Parle v. Runnels

• Decision Date: 10 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-16780.,06-16780.
• Citation: 505 F.3d 922
• Parties: Timothy Charles PARLE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. David L. RUNNELS, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

505 F.3d 922

Timothy Charles PARLE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. David L. RUNNELS, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 06-16780.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 13, 2007.

Filed October 10, 2007.

Bruce Ortega, Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, San Francisco, CA, for the respondent-appellant.

Martin N. Buchanan, Niddrie, Fish, & Buchanan LLP, San Diego, CA, for the petitioner-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; William H. Alsup, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-03487-WHA.

Before: HAWKINS, A. WALLACE TASHIMA, and CARLOS T. BEA, Circuit Judges.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

Domestic violence is a serious problem in America. When love turns to hate, grave injury — even death — can result. When that violence spins out of control, considerable problems confront the criminal justice system. The heat of the moment and the history of the relationship can make it quite difficult to assess responsibility. Sometimes it is clear who the aggressor is or has been; sometimes it is not so clear. The trial at issue here required a California jury to make just such a difficult determination. Because we conclude, as did the district court, that multiple errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence accumulated to deprive Timothy Charles Parle ("Parle") of a constitutionally fair trial, and that the one-sided prejudice caused by these errors made the state court's contrary conclusion objectively unreasonable, we affirm the grant of habeas relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because the relevant facts are recited in this court's prior opinion, Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (9th Cir.2004) (Parle I), and the district court's most recent order, Parle v. Runnels, 448 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1160-61 (N.D.Cal.2006) (Parle III), and are largely uncontested by the parties, we offer only a brief synopsis.

Parle killed his wife, Mary, on December 17, 1993, by stabbing her in the back during a domestic dispute. By all accounts, Parle and Mary had "a stormy relationship," punctuated by verbal and physical abuse by both parties. Parle I, 387 F.3d at 1033. At trial, Parle conceded that he unlawfully killed his wife, contesting only his state of mind at the time of the killing. Although Parle contended that his state of mind was such that he could be guilty of no more than second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, a jury convicted him of first-degree murder. See Parle III, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1161.

On direct review, the California Court of Appeal identified numerous, serious errors in the trial proceedings. Specifically, the court of appeal held that the trial court:

• Violated Parle's psychotherapist-patient privilege by erroneously holding that the privilege had been waived and requiring Parle's psychiatrist to give damaging testimony against Parle;

• Improperly excluded rebuttal testimony from a defense expert about the effects of a manic episode due to severe bipolar disorder, relevant to whether Parle had the mental state required for a first-degree murder conviction;

• Improperly excluded evidence of Mary's propensity for violence, including her threats to Parle in the weeks leading up to his crime;

• Improperly excluded testimony of Parle's father relating to Parle's appearance and demeanor immediately before and after the crime; and

• Improperly admitted impermissible character evidence of Parle's threats to a police officer five years prior to his crime.

Despite these errors, the California Court of Appeal upheld Parle's conviction, concluding that the various errors — both individually and collectively — were harmless. The court of appeal reasoned that the erroneously excluded (or included) evidence was "essentially cumulative" of other properly admitted evidence, and therefore that it was not reasonably probable that the jury would have returned a different verdict but for the errors.¹ People v. Parle, No. H017348, slip op. at 56 (Cal.Ct.App. 2000). As such, the court held that the errors did not result in a "serious flaw" in Parle's trial. Accordingly, "the determinations by the judge and jury were reliable" and Parle's trial "fundamentally fair." Id. at 57 (internal quotations omitted).

Parle thereafter sought federal habeas relief. Following extensive briefing, the district court subsequently granted relief, concluding that: (1) "the California Court of Appeal clearly erred in finding that admission of the victim's diary did not violate the Confrontation Clause" and (2) "the cumulative effect of this and several other evidentiary errors deprived petitioner of his due process right to a fair trial." This court reversed on appeal, concluding that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred, and remanded for further consideration of Parle's cumulative error/due process claim. Parle I, 387 F.3d at 1046.

On remand, the district court again granted habeas relief. The district court concluded: (1) the California Court of Appeal engaged in an issue-by-issue analysis, rather than a cumulative effect analysis; and (2) to the extent the state court actually performed a cumulative error analysis, it applied an incorrect standard — whether the errors resulted in a "serious flaw" in defendant's trial — rather than a "substantial and injurious effect" standard. This court again reversed, concluding that "[the state] court, however imperfectly, conducted cumulative error review of the trial" and remanding "for the district court to determine whether the decision was an objectively unreasonable application of [clearly established Supreme Court law]" under AEDPA.² Parle v. Runnels, No. 05-16610, 177 Fed.Appx. 759, 759 (9th Cir. Apr.27, 2006) (Parle II).

Following this second remand, the district court once again granted habeas relief, concluding that "[t]he erroneous evidentiary rulings ... infected the trial with such unfairness that it rose to the level of a due-process violation." Parle III, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1171-72. Because "the [cumulative] impact of these errors is devastating to one's confidence in the reliability of the verdict," the district court held that the California Court of Appeal's "decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of [Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949), and Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 S.Ct. 136, 3 L.Ed.2d 125 (1954)]." Parle III, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1172. The State timely appealed.³

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c)(3) and "review de novo a district court's order granting a writ of habeas corpus." Parle I, 387 F.3d at 1034.

Under AEDPA, habeas relief is available only where a state court's rulings "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the [United States] Supreme Court," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or were based on "an unreasonable determination of the facts," id. § 2254(d)(2). Where, as here, the state supreme court denies review of a prisoner's habeas petition without comment, we "look to the last reasoned state-court decision": in this case, that of the California Court of Appeal. Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003).

A state court's decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law "if `the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle[ ] from [Supreme Court] decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'"⁴ Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). The state court's application must be more than erroneous, it must be "objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Finally, if a state court's decision was objectively unreasonable, we may grant habeas relief only if the error had a "substantial or injurious effect" on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Parle I, 387 F.3d at 1035.

DISCUSSION

I. Clearly Established Law

A) Cumulative Error and Due Process

The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple trial court errors violates due process where it renders the resulting criminal trial fundamentally unfair. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298, 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (combined effect of individual errors "denied [Chambers] a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process" and "deprived Chambers of a fair trial").⁵ The cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where no single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would independently warrant reversal. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 290 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1038.⁶

Under traditional due process principles, cumulative error warrants habeas relief only where the errors have "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). Such "infection" occurs where the combined effect of the errors had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (internal quotations omitted); see also Thomas, 273 F.3d at 1179-81 (noting similarity between Donnelly and Brecht standards and concluding that "a Donnelly violation necessarily meets the requirements of Brecht"). In simpler terms, where the combined effect of individually harmless errors renders a criminal defense "far less persuasive than it might [otherwise] have been," the resulting conviction violates due process. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038.

B) Harmless Error and Cumulative...