Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
| Decision Date | 07 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-16932,92-16932 |
| Citation | 51 F.3d 1421 |
| Parties | 1995-1 Trade Cases P 70,952 REBEL OIL COMPANY, INC., a Nevada corporation; Auto Flite Oil Company, Inc., a Nevada corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
William H. Bode, William H. Bode & Associates, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Donald C. Smaltz, Leighton M. Anderson, Christopher H. Benbow, Emily A. Breckenridge, Smaltz & Anderson, Los Angeles, CA, Thomas F. Kummer, Vargas & Bartlett, Las Vegas, NV, Paul J. Richmond, Atlantic Richfield Co., Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.
Before: POOLE, BEEZER and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
This case presents three antitrust claims arising from the defendant's conduct in the retail gasoline market in Las Vegas, Nevada. The plaintiffs contend that the defendant engaged in predatory pricing between 1985 and 1989, selling self-serve, cash-only gasoline below marginal cost. The plaintiffs claim that the alleged predatory pricing was an attempt by the defendant to monopolize the market, in violation of Sherman Act Sec. 2. The plaintiffs also claim that the predatory pricing scheme involved a conspiracy to restrain trade, in violation of Sherman Act Sec. 1, and primary-line price discrimination, in violation of Clayton Act Sec. 2, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 13(a).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on all three antitrust claims, concluding that the defendant did not possess enough power in the market to allow the predatory scheme to succeed, and therefore that the plaintiffs had not suffered any injury cognizable under the antitrust laws. We have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' timely appeal. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
The evidence before the district court on summary judgment reveals the following facts: Gasoline sold in Las Vegas is first produced from crude oil in Los Angeles refineries. Wholesale marketers then pump the gasoline to Las Vegas storage terminals via a common carrier pipeline operated by the Cal-Nev Pipeline Co. ("Cal-Nev"). Ninety-five percent of Las Vegas' gasoline travels this 250-mile route. Wholesale marketers sell the gasoline to retail marketers, who then sell the gasoline to Las Vegas motorists.
As of 1991, there were more than 275 retail gasoline stations in Las Vegas. Although the grades and types of fuel vary, retailers sell gasoline through two types of service. Some gasoline is sold only on a self-serve, cash-only basis. Motorists purchasing this product must pump their own gasoline and must pay cash. Other gasoline is sold on a full-serve basis. In full serve, a service station attendant pumps the gasoline for the consumer, checks the oil and tires, washes the windows and may perform other minor services. The motorist also has the option of paying either with cash or a credit card. The consumer pays a premium for these services, which means that the price for full-serve gasoline is generally higher than the price for self-serve gasoline. Some retail marketers sell only self-serve, cash-only gasoline; others sell both self-serve, cash-only gasoline and full-serve gasoline. No marketer sells only full-serve gasoline.
The plaintiffs, Rebel Oil Co., Inc., and Auto Flite Oil Co., Inc. (collectively "Rebel"), are retail marketers of gasoline in Las Vegas who sell only self-serve, cash-only gasoline. Rebel operates 16 retail stations under various gasoline brand names. Nine stations operate under the "Rebel" brand name, six stations operate under the "Unocal" brand name and one operates under the "Texaco" brand name. In addition to its retail sales, Rebel is one of the several wholesale marketers who ship gasoline via the Cal-Nev pipeline and sell to retail marketers.
The defendant, Atlantic Richfield Co. ("ARCO"), is a retail and wholesale marketer of gasoline in Las Vegas, as well as a major driller and refiner of crude oil in Los Angeles. ARCO supplies gasoline to 53 retail stations in Las Vegas bearing the "ARCO" brand name. These stations sell only self-serve, cash-only gasoline. Of those 53 stations, Prestige Stations, a subsidiary of ARCO, owns and operates 15 stations. The remaining 38 stations are owned and operated by independent dealers who purchase the gasoline wholesale from ARCO and then sell the product at retail for their own account. Thirteen of these dealer stations are leased from ARCO; the remaining 25 dealer stations are operated by "contract dealers" who either own the stations or lease from third parties. The largest "contract dealer" is Terrible Herbst, Inc. ("Terrible Herbst"), which controls 23 stations under the "ARCO" brand name.
