Gilmore v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 07 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-1738,91-1738
• Citation: 124 L.Ed.2d 306,508 U.S. 333,113 S.Ct. 2112
• Parties: Jerry D. GILMORE, Petitioner, v. Kevin TAYLOR
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

508 U.S. 333

113 S.Ct. 2112

124 L.Ed.2d 306

Jerry D. GILMORE, Petitioner,

v Kevin TAYLOR.

No. 91-1738

Argued March 2, 1993.

Decided June 7, 1993.

Syllabus ^*

At his trial in Illinois state court, respondent Taylor admitted the killing with which he was charged, but presented evidence to support his claim that he was only guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The jury received instructions modeled after the state pattern instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter and convicted Taylor of murder. After the conviction and sentence became final, he sought federal habeas relief on the ground that the jury instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. While his case was pending, the Court of Appeals, relying on Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368, held as much, finding that because the pattern murder instructions preceded the voluntary-manslaughter instructions, but did not expressly direct a jury that it could not return a murder conviction if it found that a defendant possessed a mitigating mental state, it was possible for a jury to find that a defendant was guilty of murder without even considering whether he was entitled to a voluntary-manslaughter conviction. Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129. The State conceded that Taylor's jury instructions were unconstitutional, but argued that the Falconer rule was "new" within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, and could not form the basis for federal habeas relief. The District Court agreed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316, and Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (plurality opinion), rather than Cupp, were specific enough to have compelled the result in Falconer.

Held: The Falconer rule is "new" within the meaning of Teague and may not provide the basis for federal habeas relief. Pp. ____.

(a) Subject to two narrow exceptions, a case that is decided after a defendant's conviction and sentence become final may not provide the basis for federal habeas relief if it announces a new rule, i.e., a result that was not dictated by precedent at the time the defendant's conviction became final. This principle validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts and therefore effectuates the States' interest in the finality of criminal convictions and fosters comity between federal and state courts. Pp. ____.

(b) The flaw found in Falconer was not that the instructions somehow lessened the State's burden of proof below that constitutionally required by cases such as In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, but rather that the instructions prevented the jury from considering evidence of an affirmative defense. Cases following Cupp in the Winship line establish that States must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element of the offense charged, but may place on defendants the burden of proving affirmative defenses, see Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, and, thus, make clear that Cupp is an unlikely progenitor of the Falconer rule. Nor do the other cases cited by the Court of Appeals dictate the Falconer result. Boyde, supra—in which the Court clarified the standard for reviewing on habeas a claim that ambiguous instructions impermissibly restricted a jury's consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence—was a capital case, with respect to which the Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and fact finding than in noncapital cases. In contrast, in noncapital cases, instructions containing state-law errors may not form the basis for federal habeas relief, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385, and there is no counterpart to the Eighth Amendment's doctrine of constitutionally relevant evidence in capital cases. Connecticut v. Johnson, supra, and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, which it discusses, flow from Winship's due process guarantee, which does not apply to affirmative defenses. The jury's failure to consider Taylor's affirmative defense is not a violation of his due process right to present a complete defense, since the cases involving that right have dealt only with the exclusion of evidence and the testimony of defense witnesses, and since Taylor's expansive reading of these cases would nullify the rule reaffirmed in Estelle v. McGuire, supra. Pp. ____.

(c) The Falconer rule does not fall into either of Teague's exceptions. The rule does not "decriminalize" any class of conduct or fall into that small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Pp. ____.

954 F.2d 441 (CA 7 1992), reversed.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in all but n. 3 of which SOUTER, J., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which WHITE, J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined.

Mark E. Wilson, Chicago, IL, for petitioner.

Lawrence C. Marshall, Chicago, IL, appointed by this Court, for respondent.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.^*

Respondent Kevin Taylor was convicted of murder by an Illinois jury and sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment. After his conviction and sentence became final, he sought federal habeas relief on the ground that the jury instructions given at his trial violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted relief on the basis of its recent decision in Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (1990), which held that the Illinois pattern jury instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter were unconstitutional because they allowed a jury to return a murder verdict without considering whether the defendant possessed a mental state that would support a voluntary-manslaughter verdict instead. We conclude that the rule announced in Falconer was not dictated by prior precedent, and is therefore "new" within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Accordingly, the Falconer rule may not provide the basis for federal habeas relief in respondent's case.

Early one morning in September 1985, respondent became involved in a dispute with his former wife and her live-in boyfriend, Scott Siniscalchi, over custodial arrangements for his daughter. A fracas ensued between the three adults, during which respondent stabbed Siniscalchi seven times with a hunting knife. Siniscalchi died from these wounds, and respondent was arrested at his home later that morning.

Respondent was charged with murder. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 9-1 (1985). At trial, he took the stand and admitted killing Siniscalchi, but claimed he was acting under a sudden and intense passion provoked by Siniscalchi, and was therefore only guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. ¶ 9-2. At the close of all the evidence, the trial judge found that there was sufficient evidence supporting respondent's "heat of passion" defense to require an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and instructed the jury as follows:

"To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:

"First: That the Defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Scott Siniscalchi; and

"Second: That when the Defendant did so he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that his act would cause death or great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he was committing the offense of home invasion.

"If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant guilty.

"If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant not guilty.

. . . . . "To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the evidence must prove the following propositions:

"First: That the Defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Scott Siniscalchi; and

"Second: That when the Defendant did so he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that such acts would [sic ] death or great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi;

"Third: That when the Defendant did so he acted under a sudden and intense passion, resulting from serious provocation by another.

"If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant guilty.

"If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant not guilty.

"As stated previously, the Defendant is charged with committing the offense of murder and voluntary manslaughter. If you find the Defendant guilty, you must find him guilty of either offense; but not both. On the other hand, if you find the Defendant not guilty, you can find him not guilty on either or both offenses." App. 128-131.

These instructions were modeled after, and virtually identical to, the Illinois pattern jury instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter, which were formally adopted in 1981, Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal §§ 7.02 and 7.04 (2d ed. 1981), but had been uniformly given by Illinois judges since 1961, when the State...