Martin v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 12 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. B083585,B083585
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9016, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,911 Jose MARTIN et al., Cross-complainants and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Cross-defendant and Appellant.

Page 303

59 Cal.Rptr.2d 303

51 Cal.App.4th 688, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9016,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,911

Jose MARTIN et al., Cross-complainants and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Cross-defendant and Appellant.

No. B083585.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Dec. 12, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1997.

Review Denied April 16, 1997.

Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, Hall R. Marston, Aaron M. Peck, Santa Monica, Cooper, Kardaras & Scharf, and Victor Aguilera, for Cross-complainants and Respondents.

Veatch, Carlson, Grogan & Nelson, Mark A. Weinstein, Pollak, Vida & Fisher, Girard Fisher, and Daniel P. Barer, Los Angeles, for Cross-defendant and Appellant.

ARMSTRONG, Associate Justice.

In this equitable indemnity action, we determine that the County of Los Angeles was entitled to have the case heard by a jury. Because the trial court denied the County a jury trial, we reverse the judgment. In the appeal of the underlying wrongful death action, we ruled that Donald MacIntyre, Jeffrey MacIntyre, and Megan MacIntyre (the "MacIntyres"), plaintiffs therein, were entitled to judgment against the County. (MacIntyre v. County of Los Angeles (B080699), filed December 12, 1996.) Because the jury in that case allocated the comparative fault of the various tortfeasors, assigning to the County 13 percent responsibility for the decedent's death, a new trial is not required.

FACTS

On September 16, 1987, Christine MacIntyre was killed when a runaway truck owned by Bourget Brothers Building Materials ("Bourget") and driven by Jose Martin on Kanan Dume Road crashed through the intersection at Pacific Coast Highway.

The MacIntyres brought a wrongful death lawsuit against Martin, Bourget, Western Truck Service, which maintained Bourget's vehicles, the County of Los Angeles, and the State of California. Martin and Bourget cross-complained against the County, the State, and Western Truck Service.

Western Truck Service settled with the MacIntyres prior to trial. Martin and Bourget settled with the MacIntyres after the trial commenced. The complaint and cross-complaint were to be tried together. However, during the course of the trial, Martin and Bourget waived a jury trial as to the cross-complaint. Consequently, after both sides in the wrongful death action had rested and over the County's objection, the court severed the cross-complaint for later trial to the court alone.

The MacIntyres' cause of action against the State and County was predicated on public entity liability for injury caused by the dangerous condition of property as set forth in Government Code section 835. The jury returned a special verdict. To the question, "Assuming that 100% represents the total causes of the plaintiffs['] damages, what percentage of this 100% is due to the actions or omissions of the County of Los Angeles, and/or the State of California, and all other persons?" the jury responded: the County: 13%; the State: 0%; Bourget: 39%; and Martin: 48%. ¹ Notwithstanding this apparent finding of 13% fault attributable to the County, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the County based on an affirmative defense. In MacIntyre v. County of Los Angeles, supra, we held that the trial court erred in entering judgment for the County, and directed the court to enter judgment for the MacIntyres.

In the bench trial of respondents' equitable indemnity claim, the trial court found that respondents and the County were concurrent tortfeasors, and that the County was 50 percent at fault for the MacIntyres' damages.

CONTENTIONS

The County appeals the judgment for equitable indemnity, arguing that it was denied its right to a jury trial on the cross-complaint. The County also argues that the jury findings of comparative fault in the wrongful death action should be given collateral estoppel effect.

DISCUSSION

On May 25, 1993, respondents' attorney delivered his opening remarks to the jury impaneled to hear the MacIntyres' wrongful death action against the County and the State, as well as respondents' equitable indemnity cross-complaint against the public entities. ² On August 4, 1993, counsel for respondents sought to withdraw the issue of the cross-complaint from the jury. The The County contends that denial of its right to a trial by jury constituted a miscarriage of justice and is per se reversible error. The County further maintains, however, that the jury in the wrongful death action rendered a finding regarding the comparative fault of the various tortfeasors, and that retrial of the equitable indemnity action is therefore not required. We agree, and order judgment entered herein in accordance with the jury's finding that the County is 13 percent liable for the MacIntyres' damages.

