State, ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc.

Decision Date03 June 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-230,86-230
Citation31 OBR 70,31 Ohio St.3d 18,508 N.E.2d 936
Parties, 31 O.B.R. 70 The STATE, ex rel. BURLEY, Appellee, v. COIL PACKING, INC.; Industrial Commission of Ohio, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

This court's role in the review of mandamus actions challenging the Industrial Commission's decision as to the extent of disability in cases involving multiple allowed conditions shall henceforth be limited to a determination as to whether there is some evidence in the record to support the commission's stated basis for its decision. (State, ex rel. Anderson, v. Indus. Comm. [1980], 62 Ohio St.2d 166, 16 O.O.3d 199, 404 N.E.2d 153, overruled.)

Relator-appellee, Raymond Burley, was employed by the respondent Coil Packing, Inc. as a butcher. On July 24, 1974, relator was injured at work when he was struck by a falling object. Relator timely filed an application for workers' compensation benefits and the claim was allowed for "[c]erebral concussion, cervical myositis, lumbrosacral sprain, depressive neurosis."

On January 18, 1984, relator's treating physician, James C. Cameron, D.O., submitted a physician's "C-84" report in which he estimated that relator would be substantially able to return to his former position of employment on May 30, 1984. In two subsequent reports, Dr. Cameron updated relator's projected return date to August 30, 1984, and later, to September 20, 1984.

On March 28, 1984, relator was given a neurological evaluation by Gerald S. Steiman, M.D. Dr. Steiman concluded that relator's physical injury had become a permanent condition and evaluated the impairment at five percent. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Steiman specifically excluded any consideration of relator's psychiatric impairment and recommended that relator undergo further evaluation by a psychiatrist.

On April 3, 1984, relator was examined by Robert L. Turton, D.O. for a psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Turton estimated relator's psychiatric impairment to be temporary, in the range of ten percent and not work restrictive.

On the same date, relator was given an additional orthopedic examination by William Reynolds, M.D. Dr. Reynolds concluded that relator had reached the maximum recovery from his injury and that his impairment would be in the range of fifteen percent. Dr. Reynolds specifically stated that from an orthopedic standpoint, relator would be "substantially able to peform [sic ] his former job duties."

Lastly, on July 12, 1984, J.A. Hardie, M.D. conducted a review of relator's claim file. Upon reviewing all the medical information available in the file at that time, Dr. Hardie stated that the file, "as reviewed & accepted," did not indicate that relator was impaired from returning to his former position of employment.

On July 6, 1984 and August 6, 1984, a hearing was held before the district hearing officer to determine the extent of relator's disability. The district hearing officer ruled that temporary total disability compensation be denied after August 18, 1984, on the grounds that relator could return to his former position of employment. This decision was based upon the reports of Drs. Reynolds, Steiman, Turton and Hardie.

The decision of the district hearing officer was affirmed by the Columbus Regional Board of Review. A staff hearing officer of the Industrial Commission refused further appeal from the regional board of review.

On March 1, 1985, relator filed an original action in mandamus with the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in which relator alleged that the commission abused its discretion by failing to continue the payment of temporary total disability compensation. Upon review, the court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus directing the Industrial Commission to vacate its previous orders and enter an order awarding relator temporary total disability compensation on a continuing basis until such time as future proceedings may demonstrate that he is no longer entitled to such benefits.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.

Michael J. Muldoon, Columbus, for appellee.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Janet E. Jackson and Merl H. Wayman, Columbus, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is but another example of the multitude of cases in which this court has been asked to evaluate the credibility of the evidence before the Industrial Commission in workers' compensation claims involving two or more allowed conditions. All of these actions are the result of this court's judgment in State, ex rel. Anderson, v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 166, 16 O.O.3d 199, 404 N.E.2d 153, wherein this court established the combined-effects evidentiary rule.

