Hif Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Indus.

• Decision Date: 13 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006-1522.,2006-1522.
• Citation: 508 F.3d 659
• Parties: HIF BIO, INC. and BizBiotech Co., Ltd., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. YUNG SHIN PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD. (doing business as Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals and Yung Shin Pharm. Ind. Co. Ltd.), Yung Zip Chemical Co., Ltd., Fang-Yu Lee, and Che-Ming Teng, Defendants, and Carlsbad Technology, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, and Fish and Richardson P.C., and Y. Rocky Tsao, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

508 F.3d 659

HIF BIO, INC. and BizBiotech Co., Ltd., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. YUNG SHIN PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD. (doing business as Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals and Yung Shin Pharm. Ind. Co. Ltd.), Yung Zip Chemical Co., Ltd., Fang-Yu Lee, and Che-Ming Teng, Defendants, and Carlsbad Technology, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, and Fish and Richardson P.C., and Y. Rocky Tsao, Defendants.

No. 2006-1522.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

November 13, 2007.

Bub-Joo S. Lee, Lee Anav Chung, LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiffs-appellees.

Glenn W. Rhodes, Howrey LLP, of San Francisco, CA, argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were Julie S. Gabler, Stephanie M. Byerly, and Jesse D. Mulholland, of Los Angeles, CA.

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, GAJARSA, Circuit Judge, and HOLDERMAN, Chief District Judge.^*

GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Carlsbad Technology, Inc. ("CTI") appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Central District of California remanding the case to state court. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharms. Indus. Co., Ltd. ("Order"), No. 05-07976 (C.D.Cal. Jun. 9, 2006). The remand order was entered in response to a motion to dismiss brought by Defendant CTI. Id. at 5. Because we lack jurisdiction to review this appeal, we dismiss.

I.

A.

The plaintiffs alleged the following facts, which we accept as true for purposes of this appeal, in their first amended complaint ("FAC").

In 1999, Jong-Wan Park ("Park") and Yang-Sook Chun ("Chun"), two researchers affiliated with a Korean university, began to investigate the effect of the chemical compound YC-1 on a protein complex known as HIF-1. A component of HIF-1 is expressed in human tumors, and Park and Chun hypothesized that YC-1 could be used to inhibit the activity of HIF-1, "which would have the effect of suppressing angiogenesis, that is, the growth of blood vessels into animal tumors, and thereby kill the tumor by starving it of oxygen and nutrients." FAC ¶¶ 19-21.

Between 1999 and 2002, Park and Chun "conducted a series of laboratory experiments that confirmed that YC-1 in fact inhibits HIF-1 activity in vitro, that is, in test tube experiments" and "in vivo, that is, in live laboratory animals." Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. Park and Chun "filed a Korean patent application disclosing their INVENTION, including the novel anti-angiogenic, anti-cancer application of YC-1" and submitted the results of their experiments in papers to two academic journals, which subsequently accepted and published the papers. Id. ¶¶ 22-26.

During this time period, Park contacted and exchanged several emails with Defendant Che-Ming Teng ("Teng"). Park contacted Defendant Teng because of his "prior role in the synthesis and development of YC-1, his general familiarity with the compound, and his relationship with" Defendant Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co., Ltd. ("Yung Shin"), "a major supplier of YC-1." Id. ¶ 32. Defendant Teng supplied Park with four batches of YC-1 to be used in the experiments. Park disclosed the results of his study and sent to Defendant Teng a draft manuscript of the in vitro paper and the not-yet-public experimental data from the in vivo experiments. Park also suggested that Defendant Teng and Defendant Fang-Yu-Lee ("Lee"), the President of Defendant Yung Shin, could be co-authors of the in vitro paper. Id. ¶¶ 32-39. Unknown to Park and Chun, Defendants Y. Rocky Tsao and Fish & Richardson P.C. (collectively "Patent Attorneys") filed U.S. patent applications "covering the novel anti-angiogenic, anti-cancer properties of YC-1" and naming Defendants Lee and Teng as the inventors. Id. ¶¶ 56-62. In March 2003, Defendant Yung Shin filed a PCT application claiming priority to the U.S. provisional application. Id. ¶ 86.

