Bufferd v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Citation113 S.Ct. 927,122 L.Ed.2d 306,506 U.S. 523
Decision Date25 January 1993
Docket NumberNo. 91-7804,91-7804
PartiesSheldon B. BUFFERD, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus *

Subchapter § of the Internal Revenue Code seeks to eliminate tax disadvantages that might dissuade small businesses from adopting the corporate form and to lessen the tax burden on such businesses by means of a pass-through system under which corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits are attributed to individual shareholders in a manner akin to the tax treatment of partnerships. Petitioner Bufferd, a shareholder in an § corporation, Compo Financial Services, Inc., claimed on his 1979 income tax return a pro rata share of a loss deduction and investment tax credit reported by Compo on its return for the 1978-1979 tax year. Code § 6501(a) establishes a generally applicable statute of limitations allowing the Internal Revenue Service to assess tax deficiencies "within 3 years after the return was filed." (Emphasis added.) As provided in § 6501(c)(4), Bufferd extended the limitations period on his return, but no extension was obtained from Compo with respect to its return. In 1987, the Commissioner determined that the loss deduction and credit reported by Compo were erroneous and sent a notice of deficiency to Bufferd based on the deduction and credit he had claimed on his return. The Tax Court found for the Commissioner, rejecting Bufferd's argument that the claim was time barred because the disallowance was based on an error in Compo's return, for which the 3-year period had lapsed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, where a tax deficiency is assessed against a shareholder, the filing date of the shareholder's return is the relevant date for purposes of § 6501(a).

Held: The limitations period for assessing the income tax liability of an § corporation shareholder runs from the date on which the shareholder's return is filed. Plainly, "the" return referred to in § 6501(a) is the return of the taxpayer against whom a deficiency is assessed, since the Commissioner can only determine whether the taxpayer understated his tax obligation and should be assessed a deficiency after examining his return. That Compo erroneously asserted a loss and credit to be passed through to its shareholders is of no consequence. The errors did not and could not affect Compo's tax liability, and hence the Commissioner could only assess a deficiency against the shareholder whose return claimed the benefit of the errors. By contrast, the § corporation's return does not contain all of the information necessary to compute a shareholder's taxes and thus should not be regarded as triggering the period of assessment. Cf. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 188, 77 S.Ct. 707, 712, 1 L.Ed.2d 746. The statutory evidence and policy considerations proffered by Bufferd offer no basis for questioning this conclusion. Pp. ____.

952 F.2d 675 (CA 2 1992), affirmed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Stuart Jay Filler, DC, appointed by this Court, for petitioner.

Kent L. Jones, DC, for respondent.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

On his 1979 income tax return, petitioner, a shareholder in a Subchapter § corporation, claimed as "pass-through" items portions of a deduction and a tax credit reported on the corporation's return. The question presented is whether the 3-year period in which the Internal Revenue Service is permitted to assess petitioner's tax liability runs from the filing date of the individual return or the corporate return. We conclude with the Tax Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that the relevant date is that on which petitioner's return was filed.

I

Subchapter § of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1379, was enacted in 1958 to eliminate tax disadvantages that might dissuade small businesses from adopting the corporate form and to lessen the tax burden on such businesses. The statute accomplishes these goals by means of a pass-through system under which corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits are attributed to individual shareholders in a manner akin to the tax treatment of partnerships. See §§ 1366-1368.1 In addi tion, since 1966, "S corporations" have been liable for certain capital gains and other taxes. 80 Stat. 111, 113; 26 U.S.C. §§ 1374, 1378.

Petitioner was treasurer and a shareholder of Compo Financial Services, Inc., an § corporation. On February 1, 1980, Compo filed a return for the tax year of December 26, 1978 to November 30, 1979 as required by § 6037(a) of the Code.2 On that return, Compo reported a loss deduction and an investment tax credit arising from its partnership interest in a venture known as Printers Associates. Petitioner and his wife filed a joint return for 1979 on April 15, 1980.3 Their return claimed a pro rata share of the deduction and credit reported by Compo pursuant to the pass-through provisions of Subchapter S.

