Stephens v. Toomey

Citation51 Cal.2d 864,338 P.2d 182
Decision Date21 April 1959
Docket NumberS.F. 19968
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
PartiesJoseph STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. Thomas A. TOOMEY, as Registrar of Voters, etc., Respondent.

Kenneth C. Zwerin, San Francisco, for appellant.

Dion R. Holm, City Atty., Lawrence S. Mana, Chief Deputy City Atty., and William J. Braun, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for respondent.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard S. L. Roddis, Deputy Atty. Gen., amici curiae on behalf of respondent.

SHENK, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the registrar of voters of the City and County of San Francisco to register the petitioner as an elector. The registrar refused on the ground that he had been convicted of an infamous crime as contemplated by section 1 of article II of the Constitution of the state and was therefore ineligible to vote.

On October 6, 1954, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the crime of robbery, found by the court to be robbery of the first degree, a felony (penalty five years to life, Pen.Code, § 213). Judgment was pronounced against him and he was sentenced to state prison for the time prescribed by law. He applied for probation which was granted, sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation on certain conditions for the term of five years. The term has not yet expired.

With the foregoing background the petitioner seeks to enforce his right to vote while confronted with section 1 of article II of the Constitution of the State of California which reads in part: '(N)o person convicted of any infamous crime * * * shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this State * * *.'

The contention of the registrar is that, as provided in the foregoing constitutional provision, the petitioner is under conviction of an infamous crime and therefore ineligible to vote. It is the position of the petitioner that the sentence has been suspended under the probation laws of the state and that he is therefore entitled to exercise the right of an elector during probation.

It is first necessary to determine the meaning and application of the words 'convicted of an infamous crime' as used in the above constitutional provision in connection with other laws of the state.

A plea of guilty constitutes a conviction. People v. Williams, 27 Cal.2d 220, 228, 163 P.2d 692; People v. Goldstein, 32 Cal. 432, 433; 14 Cal.Jur.2d 493. Robbery of the first degree is punishable by imprisonment in state prison and is an infamous crime. Matter of Application of Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 319, 139 P. 674; 14 Cal.Jur.2d 205. The word conviction, used in this connection, must mean a final judgment of conviction. A judgment is not final if there still remains some legal means of setting it aside. There may be ways to avoid its execution, such as a general pardon, but a judgment in an ordinary criminal case, such as we have here, becomes final when all available means to avoid its effect have been exhausted. Certain means to that end have been made available to an accused. The traditional method was by appeal. The probation laws then intervened. Since the enactment of those laws in 1903, the offender has been brought before the court for judgment on a plea or verdict of guilty under differing and varying circumstances affecting the powers of the court and the rights of the accused. They may be classified as follows:

First: Those who are ineligible for probation. Offenders in that class are, for the most part, enumerated in section 1203 of the Penal Code. Undoubtedly they were excluded from the benefits of probation because of the character of the offenses against the social order. With this class of offenders the court has no discretion but to sentence the defendant to an appropriate institution for such punishment or treatment as is provided by law. That judgment is appealable under section 1237 of the Penal Code and the finality of the judgment must await the results of an appeal.