In July 2003, Park and Chun assigned all of their rights relating to YC-1 to Plaintiff BizBiotech. Plaintiff BizBiotech attempted to negotiate a joint venture with Defendants Teng, Lee, and Yung Shin; during the negotiations, Plaintiff BizBiotech "disclosed its patent protection strategy" and "business plans." Id. ¶ 63-71. The defendants involved in the negotiations did not reveal their own patent applications to the plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 28, 63-71. In February 2005, Plaintiff BizBiotech assigned all of its rights with respect to YC-1 to Plaintiff HIF Bio, Inc. ("HIF").

Plaintiffs BizBiotech and HIF assert that they hold all rights "with respect to the INVENTION and application of YC-1 as an anti-cancer, anti-angiogenesis agent," including several U.S. patent applications filed between April 2003 and June 2004 naming Park and Chun as the inventors. Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 86, 89. The plaintiffs also assert that Defendant CTI agreed to work with Defendants Yung Shin, Lee, and Teng "to further develop, commercialize, sell and market YC-1 and its analogues as anti-angiogenic, anti-cancer drugs in the United States and abroad." Id. ¶ 82.

B.

In September 2005, Plaintiffs HIF and BizBiotech filed a complaint against Defendants Yung Shin, Yung Zip Chem. Co., Ltd. ("Yung Zip"), Lee, Teng, CTI, and Patent Attorneys in Los Angeles Superior Court. In November 2005, Defendant CTI removed the action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In March 2006, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, asserting twelve causes of action.

The first and second causes of action seek a declaratory judgment for ownership and inventorship, respectively, of "the INVENTION." FAC ¶¶ 104-110. The third cause of action asserts violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. FAC ¶¶ 112-71. The remaining nine causes of action are based respectively on slander of title, id. ¶¶ 172-75; conversion, id. ¶¶ 176-80; actual and constructive fraud, id. ¶¶ 181-84; intentional interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, id. ¶¶ 185-89; negligent interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, id. ¶¶ 190-96; breach of implied contract, id. ¶¶ 197-203; unfair competition and fraudulent business practices, id. ¶¶ 204-09; unjust enrichment-constructive trust, id. ¶¶ 210-14; and permanent injunction, id. ¶¶ 215-19.

The defendants filed various motions to dismiss and to strike. Of pertinence here, Defendant CTI moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The district court dismissed the RICO claim finding that the plaintiffs "have not adequately alleged a pattern of racketeering." Order, slip op. at 11-12. In addition, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the rights of inventorship and ownership of inventions claims, which it found were state law claims, and also declined supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' nine other state claims. Id. at 7-9, 12. Having declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, the district court remanded the case to state court. Id.

Defendant CTI filed a timely notice of appeal with this court.¹

II.

We have stated that "[w]hether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal taken from a district court judgment is a question of law which we address in the first instance." Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 471 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Pause Tech. LLC v. TiVo Inc., 401 F.3d 1290, 1292 (Fed.Cir.2005)). Whether the district court possessed jurisdiction is also a question of law that this court reviews without deference. Dehne v. United States, 970 F.2d 890, 892 (Fed.Cir. 1992) ("This Court . . . reviews jurisdiction, a question of law, de novo.") (citation omitted); see Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994) ("[Q]uestion[s] of law . . . must be resolved de novo on appeal."); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed.Cir.2007) (§ 2201 declaratory judgment action); Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 892 (Fed.Cir.2007) (§ 1367 supplemental jurisdiction); see Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) (§ 1331 federal question jurisdiction in removal context).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 "reaffirms that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the district court." Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.1994); see also City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997) (stating that supplemental jurisdiction statute codifies the principle "that pendent jurisdiction `is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right,' and that district courts can decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons") (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). A district court's discretion, however, is not unfettered and is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Voda, 476 F.3d at 897-98.

III.

A.

Defendant CTI asserts on appeal that the district court's remand order was improper because the plaintiffs' remanded claims raise a substantial question of federal patent law—inventorship. The plaintiffs assert that the district court's remand order was proper because their claims are based solely on state law and do not arise under the federal patent laws. We dispose of this appeal, however, on a threshold issue — whether this court has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order.

The Supreme Court has stated that "every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction . . . even though the parties are prepared to concede it." Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., SafeTCare Mfg., Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc., 497 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed.Cir....