Code § 6501(a) establishes a generally applicable statute of limitations providing that the Internal Revenue Service may assess tax deficiencies within a 3-year period from the date a return is filed.4 That limitations period may be extended by written agreement. § 6501(c)(4). In March 1983, before three years had passed from the time the joint return was filed, petitioner agreed to extend the period in which deficiencies arising from certain claims on the return could be assessed against him. No extension was obtained from Compo with respect to its return for the 1978-1979 tax year.

In 1987, the Commissioner determined that the loss deduction and credit reported by Compo were erroneous and sent a notice of deficiency to petitioner based on the loss deduction and credit that he had claimed on his return. In the Tax Court, petitioner contended that the Commissioner's claim was time barred because the disallowance was based on an error in Compo's return, for which the 3-year assessment period had lapsed. The Tax Court found for the Commissioner, relying on its decision in Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990), aff'd, 954 F.2d 653 (CA11 1992). See App. 61. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, where a tax deficiency is assessed against the shareholder, the filing date of the shareholder's return is the relevant date for purposes of § 6501(a). 952 F.2d 675 (1992). Because another Court of Appeals has a contrary view, we granted certiorari. 505 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2990, 120 L.Ed.2d 868 (1992).5

II

Title 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) states simply that "the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed. . . ." The issue before us is whether "the" return is that of petitioner or that of the corporation which was the source of the loss and credit claimed on petitioner's return. Petitioner's position is that the Commissioner had three years from the date his return was filed to object to that return in any respect except the loss and credit items passed through to him by the corporation. To disallow those items, petitioner argues, the Commissioner must have acted within three years of the filing of the corporate return. Under this approach, "the" return referred to in § 6501(a) becomes two returns, and petitioner claims that there is adequate statutory basis for his submission. We have no doubt that the courts below properly concluded, as the Commissioner argued, that it is the filing of petitioner's return that triggers the running of the statutory period.

The Commissioner can only determine whether the taxpayer understated his tax obligation and should be assessed a deficiency after examining that taxpayer's return. Plainly, then, "the" return referred to in § 6501(a) is the return of the taxpayer against whom a deficiency is assessed. Here, the Commissioner sought to assess taxes which petitioner owed under the Code because his return had erroneously reported a loss and credit to which he was not entitled. The fact that the corporation's return erroneously asserted a loss and credit to be passed through to its shareholders is of no consequence. In this case, the errors on the corporate return did not and could not affect the tax liability of the corporation, and hence the Commissioner could only assess a deficiency against the stockholder-taxpayer whose return claimed the benefit of the errors. Under the plain language of § 6501(a), the Commissioner's time to make the assessment ran from the filing date of petitioner's return.6

By contrast, the § corporation's return, which petitioner asserts triggers the beginning of the limitations period, is deficient precisely because it does not contain all of the information necessary to compute a shareholder's taxes. If the Internal Revenue Service were required to rely on that return, it would be forced to conduct its assessment on the basis of incomplete information:

"While [the corporate return] may show petitioner's distributive share of losses, it does not indicate his adjusted basis in his corporate stock, which is information necessary to determine if the loss is deductible. Nor does it show petitioner's income, losses, deductions, and credits from other sources. Moreover, the information return of the § corporation does not relate to the same taxable period as petitioner's return. . . ." Fehlhaber, supra, at 869 (citation omitted).

As noted in analogous cases, tax returns that "lack the data necessary for the computation and assessment of deficiencies" generally should not be regarded as triggering the period of assessment. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 188, 77 S.Ct. 707, 712, 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957) (citing Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 64 S.Ct. 511, 88 L.Ed. 684 (1944)).7

Petitioner asserts that § 6501(a) supports a contrary view when read in light of two related Code provisions pertaining to § corporations. Section 6012...

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