The impetus for this decision was a concern that in the disposition of multiple-injury claims, the commission would premise its determination as to the extent of disability on the basis of medical reports which only considered one of the claimant's recognized conditions. The Anderson court sought to prevent this perceived inadequacy by requiring the commission to consider only those medical reports which evaluated the claimant's total impairment resulting from the combined effect of all his allowed conditions.

While the underlying purpose for the Anderson rule may have been well-intentioned, the practical application of this evidentiary doctrine has ultimately undermined the adjudicatory function of the Industrial Commission in the resolution of compensation claims involving multiple injuries. See, generally, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in State, ex rel. Rouch, v. Eagle Tool & Machine Co. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 197, 201-217, 26 OBR 289, 292-306, 498 N.E.2d 464, 468-480.

To begin with, the Anderson rule effectively prevents the commission from ever considering the weight and credibility of any evidence which does not comport with the requisites of Anderson. This rule applies without regard to the relevancy with which a particular medical report may have toward one of the claimant's impairments. Not only does this rule deny the commission the benefit of considering what could be some of the most persuasive and credible evidence before it as to one aspect of the claimant's impairments, but it also dissuades the parties from tendering all the relevant evidence in the matter.

Moreover, the Anderson evidentiary doctrine has distorted this court's traditional role in the review of mandamus actions challenging the Industrial Commission's determination as to the extent of a disability. Pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, there is no appeal from a determination of the commission as to the extent of a claimant's disability. The only recognized means of review from such determinations is through a mandamus action. State, ex rel. General Motors Corp., v. Indus. Comm. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 278, 280, 71 O.O.2d 255, 257, 328 N.E.2d 387, 389. However, the party which challenges the Industrial Commission's determination as to the extent of disability bears the burden of demonstrating that the commission's determination manifests an abuse of discretion and, in this context, abuse of discretion has been repeatedly defined as a showing that the commission's decision was rendered without some evidence to support it. State, ex rel. Elliott, v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 76, 79, 26 OBR 66, 68, 497 N.E.2d 70, 72; State, ex rel. Milburn, v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 119, 121, 26 OBR 102, 103, 498 N.E.2d 440, 441; State, ex rel. Rouch, v. Eagle Tool & Machine Co., supra, at 198, 26 OBR at 290, 498 N.E.2d at 466.

When this court has previously reviewed a mandamus action involving a combined-effects issue, it has conducted a review which goes beyond the traditional search for "some evidence" to support the commission's findings. In short, this court evaluated the credibility of the evidence before the commission. Such a review placed this court in the role of a "super commission," a role never envisioned by either the Ohio Constitution or the General Assembly.

Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, we hereby overrule the Anderson decision and abandon the combined-effects evidentiary standard announced therein. The commission alone shall be responsible for the evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence before it. This court's role in the review of mandamus actions challenging the Industrial Commission's decision as to the extent of disability in cases involving multiple allowed conditions shall henceforth be limited to a determination as to whether there is some evidence in the record to support the commission's stated basis for its decision.

Looking now to the matter at hand, the district hearing officer discontinued relator's temporary...

To continue reading

Request your trial
326 cases
  • State ex rel. v. Brunner
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2008
    ...for "some evidence," as it does in workers' compensation disability determinations, see, e.g., State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936, because I do not believe that that type of review accords with the procedural framework in R.C. 3501......
  • State v. George, 88-559
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • September 27, 1989
    ... ... without some evidence to support it." State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, ... ...
  • State ex rel. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Ohio
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • July 3, 1990
    ...the twelve percent and thirty percent awards for his 1982 and 1983 injuries, respectively. See State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936, syllabus; State ex rel. Rouch v. Eagle Tool & Machine Co. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 197, 198, 26 OBR 289......
  • Grant v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • January 29, 1993
    ...Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 166, 16 O.O.3d 199, 404 N.E.2d 153, overruled on other grounds in State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936; Zavatsky v. Stringer (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 386, 10 O.O.3d 503, 384 N.E.2d 693, followed in Afrates v.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT