Enger v. Walker Field, Colorado Public Airport Authority, 25734
Decision Date | 16 April 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 25734,25734 |
Citation | 508 P.2d 1245,181 Colo. 253 |
Parties | W. D. ENGER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The WALKER FIELD, COLORADO PUBLIC AIRPORT AUTHORITY, a Colorado Body Corporate and Politic, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Sell & Colosky, James M. Colosky, Hotchkiss, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Gerald J. Ashby, Grand Junction, for defendants-appellees.
This is a class action instituted pursuant to C.R.C.P. 23(a)(1) to challenge the validity of revenue bonds in the amount of one million dollars authorized by the Walker Field, Colorado Public Airport Authority (Airport Authority). Airport Authority was created by action of the combination of the County Commissioners of Mesa County and the City Council of Grand Junction, an Article XX home rule city, pursuant to the Public Airport Authority Act, 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 5--5--1 et seq.
The plaintiffs, W. D. Enger, W. L. Beard, Clinton L. Kitson, and John J. Arnhold are residents of the City of Grand Junction and Mesa County and tax-paying electors of both political subdivisions. The plaintiff Association of Voters of Colorado is an unincorporated, nonprofit association, of which the individual plaintiffs are members, organized for the purpose of obtaining fair and equitable taxation for the citizens of Mesa County.
The plaintiffs pled five separate claims. Several claims challenged the bond proceedings on more than one ground. However, the plaintiffs have not presented arguments on all issues raised by their complaint. Our discussion will be limited to four specific points argued in the brief. Another was dismissed without prejudice by stipulation of the parties. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to each of the claims. C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). To their motions the defendants attached certified copies of the resolutions of the county and the city creating the Airport Authority referred to in plaintiffs' first claim, and the bond resolution adopted by the Board of Commissioners of the Authority on April 26, 1971, and certain 'covenants and agreements' adopted by the City Council and the County Commissioners on April 7, 1971, the alleged invalidity of which forms the basis for one claim for relief in plaintiffs' complaint. We assume the trial court took these matters into consideration in sustaining the defendants' motions.
Under the foregoing circumstances the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted had to be treated by the trial court as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Rule 12(b).
It appears that, except for one issue which will be discussed later, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the issues were properly resolved by the trial court as matters of law. Rule 56(c).
Each of the four points argued in the brief will be discussed separately.
The first claim challenged the validity of the emergency clause in the ordinance introduced and passed by the City Council on March 17, 1971, as its part of the joint action with Mesa County in creating the Walker Field, Colorado Public Airport Authority. The challenge involves the following provision of the Grand Junction City Charter:
'No ordinance shall be passed finally on the date it is introduced, except in cases of emergency, for the preservation of the public peace, health or safety, and then only by the unanimous vote of all members of the Council.'
The trial court, in ruling on the issues, noted that,
In Fladung v. City of Boulder, 160 Colo. 271, 417 P.2d 787, we held that,
The plaintiffs' response to the trial judge's holding appears in this quote from their brief:
'The facts showing such urgency and need shall be specifically stated in the measure itself.'
In Fladung and McCray, we refused to strike down the ordinances, holding that the ordinances 'just barely' complied with the charter provision, refusing to intercede under the principle of judicial restraint, 'which compels us to give validity to actions of the legislative branch of the Boulder City Government, if we can possibly do so, . . ..'
It is clear that the Grand Junction City Charter is less demanding than the Boulder Charter emergency provision relative to stating the facts showing the emergency. The only requirement in the Grand Junction Charter is that the emergency be 'for the preservation of the public peace, health or safety.' This legislative finding was made. However, the Grand Junction Charter requirement that the emergency clause be adopted 'by the unanimous vote of all members of the Council' is much more demanding than the Boulder Charter, which only requires a vote of two-thirds of the council members present.
There was strict compliance by the Grand Junction Council with the terms of its charter. We find no error in the result reached by the trial court.
Plaintiffs' second claim for relief attacks the constitutionality of 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 5--5--4(2), which provides:
Plaintiffs argue that the provision for the vesting in the Airport Authority 'all rights, contracts, obligations and property, both real and personal,' belonging to the city and the county without the approval of the taxpaying electors in the respective political entities 'constitutes the taking of property...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Destefano v. Grabrian
...and not excluded by the court. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1276 (Colo.1985); Enger v. Walker Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Auth., 181 Colo. 253, 256-57, 508 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1973).Here, the trial court admitted the truth of the factual allegations and determined that the claims ......
-
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co.
...judgment. See C.R.C.P. 12(b); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1276 (Colo.1985); Enger v. Walker Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Auth., 181 Colo. 253, 256-57, 508 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1973). In response, Churchey filed her own summary judgment motion. The trial court denied Churchey's moti......
-
Walker Field, Colo., Public Airport Authority v. Adams
...since the City and County created the Walker Field Authority by their combined action. See Enger v. Walker Field, Colorado, Public Airport Authority, 181 Colo. 253, 508 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Colo.). We cannot say that calling for the additional obligations by the City and County were beyond the ......
-
City of Colorado Springs v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Eagle, s. 93CA0386
...or created under the constitution, municipalities have no privileges or immunities under the state constitution. Enger v. Walker Field, 181 Colo. 253, 508 P.2d 1245 (1973); Board of County Commissioners v. E-470 Public Highway Authority, 881 P.2d 412 (Colo.App.1994) (cert. granted October 1......
-
Rule 12 DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS — WHEN AND HOW PRESENTED — BY PLEADING OR MOTION — MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS.
...to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted treated as motion for summary judgment. Enger v. Walker Field, 181 Colo. 253, 508 P.2d 1245 (1973). Where the trial court, in ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, considered affidavit submitted......
-
Rule 56 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RULINGS ON QUESTIONS OF LAW.
...upon a motion for summary judgment. Smith v. Mills, 123 Colo. 11, 225 P.2d 483 (1950); Enger v. Walker Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Auth., 181 Colo. 253, 508 P.2d 1245 (1973). It is wholly immaterial whether the trial court considers the judgment of dismissal proper under the provisions of C.R......
-
Using Local Police Powers to Protect the Environment
...28. See Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez School District, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992); Enger v. Walker Field Colorado Public Airport Authority, 508 P.2d 1245 (Colo. 1973); Colorado Chiropractic Ass'n v. Heuser, 494 P.2d 833 (Colo. 1972); City of Leadville v. Leadville Sewer Co., 107 P. 801 (Colo. 1......