506 F.2d 291 (2nd Cir. 1974), 118, United States v. Glover
|Docket Nº:||118, Docket 74-1739.|
|Citation:||506 F.2d 291|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Solomon GLOVER, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Case Date:||October 04, 1974|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit|
Argued Sept. 11, 1974.
Hudson H. Reid, New York City (William C. Chance, Jr., New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Mel P. Barkan, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City (Paul J. Curran, U.S. Atty., and S. Andrew Schaffer, Asst. U.S. Atty., S.D. of New York, of counsel), for appellee.
Before SMITH, TIMBERS and GURFEIN, [*] Circuit Judges.
GURFEIN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the picture of an able trial judge, the Honorable Charles L. Brieant, faced with the unusual dilemma of conflicting constitutional mandates, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as expressed in the
Bruton rule 1 and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Solomon Glover appeals from a conviction entered on May 8, 1974 in the Southern District of New York after a two-and-a-half-day trial before the Honorable Robert J. Ward and a jury. Glover was found guilty of conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics laws, 21 U.S.C. 846, under Count 1 of Indictment 73 Cr. 327. 2 He was sentenced to a term of one year imprisonment with a special parole of three years to follow. His principal ground of appeal is that he was 'twice put in jeopardy' in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The indictment in question charged thirteen persons including Glover with the conspiracy mentioned. Four of these defendants, including Glover, were brought to trial before Judge Brieant and a jury. On July 23, 1973 after four days of trial the court severed the case against Glover and directed a mistrial as to him, in the court's own words, 'without his consent.'
Glover then moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that a subsequent trial would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy. Judge Brieant in a thoughtful opinion denied his motion, 3 and Glover was thereafter tried before Judge Ward and a jury and convicted of the very conspiracy recounted above on the same indictment.
We turn to the events that pose the issue on appeal.
The trial had begun on July 16 before Judge Brieant. Late in the afternoon of Friday, July 20, written reports of three oral statements made by Glover to government agents were shown to Judge Brieant for the first time by the Government though they had previously been shown to Glover's attorney. 4 Immediately upon viewing the reports of the oral statements of Glover the Court advised counsel for the Government and all defendants that the statements presented a Bruton problem and that he would give counsel 'an opportunity to organize your thoughts on it and give me briefly what you have in mind on it.'
Though the attorneys were to brief the matter over the weekend, the trial judge in an effort to avoid wasting the jurors' time, ordered the trial to proceed on Friday afternoon.
The Government, on its part, though concededly not a single bit of evidence had been produced against Glover himself thus far, now introduced a witness who testified directly about Glover. As the Court noted, 'this testimony was the first evidence received in the trial bearing upon the guilt of Glover.' 5
By Monday, July 23, the trial judge had reached a decision that 'it looks pretty clear to me that to admit any of this statement would violate the Bruton rule.' Glover's attorney at this juncture, consonant with his obligation to his client, refused to move for a severance
though he had previously anticipated doing so.
The Court then told the Assistant U.S. Attorney that he had two alternatives open to him. 'You may either proceed without using the statement or you may move for a severance and mistrial.' The Government moved for a severance of the defendant Glover. The Court reluctantly granted the severance because it believed that the statements of Glover would be unduly prejudicial to his co-defendants even with redaction.
To the extent that it is relevant to the issue now before us, we believe that Judge Brieant was right in his analysis of the Bruton problem as he later expounded it on the subsequent motion to dismiss the indictment. His conscientious regard for the rights of the co-defendants properly led him to the exclusion of the oral statements by Glover. See e.g. United States v. Wilkins, 367 F.2d 990 (2 Cir. 1966); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2 Cir. 1966) (anticipating Bruton).
Having come to that pass, the court had the option of permitting the trial to continue against Glover as well without allowing the admissions to be available to the Government against Glover, or to sever and allow the prosecution to tender Glover's admissions against himself at a second trial against Glover alone. The trial judge chose the second option on the obviously considered view that this would not constitute double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. We are constrained to disagree.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows: 'nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'
The District Court understood that double jeopardy normally attaches upon the empaneling of a jury competent to try the defendant, for it is then that a defendant is 'put in jeopardy.' Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); Green v. United States,355 U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949); Kepner v. United States,195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904). 6 Having been 'put in jeopardy,' the defendant is thought to have the right to seek a favorable verdict from the jury which he has accepted as satisfactory. See United States v. Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. at 486, 91 S.Ct. 547; Downum v. United States,372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963); Wade v. Hunter,supra, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. 834. The negative reason for this solicitude is that to permit the trial to be aborted might lead to mistrials covertly for the benefit of a prosecution that needs strengthening. See e.g. United States v. Kin Ping Cheung, 485 F.2d 689, 691-692 (5 Cir. 1973). A mistrial can operate 'as a post-jeopardy continuance to allow the prosecution an opportunity to strengthen its case.' Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 469, 93 S.Ct. at 1073 (per Rehnquist, J.), citing Downum v. United States, supra. 7
While the rule is firm that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn there are exceptions. These exceptions do not lend themselves to 'meaningful categorization.' See Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority in Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 464, 98 S.Ct. 1066. 8 In the words of Justice Story, spoken one hundred and fifty years ago, 'it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere.' United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824).
Despite the difficulty, and perhaps the undesirability of precise classification, it is possible nonetheless to find some common ground in the decisions which have held particular exceptions not to be in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
It was early decided, for example, that a judge could discharge a jury without jeopardy when it could not agree upon a verdict. United States v. Perez, supra. And the reversal of a conviction upon appeal allows the successful appellant to be tried again. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-672, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 560, 70 S.Ct. 317, 94 L.Ed. 335 (1950). Such rules are general and easy to apply.
The more difficult situations arise when the trial is stopped, short of its being given to the jury for a verdict...
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