United States v. Thompson Center Arms Company
| Citation | 119 L.Ed.2d 308,504 U.S. 505,112 S.Ct. 2102 |
| Decision Date | 08 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-164,91-164 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. THOMPSON/CENTER ARMS COMPANY |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Respondent manufactures the "Contender" pistol and, for a short time, also manufactured a kit that could be used to convert the Contender into a rifle with either a 21-inch or a 10-inch barrel. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms advised respondent that when the kit was possessed or distributed with the Contender, the unit constituted a "firearm" under the National Firearms Act (NFA or Act), 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(3), which defines that term to include a rifle with a barrel less than 16 inches long, known as a short-barreled rifle, but not a pistol or a rifle having a barrel 16 inches or more in length. Respondent paid the $200 tax levied by § 5821 upon anyone "making" a "firearm" and filed a claim for a refund. When its refund claim proved fruitless, respondent brought this suit under the Tucker Act. The Claims Court entered summary judgment for the Government, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a short-barreled rifle "actually must be assembled" in order to be "made" within the NFA's meaning.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
924 F.2d 1041 (Fed.1991), affirmed.
Justice Souter, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, concluded that the Contender and conversion kit when packaged together have not been "made" into a short-barreled rifle for NFA purposes. Pp. 509-518.
(a) The language of § 5845(i)—which provides that "[t]he term 'make', and [its] various derivatives . . ., shall include manufacturing . . ., putting together . . ., or otherwise producing a firearm"—clearly demonstrates that the aggregation of separate parts that can be assembled only into a firearm, and the aggregation of a gun other than a firearm and parts that would have no use in association with the gun except to convert it into a firearm, constitute the "making" of a firearm. If, as the Court of Appeals held, a firearm were only made at the time of final assembly (the moment the firearm was "put together"), the statutory "manufacturing . . . or otherwise producing" language would be redundant. Thus, Congress must have understood "making" to cover more than final assembly, and some disassembled aggregation of parts must be included. Pp. 509-512.
(b) However, application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction shows that the Act is ambiguous as to whether, given the fact that the Contender can be converted into either an NFA-regulated firearm or an unregulated rifle, the mere possibility of its use with the kit to assemble the former renders their combined packaging "making". Pp. 512-517.
(c) The statutory ambiguity is properly resolved by applying the rule of lenity in respondent's favor. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1007, 108 L.Ed.2d 132. Although it is a tax statute that is here construed in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that carry no additional requirement of willfulness. Making a firearm without approval may be subject to criminal sanction, as is possession of, or failure to pay the tax on, an unregistered firearm. Pp. 517-518.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the rule of lenity prevents respondent's pistol and conversion kit from being covered by the NFA, but on the basis of different ambiguities: whether a firearm includes unassembled parts, and whether the requisite "inten[t] to be fired from the shoulder" existed as to the short barrel component. Pp. 2104-2106.
SOUTER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
James A. Feldman, Washington, D.C., argued, for petitioner.
Stephen P. Halbrook, Fairfax, Va., argued, for respondent.
Justice SOUTER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice O'CONNOR join.
Section 5821 of the National Firearms Act (NFA or Act), see 26 U.S.C. § 5849, levies a tax of $200 per unit upon any- one "making" a "firearm" as that term is defined in the Act. § 5821. Neither pistols nor rifles with barrels 16 inches long or longer are firearms within the NFA definition, but rifles with barrels less than 16 inches long, known as short-barreled rifles, are. § 5845(a)(3). This case presents the question whether a gun manufacturer "makes" a short-barreled rifle when it packages as a unit a pistol together with a kit containing a shoulder stock and a 21-inch barrel, permitting the pistol's conversion into an unregulated long-barreled rifle,1 or, if the pistol's barrel is left on the gun, a short-barreled rifle that is regulated. We hold that the statutory language may not be construed to require payment of the tax under these facts.
The word "firearm" is used as a term of art in the NFA. It means, among other things, "a rifle having a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length. . . ." § 5845(a)(3). "The term 'rifle' means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed cartridge to fire only a single projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of the trigger, and shall include any such weapon which may be readily restored to fire a fixed cartridge." § 5845(c).
The consequence of being the maker of a firearm are serious. § 5821(a) imposes a tax of $200 "for each firearm made," which "shall be paid by the person making the firearm," § 5821(b). Before one may make a firearm, one must obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, § 5822, and § 5841 requires that the "manufacturer, importer, and maker . . . register each firearm he manufactures, imports, or makes" in a central registry maintained by the Secretary of the Treasury. A maker who fails to comply with the NFA's provisions is subject to criminal penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000, or both, which may be imposed without proof of willfulness or knowledge. § 5871.
Respondent Thompson/Center Arms Company manufactures a single-shot pistol called the "Contender," designed so that its handle and barrel can be removed from its "receiver," the metal frame housing the trigger, hammer and firing mechanism. See 27 CFR § 179.11 (1991) (). For a short time in 1985 Thompson/Center also manufactured a carbine-conversion kit consisting of a 21-inch barrel, a rifle stock, and a wooden fore-end. If one joins the receiver with the conversion kit's rifle stock, the 21-inch barrel, and the rifle fore-end, the product is a carbine rifle with a 21-inch barrel. If, however, the shorter, pistol-length barrel is not removed from the receiver when the rifle stock is added, one is left with a 10-inch or "short-barreled" carbine rifle. The entire conversion, from pistol to long-barreled rifle takes only a few minutes; conversion to a short-barreled rifle takes even less time.
