Marvin v. City of Taylor
Decision Date | 04 December 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 06-2008.,06-2008. |
Citation | 509 F.3d 234 |
Parties | Frank L. MARVIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF TAYLOR, Don Helvey, Matt Minard, and Jeffrey Shewchuk, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ON BRIEF: John H. Dise, Jr., Gina U. Puzzuoli, Dise & Associates, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellants. Evelyn G. Butler, Plymouth, Michigan, for Appellee.
Before: BATCHELDER and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; ACKERMAN, District Judge.*
ACKERMAN, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (p. 253), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Plaintiff Frank L. Marvin alleges that three police officers of the City of Taylor, Michigan — Commander Don Helvey, Officer Matthew Minard, and Officer Jeffrey Shewchuk — used excessive force when arresting him on July 11, 2004. The District Court denied the Defendants' summary judgment motion, which asserted qualified immunity to Marvin's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and governmental immunity to Marvin's pendent state law assault and battery claims. For the following reasons we REVERSE the District Court's denial of qualified immunity and governmental immunity on the grounds that the Defendants' actions were objectively reasonable and therefore did not violate Marvin's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
This appeal arises from the District Court's June 26, 2006, Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The District Court's Order dismissed Count 3 of the Complaint, which claimed liability on the part of the City of Taylor for failure to train and discipline its officers. The Order further dismissed, by stipulation of the Plaintiff, Counts 2 and 4 regarding denial of access to reasonable medical care and denial of due process. As a result, the City of Taylor was dismissed from the case as a party. The Order denied summary judgment to the remaining Defendants on their defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the District Court declared that Count 1, claiming a violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, and Count 5, a pendent state law claim for assault and battery, were the only Counts remaining. The Defendants, Don Helvey, Matthew Minard, and Jeffrey Shewchuk, appeal the District Court's denial of qualified immunity. Plaintiff has not cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment as to the City.
Plaintiff Frank Marvin filed with this Court a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Marvin argues that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal because Defendants "argue the facts and whether they give rise to a defense of qualified immunity" instead of arguing "strictly legal issues." (Pl.'s Br. at 1.) In arguing such, Marvin ignores the part of Defendants' brief stating that "[t]hese officers concede the most favorable view of the facts for Plaintiff in the record for purposes here" and "Defendants accept as true Plaintiff's version of the facts at the scene of the arrest for purposes of its motion." (Defs.' Br. at 19, 21.) These concessions by the Defendants are important because they help create a basis for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Sheets v. Mullins, 287 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir.2002) ().
In Phelps v. Coy, the Sixth Circuit noted that a "denial of summary judgment can be appealed immediately, but only if the appeal presents a `neat abstract [issue] of law' rather than the question of whether the record demonstrates a genuine issue of fact for trial." 286 F.3d 295, 298 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir.1998)); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317, 319-20, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). Particularly with regard to qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit has explained that "[w]hile a denial of summary judgment is usually considered an interlocutory order and not appealable, when the denial occurs because the moving party is not entitled to qualified immunity, we may review that decision." Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Phelps, 286 F.3d at 298). Thus, while Marvin's implicit argument is correct that this Court cannot review an interlocutory appeal based solely upon whether the record demonstrates genuine issues of fact, he nevertheless misinterprets the correct jurisdictional question.
"Where . . . the legal issues are discrete from the factual disputes, we may exercise our jurisdiction to resolve the legal issues only." Phelps, 286 F.3d at 298. Indeed, Phelps addressed essentially the exact same issue presented here insofar as the defendant officer in that case attempted to argue the facts on appeal, but also presented "a series of strictly legal questions," namely whether there was a violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights regarding excessive force. See id. While the defendant officers in the instant matter make some factual arguments, their appeal also presents the discrete legal question of whether qualified immunity should be granted if there was no violation of Marvin's Fourth Amendment rights. As a result, Marvin's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.
On Sunday, July 11, 2004, Marvin was driving from his home in St. Clair, Michigan to Taylor, Michigan. As he approached an intersection in Taylor, he rear-ended a vehicle stopped at that intersection. As luck would have it, the vehicle he hit belonged to Defendant Don Helvey, a commander in the City of Taylor Police Department. Commander Helvey, along with his wife and four children, were in their private vehicle at the time of the accident, the family having just returned from church.
Commander Helvey and Marvin exited their respective vehicles and Commander Helvey immediately observed that Marvin was intoxicated. Marvin admitted as much at the scene, only to learn weeks later that Helvey was a commander with the police department. Commander Helvey then called the police, and the two men waited on the street until the first officer, Defendant Officer Matthew Minard, arrived at the scene. Officer Minard asked Marvin if he had been drinking and he answered in the affirmative. Officer Minard told Marvin that they were going to move the cars off the roadway into a nearby gas station. Commander Helvey then drove Marvin's car because Marvin was too intoxicated, while Commander Helvey's wife drove the Helvey family's car. Officer Minard stated at his deposition that Marvin rode in Officer Minard's patrol car to the gas station. Marvin apparently willingly got into the police car without incident and without being handcuffed. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Officer Jeffrey Shewchuk also arrived at the scene. Officer Minard asked Marvin to perform three field sobriety tests, each of which Marvin failed. One of the tests was a preliminary breath test ("PBT"), which yielded a reading of 1.72, a number above the legal limit. Thereafter, Officer Minard informed Marvin that he was under arrest. At this point, the parties present distinctly different versions of the facts. For purposes of summary judgment, the Court must lend credence to Marvin's interpretation. See Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1775, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
After Officer Minard informed Marvin that he was under arrest, Officer Minard told Marvin to place his arms behind his back so that handcuffs could be placed on his wrists. Marvin, who was 78 years old at the time, asserts that he told Officer Minard that he was physically unable to place his arms behind his back because it was painful to do so. Therefore, instead of obeying the officer's command, Marvin placed his hands out in front and told Officer Minard to cuff him in front. Allegedly, Officer Minard then told Marvin: "Put your arm[s] behind you or we'll put them behind you for you." (J.A. at 288, Marvin Dep. 122:2-3.) Marvin repeated to the officer that he could not put his arms behind him, at which point Officer Minard (Id., Marvin Dep. 122:4-8.) Marvin repeatedly asserts that this conduct resulted in a broken or fractured arm. A review of the report from Marvin's visit to the emergency room several days later reveals that he was actually diagnosed with a "proximal humerous [sic] avulsion of head of bicep tendon."1 (J.A. at 339, Emergency Room Report.) Marvin went to his family doctor eleven days after his emergency room visit and his doctor confirmed that "Marvin's right biceps tendon was acutely ruptured." (Marvin Br. at 14.) The emergency room prescribed Vicodin and Lortab, and there is no suggestion that Marvin required surgery or a cast.
Marvin testified at his deposition that the only officer who physically touched him during the arrest was Officer Minard. (Id. at 288, Marvin Dep. 123:2-24.) Commander Helvey admitted, however, that he assisted the officers in handcuffing Marvin by grabbing one of Marvin's wrists. It is undisputed that Commander Helvey had no other contact with Marvin and that he left the scene with his family shortly after Marvin's arrest.
Upon arrival at the jail, the officers took Marvin into...
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