Second: Those who are entitled to apply for probation. In this class are the vast group of offenders against the penal laws of the state, found generally in the Penal Code. Within this group the trial court is given a wide discretion in entertaining and passing upon applications for probation. Included in this group are: (A) Those as to whom the court may, in the absence of an application for probation, pronounce judgment and sentence the defendant as provided by law. This is the judgment. It is appealable (Pen.Code, § 1237) and its finality must await the results of any appeal. (B) Those as to whom the court may pronounce judgment, sentence the defendant, suspend the execution of the sentence, and entertain an application for probation. This application may be denied or be granted on such terms as may be reasonable and for such time as may be authorized by law. The judgment entered on the plea of guilty is not appealable on the merits. The rule is correctly stated with supporting authority in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1837, pp. 683 and 684: '* * * where judgment has been entered on a plea of guilty, irregularities not going to the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings will not be reviewed.' The judgment on the verdict is appealable under section 1237 of the Penal Code. If no appeal is taken the judgment becomes final and is effective for all purposes during probation except that incarceration is prevented by reason of the stay order and that compliance with the conditions of the order of probation be observed under the supervision of the probation officer as provided by section 1203.1 of the Penal Code. If the conditions of probation are violated the order of probation may be revoked and the commitment be issued forthwith. Pen.Code, § 1203.2. If the conditions of probation are fulfilled the plea or verdict of guilty may be changed to not guilty, the proceedings be expunged from the record and the case dismissed. Pen.Code, § 1203.4. When such an order has been entered there is no further criminal prosecution pending against the defendant. He has then, without any further showing of rehabilitation on his part, received a statutory rehabilitation and a reinstatement to his former status in society insofar as the state by legislation is able to do so, with one exception, namely, that under section 1203.4 of the Penal Code the record in the criminal case may be used against him for limited purposes in any criminal proceeding thereafter brought against him. The judgment in this class is not a final judgment such as to render the prohibitive measure of the Constitution effective. It is a judgment provisional or conditional in nature. It is in the process of becoming final in that its finality depends on the outcome of the probationary proceeding. (C) Those where the court withholds the imposition of judgment, suspends further proceedings on the plea or verdict and places the defendant on probation on such conditions as are reasonable and for such time as is authorized by law. In this class of cases there is no judgment pending against the probationer. He may go about his usual activities, uninhibited by any court order, except the terms and conditions of the order of probation (Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal.2d 523, 319 P.2d 624). In that analogous case it was properly said 49 Cal.2d at pages 543 and 544, 319 P.2d at page 637 that '* * * inasmuch as no judgment of conviction or 'sentence of imprisonment in a State prison' was ever entered against plaintiff, his civil rights have been at no time suspended. (Pen.Code, § 2600.)' But from the time that the order of probation is made until the case is dismissed the probationer is not a free man. Although there is no judgment pending against him, he is still subject to the restraints of the order of probation and for the duration thereof. If he should violate its conditions he is subject to a revocation of the order of probation with pronouncement of judgment and sentence to follow. Pen.Code, § 1203.2. This judgment is appealable under section 1237 of the Penal Code, and for finality must await the result of any appeal. If the conditions of probation are satisfied and the time has expired the probationer is entitled to have his plea or verdict of guilty changed to not guilty, have the proceedings expunged from the record and the case dismissed. Upon such dismissal here again the defendant is in the same position as if no prosecution had ever been brought against him except as also provided in section 1203.4 of the Penal Code, the record in the criminal case may be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding brought against him. Here again the defendant also has the benefit of a statutory rehabilitation without any further effort on his part.

Third: There is still another classification which has to do with the operation of the probation laws and the regulation of certain professions through the issuance of licenses by duly authorized public officers, boards and commissions. Within this group, generally, a high degree of professional skill and fidelity to the public which it serves are required on the part of the licensee. In this class the law will not permit the dismissal of the proceeding in the criminal case to automatically restore or terminate the suspension of the license. With this classification the requirement of rehabilitation is not the statutory rehabilitation provided by section 1203.4 of the Penal Code. An affirmative showing of rehabilitation must be made by the applicant to the satisfaction of the licensing authority before he may be restored to his former position as a licensee.

Thus, the state by legislative and decisional law has made distinctions and has classified offenses and offenders against its laws for the purpose of punishment, discipline and rehabilitation. In the probationary field the Legislature has withheld from the courts the power to grant probation in...

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  • Mannino, In re, Cr. 9005
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
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    ...§§ 20, 310, subd. (i), 321, subd. (10), 383, subd. (c), and 14240, subd. (g); Pen.Code, §§ 1203.4 and 2600; and Stephens v. Toomey (1959) 51 Cal.2d 864, 869 and 875, 338 P.2d 182. Cf. Otsuka v. Hite (1966) 64 Cal.2d 596, 605--611, 51 Cal.Rptr. 284, 414 P.2d 412.)7 It may be noted that three......
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    ...he pleads guilty. (E.g., People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 390-391, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102; see also Stephens v. Toomey (1959) 51 Cal.2d 864, 869, 338 P.2d 182.) And a felony-misdemeanor offense is deemed a felony for all purposes with specific exceptions not relevant here. ( § 1......
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1 books & journal articles
  • RETRIBUTIVE EXPUNGEMENT.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 169 No. 3, February 2021
    • February 1, 2021
    ...theory. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 24 (2d ed. 1986)). (90) See Stephens v. Toomey, 338 P.2d 182, 187-88 (Cal. 1959) (holding that because the petitioner was under probation and thus the criminal proceeding was still outstanding against him, he was n......

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