Moran v. Rhode Island Broth. of Correctional Officers

• Citation: 506 A.2d 542
• Decision Date: 20 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-185-A,84-185-A
• Parties: John MORAN, Director of the Department of Corrections v. RHODE ISLAND BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS et al. ppeal.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 542

506 A.2d 542

John MORAN, Director of the Department of Corrections v. RHODE ISLAND BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS et al.

No. 84-185-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 20, 1986.

Stephen Robinson, Asquith, Merolla, Anderson, Ryan & Wiley, Providence, for plaintiff.

Paul M. Giacobbe, Cobleigh, Watt, Rock & Giacobbe, Warwich, for defendant.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court that adjudged the defendants to be in civil contempt and ordered them to pay to the plaintiff an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,750. The defendants claim that the trial justice erred in two respects: (1) awarding an attorney's fee without any evidence in the record to support the amount of the award and (2) denying the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of proper notice. The defendants are the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (the Brotherhood) and seven members of the Brotherhood. The director of the state correctional facilities, John Moran, will be referred to as the plaintiff.

On November 9, 1983, the Brotherhood held a meeting at six o'clock in the morning to discuss contract negotiations and dispel a rumor that the seniority clause in its contract was in jeopardy. A substantial number ¹ of the correctional officers who were scheduled to report for duty on the 6:52-a.m.-to-3-p.m. shift reported late for work. On November 18 plaintiff filed a motion to adjudge defendants in contempt of an amended order and preliminary injunction issued by a justice of the Superior Court in August of 1983. ² The matter was heard before a Superior Court justice on the afternoons of December 13 through 16, 1983.

The trial justice's bench decision found that the Brotherhood and the individual defendants reported late for duty because of their attendance at the union meeting. He determined that the lateness of defendants constituted a work slowdown that disrupted the safety of the prison, specifically interfering with rollcall briefings and normal operations at the institution. The trial justice ruled that defendants were in civil contempt of the August 1983 order and awarded the attorney's fee to which we have previously alluded.

On appeal defendants claim that an attorney's fee is an element of damages that must be proven, and an award of any such fee must (1) not exceed plaintiff's actual costs and (2) be based upon evidence in the record. The defendants insist that the absence of evidence on the record to support the award of an attorney's fee requires reversal on this issue. We disagree.

The award of an attorney's fee in a civil-contempt case is a sanction the imposition of which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. E.M.B. Associates, Inc. v. Sugarman, 118 R.I. 105, 108, 372 A.2d 508, 509-10 (1977). The only restraint on the trial justice's discretion is that the award of an attorney's fee should be reasonably related to the extent and willfulness of the contempt. Nelson v. Progressive Realty Corp., 81 R.I. 445, 451, 104 A.2d 241, 244 (1954). This court's review of a sanction imposed for civil contempt is limited to a review of the order to ensure that the terms are reasonable. Britt v. Britt, 119 R.I. 791, 797, 383 A.2d 592, 596 (1978). Bearing in mind that civil contempt is a remedial device designed to coerce compliance with judicial decrees, this court will reduce an award of a fee that is "grossly excessive." Nelson, 81 R.I. at 451, 104 A.2d at 244.

The allowance of counsel fees in civil-contempt proceedings has been an issue on which courts have expressed divergent views. Id. The same may be said about the necessity of presenting evidence regarding the reasonableness of such fees. Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 807-10 (1972).

To date this court has not required testimony or affidavits to support an award of a fee in a civil-contempt case, and we are not persuaded that it is necessary to impose such a requirement on the instant facts. But see Colonial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Contemporary Construction Co., 464 A.2d 741 (R.I.1983) (explanation of the evidentiary requirements for an award of counsel fees in a noncontempt matter).

Although the trial justice did not specifically set forth how he calculated the amount of the attorney's fee, he did comment on the efforts expended by counsel that took place in the the courtroom. He said:

"[C]ounsel had to first of all prepare the contempt motion. Counsel was in attendance at this Court for three afternoons to present testimony, and each afternoon the session lasted approximately two and a half hours. Counsel was further required to attend two morning calendar calls this week, and counsel was required to be here this morning to argue, and it seems to the Court that a reasonable counsel fee for those services would be in the amount of $1,750."

The record indicates that counsel for plaintiff made six court appearances and spent a sufficient amount of time in court to support the $1,750 award. See In re...