County objected to this request, arguing that it had a right to a jury trial on the issue of equitable indemnity. The trial court ruled that an equitable indemnity action is an action in equity, to which the parties are not entitled to a jury. Consequently, the court severed the cross-complaint and heard the equitable indemnity claim later, without a jury.

1. Right to jury trial

"The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by our Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) We have long acknowledged that the right so guaranteed, however, is the right as it existed at common law in 1850, when the Constitution was first adopted, 'and what that right is, is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or legal fact.' [Citations.] As a general proposition, '[T]he jury trial is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but not in equity.' [Citations.] [p] ... " 'If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable in courts of law, it is to that extent an action at law. In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at common law, the court is not bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights involved and the facts of the particular case--the gist of the action. A jury trial must be granted where the gist of the action is legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law.' " [Citation.] On the other hand, if the action is essentially one in equity and the relief sought 'depends upon the application of equitable doctrines,' the parties are not entitled to a jury trial. [Citations.] Although ... 'the legal or equitable nature of a cause of action ordinarily is determined by the mode of relief to be afforded' [citation], the prayer for relief in a particular case is not conclusive [citations]. Thus, 'The fact that damages is one of a full range of possible remedies does not guarantee ... the right to a jury....' [Citation.]" (C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8-9, 151 Cal.Rptr. 323, 587 P.2d 1136, original italics; see also Walton v. Walton (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 277, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 901.)

There is no question that an implied indemnity cross-complaint involves the application of equitable principles. (American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 583, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 328, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441.) However, "From the fact that equitable principles are ... used to establish the alleged liability of the defendants, it does not necessarily follow that the action to enforce that liability is equitable. The law courts now recognize and apply many equitable principles and grant relief based thereon where, as here, legal relief is sought in the form of a judgment for a specific amount...." (Mortimer v. Loynes (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 160, 168, 168 P.2d 481; see also Ripling v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 399, 402, 247 P.2d 117.)

The historical method of determining the right to jury trial is of no assistance to us here, since a cause of action for equitable indemnity did not exist when the Constitution was adopted in 1850. Prior to 1957, California law, embodying the old saw that "the law will not aid a wrongdoer," followed the common law rule denying a tortfeasor any right to contribution or indemnification. ³ (See, e.g., Dow v. Sunset Tel. &amp Because the doctrine of equitable indemnity is of modern vintage, we must examine its "gist" to determine whether it gives rise to a legal or an equitable action. No California case has directly considered this issue. While no reported California decision has held that parties to an equitable indemnity action are entitled to trial by jury, the appellate courts have consistently upheld jury verdicts in such cases. (See, e.g., American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, supra, 21 Cal.3d 322, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441; Burlingame Motor Co. v. Peninsula Activities, Inc. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 656, 93 Cal.Rptr. 376; Western S.S. Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 876 P.2d 1062; Gross v. Allen (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 354, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 429; Blecker v. Wolbart (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1195, 213 Cal.Rptr. 781; Bracket v. State (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1171, 226 Cal.Rptr. 1.) Conversely, we are aware of no California cases which question the right to a jury trial in equitable indemnity actions.

                Tel. Co.  (1912) 162 Cal. 136, 121 P. 379.)  However, this rule proved harsh in its application to particular factual circumstances.  As Chief Justice Gibson observed in Peters v. City & County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 419, 431, 260 P.2d 55:  "[T]he rule against contribution between joint tortfeasors admits of some exceptions, and a right of indemnification may arise as a result of contract or equitable considerations and is not restricted to situations involving a wholly vicarious liability, such as where a master has paid a judgment for damages resulting from the voluntary

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