In 1985, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms advised Thompson/Center that when its conversion kit was possessed or distributed together with the Contender pistol, the unit constituted a firearm subject to the NFA. Thompson/Center responded by paying the $200 tax for a single such firearm, and submitting an application for permission under 26 U.S.C. § 5822 "to make, use, and segregate as a single unit" a package consisting of a serially numbered pistol, together with an attachable shoulder stock and a 21-inch barrel. Thompson/Center then filed a refund claim. After more than six months had elapsed without action on it, the company brought this suit in the United States Claims Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, arguing that the unit registered was not a firearm within the meaning of the NFA because Thompson/Center had not assembled a short-barreled rifle from its components. The Claims Court entered summary judgment for the Government, concluding that the Contender pistol together with its conversion kit is a firearm within the meaning of the NFA. 19 Cl.Ct. 725 (1990).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a short-barreled rifle "actually must be assembled" in order to be "made" within the meaning of the NFA. 924 F.2d 1041, 1043 (1991). The Court of Appeals expressly declined to follow the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Drasen, 845 F.2d 731, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 262, 102 L.Ed.2d 250 (1988), which had held that an unassembled "complete parts kit" for a short-barreled rifle was in fact a short-barreled rifle for purposes of the NFA. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 502 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 48, 116 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991).
The NFA provides that "[t]he term 'make', and the various derivatives of such word, shall include manufacturing (other than by one qualified to engage in such business under this chapter), putting together, altering, any combination of these, or otherwise producing a firearm." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(i).2 But the provision does not expressly address the question whether a short-barreled rifle can be "made" by the aggregation of finished parts that can readily be assembled into one. The Government contends that assembly is not necessary; Thompson/Center argues that it is.
The Government urges us to view the shipment of the pistol with the kit just as we would the shipment of a bicycle that requires some home assembly. "The fact that a short-barrel rifle, or any other 'firearm,' is possessed or sold in a partially unassembled state does not remove it from regulation under the Act." Brief for United States 6.
The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Craig
...about the breadth of a criminal statute should be resolved in the defendant's favor"); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. , 504 U.S. 505, 513–18, 112 S.Ct. 2102, 119 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992) (applying the rule of lenity after noting the Court was "left with an ambiguous statute" after anal......
-
Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP
...cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859, 67 S.Ct. 1755, 91 L.Ed. 1866 (1947) ; quoted with approval, U.S. v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 511 n.4, 112 S.Ct. 2102, 119 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992).40 Katz Teller attorneys Andrew Berger and William Russo testified that they performed no independent resea......
-
Citizens for a Better Environ. v. Union Oil Co., C 94-0712 TEH
...than one location in a statute, it is meant to have the same meaning, see United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 2102, 2107 n. 5, 119 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992) (plurality opinion); Mississippi Poultry Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir.1993),......
-
Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Comr's of County of Rogers
... ... No. 92-5174 ... United States Court of Appeals, ... Tenth Circuit ... The company entered into an agreement with CemTech, Inc., ... (sic) shall be confined to as near the center of the site as practical and in no case in ... ...
-
Does N.Y. Judiciary Law §487 Apply To Arbitrations?
...a penalty for violation. The criminal nature of the statute requires a narrow interpretation. See United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992) (statute with criminal component must be construed in accordance with the rule of lenity); Crandon v. U.S., 494 U.S. 152, 168 (......
-
The Rule Of Lenity: Should Courts Defer To Agency Interpretations Of RESPA § 8?
...1 574 U.S. __ (2014). 2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a through 78pp. 4 12 U.S.C. § 2607. 5 543 U.S. 1, 11-12, n.8 (2004). 6 504 U.S. 505, 578, n.10 (1992) (plurality opinion), id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring in 7 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d) provides: (1) Any person or persons who violate......
-
Kisor v. Wilkie as a Limit on Auer Deference in the Sentencing Context
...favor because the relevant provision had "both criminal and noncriminal applications"); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992) (applying lenity in determining the meaning of a regulatory statute that could serve as the basis of criminal liability); Crandon, 494 ......
-
On Equipoise, Knowledge, and Speculation: a Unified Theory of Pleading Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act -- Jurisdiction, Identification, Misappropriation, and Inevitable Disclosure
...encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies; cf. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517-518 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying the rule of lenity to a tax statute, in a civil setting, because the statute had criminal app......
-
Preconstruction Permits: New Source Performance Standards and New Source Review
...19 ELR 21091 (3d Cir. 1989). 194. 67 Fed. Reg. 41345 (June 18, 2002) (codiied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 19, tbl. 1). 195. 397 U.S. 858 (1970). 196. 504 U.S. 505 (1992). 197. 847 F.2d 1109, 18 ELR 21053 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 491 U.S. 904,(1989), overruled on other grounds by Friends of the ......
-
THE TRAJECTORY OF FEDERAL GUN CRIMES.
...(1985); U.S. Dep't. of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. Thompson, 504 U.S. 505 (1992); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (199......