Burns v. Elrod, s. 71--1285
| Decision Date | 24 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | 72--1541,Nos. 71--1285,s. 71--1285 |
| Parties | John BURNS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Richard J. ELROD, Individually and as Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, etal., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
John C. Tucker, Gerald D. Chiss, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., Robert E. Wiss, Thomas A. Foran, Raymond F. Simon, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before KILEY, * Senior Circuit Judge, and CAMPBELL ** and GRANT, *** Senior District Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal from two orders of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the first denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and the second dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. We reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed herein.
The individual plaintiffs, with one exception, were employees of the Office of the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, on and before December 7, 1970. They were not protected by Civil Service or other laws against summary discharge from their employment. Subsequent to December 7, 1970, the date on which Richard J. Elrod took office as Sheriff of Cook County, these plaintiffs were fired, allegedly because they were either members of the Republican rather than the Democratic Party, did not have the requisite political sponsorship from the Democratic Party or because they failed to pledge their political allegiance to, work for or contribute to the Democratic Party. Sheriff Elrod is alleged to be a Democrat. Plaintiff Fred Buckley, at the time the complaint was filed, was still employed by the Sheriff of Cook County, but alleged that he was in 'imminent danger' of being fired for the same reasons that allegedly caused the other plaintiffs' dismissals.
The defendants include Richard J. Elrod, Sheriff of Cook County, at whose direction the dismissals are claimed to have been made; Richard J. Daley, President of the Democratic Organization of Cook County and Chairman of the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County; the Democratic Organization of Cook County; and the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County. Plaintiffs charged that Mr. Daley and the defendant organizations were also responsible for the dismissals of plaintiffs, alleging that Mr. Elrod effected the dismissals 'under the direction and control of and in conspiracy' with these defendants.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that, because their dismissals were based upon their political association and beliefs, defendants' conduct violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. As relief, plaintiffs prayed for a declaration of their rights, compensatory and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining defendants from conditioning plaintiffs' employment on constitutionally impermissible grounds, restraining further dismissals on such grounds and ordering reinstatement for unlawfully dismissed employees.
On the grounds that loss of employment did not constitute a sufficient showing of irreparable injury and that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law, Judge Hoffman denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Subsequently, Judge Bauer granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Bauer relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1020, 92 S.Ct. 683, 30 L.Ed.2d 667 (1972). Alomar concluded that there was no constitutional prohibition against the dismissal of governmental employees because of their political affiliations or beliefs.
Subsequent to these orders of the district court, this Circuit announced its decision in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943, 93 S.Ct. 1370, 35 L.Ed.2d 609 (1973) which refused to follow the reasoning in Alomar, holding instead that the dismissal of a public employee, not otherwise protected by Civil Service, because of his or her political associations or beliefs violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. Although defendants argue that Lewis was wrongly decided and invite our reconsideration thereof, 1 we decline to do so for the scholarly and persuasive reasons articulated in Judge Stevens opinion in Lewis. 2 Plaintiffs' allegations that they were fired or threatened with dismissal because they belonged to a political party other than that of the office holder's political party, state a legally cognizable claim entitling them to an opportunity to prove their case.
Defendant Elrod resists this conclusion on the ground that under the rationale of Lewis, the plaintiffs occupy 'policymaking' positions as a matter of law. It is maintained that the plaintiffs were deputy sheriffs and that, under Illinois law, this makes them public officials rather than public employees. Lewis recognized 'the public executives right to use political philosophy or affiliation as one criteria in the selection of policy-making officials' and that 'considerations of personal loyalty, or other factors besides determination of policy, may justify the employment of political associates in certain positions.' Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (1972). These factors were characterized as a justification for an otherwise impermissible dismissal.
Defendant Elrod reasons that since deputy sheriffs are public officials their dismissal for partisan political reasons is justified under Lewis. We fail to see how the label 'public official' or 'public employee' advances the real inquiry on whether the particular employee was 'engaged directly or indirectly in the formulation or implementation of policies' of the governmental office or agency involved. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 578 (Campbell,...
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Elrod v. Burns
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