508 U.S. 491 (1993), 91-1513, United States Department of Treasury v. Fabe
|Docket Nº:||No. 91-1513|
|Citation:||508 U.S. 491, 113 S.Ct. 2202, 124 L.Ed.2d 449, 61 U.S.L.W. 4579|
|Party Name:||United States Department of Treasury v. Fabe|
|Case Date:||June 11, 1993|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued Dec. 8, 1992
In proceedings under Ohio law to liquidate an insolvent insurance company, the United States asserted that its claims as obligee on various of the company's surety bonds were entitled to first priority under 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1)(A)(iii). Respondent Fabe, the liquidator appointed by the state court, brought a declaratory judgment action in the Federal District Court to establish that priority in such proceedings is governed by an Ohio statute that ranks governmental claims behind (1) administrative expenses, (2) specified wage claims, (3) policyholders' claims, and (4) general creditors' claims. Fabe argued that the federal priority statute does not preempt the Ohio law because the latter falls within § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides, inter alia: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to . . . supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. . . ." The court granted summary judgment for the United States on the ground that the state statute does not involve the "business of insurance" under the tripartite standard articulated in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129. The Court of Appeals disagreed and, in reversing, held that the Ohio scheme regulates the "business of insurance" because it protects the interests of the insured.
Held: The Ohio priority statute escapes federal preemption to the extent that it protects policyholders, but it is not a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance to the extent that it is designed to further the interests of creditors other than policyholders. Pp. 499-510.
(a) The McCarran-Ferguson Act's primary purpose was to restore to the States broad authority to tax and regulate the insurance industry in response to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533. Pp. 499-500.
(b) The Ohio statute, to the extent that it regulates policyholders, is a law enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance." Because that phrase refers to statutes aimed at protecting or regulating, directly or indirectly, the relationship between the insurance company and its policyholders, SEC v. National Securities Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460, the federal priority statute must yield to the conflicting Ohio statute
to the extent that the latter furthers policyholders' interests. Pireno does not support petitioner's argument to the contrary, since the actual performance of an insurance contract satisfies each prong of the Pireno test: performance of the terms of an insurance policy (1) facilitates the transfer of risk from the insured to the insurer; (2) is central to the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) is confined entirely to entities within the insurance industry. Thus, such actual performance is an essential part of the "business of insurance." Because the Ohio statute is integrally related to the performance of insurance contracts after bankruptcy, it is a law "enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance" within the meaning of § 2(b). This plain reading of the McCarran-Ferguson Act comports with the statute's purpose. Pp. 500-506.
(c) Petitioner's contrary interpretation based on the legislative history is at odds with § 2(b)'s plain language, and unravels upon close inspection. Pp. 506-508.
[113 S.Ct. 2204] (d) The preference accorded by Ohio to the expenses of administering the insolvency proceeding is reasonably necessary to further the goal of protecting policyholders, since liquidation could not even commence without payment of administrative costs. The preferences conferred upon employees and other general creditors, however, do not escape preemption, because their connection to the ultimate aim of insurance is too tenuous. Pp. 508-510.
939 F.2d 341 (CA 6 1991), affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 510.
BLACKMUN, J., lead opinion
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713, accords first priority to the United States with respect to a bankrupt debtor's obligations. An Ohio statute confers only fifth priority upon claims of the United States in proceedings to liquidate an insolvent insurance company. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3903.42 (1989). The federal priority statute preempts the inconsistent Ohio law unless the latter is exempt from preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. In order to resolve this case, we must decide whether a state statute establishing the priority of creditors' claims in a proceeding to liquidate an insolvent insurance company is a law enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance," within the meaning of § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
We hold that the Ohio priority statute escapes preemption to the extent that it protects policyholders. Accordingly, Ohio may effectively afford priority, over claims of the United States, to the insurance claims of policyholders and to the costs and expenses of administering the liquidation.
But when Ohio attempts to rank other categories of claims above those pressed by the United States, it is not free from federal preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The Ohio priority statute was enacted as part of a complex and specialized administrative structure for the regulation of insurance companies from inception to dissolution. The statute proclaims as its purpose "the protection of the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors, and the public generally." § 3903.02(D). Chapter 3903 broadly empowers the State's Superintendent of Insurance to place a financially impaired insurance company under his supervision, or into rehabilitation, or into liquidation. The last is authorized when the Superintendent finds that the insurer is insolvent, that placement in supervision or rehabilitation would be futile, and that "further transaction of business would be hazardous, financially or otherwise, to [the insurer's] policyholders, its creditors, or the public." § 3903.17(C). As liquidator, the Superintendent is entitled to take title to all assets, § 3903.18(A); to collect and invest moneys due the insurer, § 3903.21(A)(6); to continue to prosecute and commence in the name of the insurer any and all suits and other legal proceedings, § 3903.21(A)(12); to collect reinsurance and unearned premiums due the insurer, §§ 3903.32 and 3903.33; to evaluate all claims against the estate, § 3903.43; and to make payments to claimants to the extent possible, § 3903.44. It seems fair to say that the effect of all this is to empower the liquidator to continue to operate the insurance company in all ways but one -- the issuance of new policies.
Pursuant to this statutory framework, the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County, [113 S.Ct. 2205] Ohio, on April 30, 1986, declared American Druggists' Insurance Company insolvent. The court directed that the company be liquidated, and it appointed respondent, Ohio's Superintendent of Insurance, to serve as liquidator. The United States, as obligee
on various immigration, appearance, performance, and payment bonds issued by the company as surety, filed claims in excess of $10.7 million in the state liquidation proceedings. The United States asserted that its claims were entitled to first priority under the federal statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1)(A)(iii), which provides: "A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when . . . a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and . . . an act of bankruptcy is committed."
Respondent Superintendent brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking to establish that the federal priority statute does not preempt the Ohio law designating the priority of creditors' claims in insurance liquidation proceedings. Under the Ohio statute, as noted above, claims of federal, state, and local governments are entitled only to fifth priority, ranking behind (1) administrative expenses, (2) specified wage claims, (3) policyholders' claims, and (4) claims of general creditors. § 3903.42.
Respondent argued that the [113 S.Ct. 2206] Ohio priority scheme, rather than the federal priority statute, governs the priority of claims of the United States because it falls within the anti-preemption
provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the United States. Relying upon the tripartite standard for divining what constitutes the "business of insurance," as articulated in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), the court considered three factors:
first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a (quoting Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129). Reasoning that the liquidation of an insolvent insurer possesses none of these attributes, the court concluded that the Ohio priority statute does not involve the "business of insurance." App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. 939 F.2d 341 (CA6 1991). The court held that the Ohio priority...
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