Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-1727,94-1727
• Citation: 51 F.3d 1087
• Parties: 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 838, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,520, 63 USLW 2687, 41 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1309 Frank B. WOODMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HAEMONETICS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 1087

51 F.3d 1087

67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 838,

66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,520, 63 USLW 2687,

41 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1309

Frank B. WOODMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HAEMONETICS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 94-1727.

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit.

Heard Dec. 5, 1994.

Decided April 14, 1995.

Stuart DeBard, Boston, MA, for appellant.

Jeffrey M. Hahn, with whom Foley, Hoag & Eliot was on brief, Boston, MA, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Frank B. Woodman appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment for Haemonetics Corporation ("HC"), Woodman's former employer, and dismissing his claim for wrongful discharge under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). We vacate the district court judgment and remand for factfinding.

I BACKGROUND ¹

Woodman was hired by HC in January 1981 at age forty-eight. For ten years he worked as a machinist, primarily in HC's machine shop at Holbrook, Massachusetts. Throughout his employment as a machinist he consistently earned favorable performance reviews. He was promoted twice, receiving commensurate wage increases from $5.28 per hour as a Machinist Trainee, to $11.75 per hour as a Machinist B.

In December 1990, at age fifty-seven, Woodman was transferred to the "bowl department" in Braintree, Massachusetts, where HC manufactures disposable components for medical equipment designed to facilitate the collection, separation and cleansing of blood and blood constituents. The medical equipment manufactured in the bowl department is fabricated under sterile conditions in a controlled-access area known as the "clean room."

On January 24, 1991, Woodman received a flawless performance report from his bowl department supervisor, Mary LeBlanc. Not only did he earn the highest possible rating in all six review categories, but LeBlanc commented: "[Y]our work since joining bowls has been exceptional. You have made a positive contribution in work and in adapting to change."

Thereafter, in late March 1991, Mary LeBlanc was succeeded by Rick Lucas as Woodman's supervisor in the bowl department. Lucas began training Woodman in two non-assembly line tasks--"material handling" (i.e., retrieving raw materials for use in the clean room) and "bowl packing" (i.e., packaging the finished product). The record discloses but one performance review of Woodman by Lucas, in late July 1991. Though less favorable than the LeBlanc report, the Lucas report indicated that Woodman was performing at an acceptable level. Woodman was rated "exceptional" in terms of dependability and "above average" in terms of both customer/supplier relations and quality of work. In no category did Woodman receive a rating lower than "average." Lucas added, "Frank is a highly organized, consistent performer."

John Barr became Vice President of Operations for HC in mid-September 1991. Shortly thereafter, Barr directed all HC managers to reevaluate their employees, with particular emphasis on flexibility (i.e., susceptibility to cross-training and to multiple production-line responsibilities), reliability, participation (i.e., the capacity to provide suggestions and contribute to improved operational efficiencies) and quality and quantity of work product. The record on appeal does Sometime in the fall of 1991, Mary LeBlanc resumed her supervisory role over Woodman in the bowl department. Around this same time, LeBlanc was privy to at least one discussion, among members of HC's upper management, in which future employee terminations were discussed. Following such a meeting, and in the presence of Woodman, LeBlanc referenced the management discussion relating to future terminations: "These damn people--they want younger people here. They will be the one[s] that will be successful here." Woodman's affidavit attests that LeBlanc made similar statements on several occasions.

not reflect a performance rating on Woodman under Vice President Barr's revised performance review procedure in the fall of 1991. The record is clear, however, that many HC employees did receive performance ratings considered unacceptable by Barr. The record evidence also discloses that Barr determined that HC could terminate its "C performers" without jeopardizing its production, while dramatically reducing labor costs.

During the time that HC's management was deciding which employees were to be terminated, Mary LeBlanc submitted a memorandum, dated November 15, 1991, describing Woodman's work performance as having been unsatisfactory throughout the period "since July 1991." The November 15 memorandum made no reference to the performance review by Lucas in late July 1991. LeBlanc described Woodman as an "unmotivated worker" who "would prefer to sit in the Bowl Prep area and read for extended periods of time up to several hours." She noted further that Woodman was slow, routinely requiring a minimum of thirty minutes to dress for the sterile conditions in the clean room, whereas the requisite procedures should take no longer than ten minutes. LeBlanc reported that Woodman possessed limited skills: "Frank cannot perform 50% of line operations to standard requirement. He can only be assigned 2 off line jobs in the clean room, where his performance will not affect production quantities." Furthermore, she stated, despite Woodman's training on most assembly-line operations, his inability to perform those operations in a satisfactory manner had led to the abandonment of further training efforts. LeBlanc concluded: "I recommend Frank be relieved from his current duties."

Five days later, in a reduction in force ("RIF"), thirty-three HC employees were terminated; twelve, including Woodman, were bowl department employees. HC presented statistical evidence demonstrating that the ratio of older to younger employees in the bowl department increased slightly during the reduction in force; viz., 41% over age 40 before the RIF; 44% after the RIF. ²

Woodman received written notice of his immediate termination on November 20, which advised that HC had decided that it could "eliminate a group of its poorest performers and still meet the production plan." Later, HC reported to the Massachusetts Department of Employment Training that Woodman was discharged as part of a reduction in force involving the company's "poorest performers." On March 2, 1993, Woodman initiated the present suit in federal district court, alleging age discrimination in violation of the ADEA.

In due course, the statement attributed to Mary LeBlanc by the Woodman affidavit submitted in opposition to HC's motion for summary judgment was excluded by the district court as inadmissible "totem-pole" (i.e., multiple) hearsay, "unavailing on a motion for summary judgment." The court went on to conclude that though Woodman had made out a prima facie case of age discrimination, HC had rebutted the resulting presumption of unlawful age discrimination by producing enough evidence, if credited, to enable a rational trier of fact to find a nondiscriminatory basis for Woodman's dismissal; viz., poor work performance. Ultimately, the district court awarded summary judgment to HC on the ground that Woodman had not proffered competent evidence sufficient to generate a trialworthy issue as to whether impermissible age-based discrimination constituted a

determinative factor in the dismissal. Woodman appealed.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

We examine a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party resisting summary judgment. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 634, 126 L.Ed.2d 593 (1993). Summary judgment is inappropriate unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 144 (1st Cir.1994). No credibility assessment may be resolved in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assurance Co., 8 F.3d 873, 877 (1st Cir.1993).

III DISCUSSION

A. The Burden-Shifting Paradigm

The burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ["McDonnell Douglas" ], and imported for use in ADEA cases, see Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 760 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994), allocates burdens of production and orders the presentation of evidence so as "progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095 n. 8, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

At the first stage in the McDonnell Douglas matrix, Woodman was required to make a prima facie showing that he (1) was at least forty years old, (2) met HC's legitimate job performance expectations, (3) experienced adverse employment action, and (4) since the challenged action was part of a reduction in force, that HC did not treat age neutrally or it retained younger persons in the same position. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1993); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842. The required prima facie showing is not especially burdensome, see Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir.1995); Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 15 n. 4 (1st Cir.1994), and once established, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the employer...