truly integrated and balanced living patterns." 114 Cong.Rec. 3422 (1968). This objective is one to which Congress has accorded the highest priority, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211, 93 S.Ct. 364, 367, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972); Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, supra. The Act is to be construed generously so as to ensure the prompt and effective elimination of all traces of discrimination within the housing field. Trafficante, supra, at 211-212, 93 S.Ct. at 367-368. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1974).

At the same time, however, this Court should not order relief that is more intrusive on the governmental functions of Parma than is necessary to achieve Title VIII's goals. Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, supra at 1040; Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3rd Cir. 1977); cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1457, 55 L.Ed.2d 499 (1978).

For civil rights violations such as those in existence herein, courts are governed by traditional principles of equity in fashioning affirmative relief. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-80, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2756-57, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 374-375, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1874, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 12-13, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1274, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1970). As Chief Justice Burger stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1972):

(E)quitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable. `Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.' Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955).

With these principles in mind, many courts have addressed findings of liability against municipalities for violations of the Fair Housing Act and have authorized broad remedies aimed at effectively curing these violations. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 95 S.Ct. 2656, 45 L.Ed.2d 694 (1975); Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401...