Besides Rebel and ARCO, other major retail marketers of gasoline in Las Vegas are Southland Corp. and Texaco Inc. As of 1991, Southland owned and operated 89 "7-11" stations, and Texaco owned and operated five gasoline stations. In addition, numerous independent dealers sell under varying brand names. These dealers either own the stations or are franchised dealers. Although the parties offer conflicting numbers, it is undisputed that at least 67 independent dealers sell under the "Texaco" brand name; 16 independent dealers sell under the "Unocal" brand name; 17 independent dealers sell under the "Chevron" brand name; and 12 other independent marketers sell under various names. The number of stations operated by a marketer does not necessarily determine that marketer's share in gasoline sales. The "7-11" stations, for example, sell far less volume in gasoline than other marketers because their sales are primarily in the grocery retail market.
The facts of this case developed against a backdrop of change in the gasoline business. In the era of high fuel consumption motor vehicles, major-brand marketers affiliated with major oil companies were dominant. They enjoyed superior locations and facilities, national advertising, and customer loyalty. Independent marketers, who purchased gasoline from major oil companies for resale under their own brand name, were minor participants--"middle-of-the-block dumps," in ARCO's words. Because they sold only self-serve, cash-only gasoline, independent marketers enjoyed low overhead and, hence, could charge less than stations selling equivalent quality gasoline under major brand names. During the 1970s, a growing number of cost-conscious motorists patronized these independent marketers. Independent marketers saw substantial growth in their business. Taking a cue, ARCO in 1982 adopted a nationwide strategy to compete directly with the independent discount marketers. Developed by ARCO's Special Planning Unit (SPU), the new strategy called for the elimination of full-serve and credit-card sales. Under the SPU's new strategy, all sales would be self-serve and cash-only. Dealers would be provided with incentives, such as volume discounts, to increase sales volume and match the prices of the discount independents. In an internal memorandum, the SPU predicted that "depending on the degree and rapidity of competitive attrition, a lasting period of quite acceptable profitability could ensue." ARCO's new strategy increased its sales and market share nationwide.
In January, 1990, Rebel filed this antitrust suit against ARCO, pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which allows private parties to sue antitrust violators for damages. Rebel claims that between 1985 and 1989, ARCO executed the SPU's new strategy in Las Vegas with "more specific vengeance," charging predatory prices in an attempt to take away market shares from its competitors and, eventually, monopolize the gasoline market in Las Vegas. Relying on affidavits obtained from former ARCO dealers, Rebel claims that ARCO controlled not only the prices charged at the 15 stations it operated through its subsidiary, Prestige Stations, but also the prices charged at the 38 stations operated by independent dealers. Rebel also obtained affidavits from an expert who compared ARCO's prices in Los Angeles and Las Vegas markets. ARCO supplies both markets with gasoline from the same Los Angeles refinery. The expert concluded retail prices in Las Vegas for self-serve, cash-only gasoline, when adjusted for transportation costs, were consistently 6 to 14 cents per gallon below those charged in Los Angeles. The expert concluded that ARCO's retail prices in Las Vegas were consistently below the wholesale prices of all other wholesale suppliers in Las Vegas, and at times were 10 cents or more per gallon below ARCO's marginal cost. 1 Rebel contends that Terrible Herbst, ARCO's major contract dealer, conspired with ARCO in the predatory scheme.
Rebel asserts that ARCO's pricing scheme forced 37 competitors out of the Las Vegas gasoline market, including both independent discount marketers and major oil companies, such as Exxon, Shell, Conoco, Mobil and Philips. According to Rebel, non-ARCO stations decreased in number, from 258 to 222, during the alleged predation. Rebel contends that the marketwide attrition occurred despite the fact that Las Vegas is one of the fastest growing retail gasoline markets in the United States. Rebel's own share of the self-serve, cash-only gasoline market dropped from 30 percent in 1982 to less than 10 percent in 1990. Rebel claimed losses totalling $2 million. Rebel was forced to mostly withdraw from the retail market and instead concentrate on the wholesale market. Rebel claims it has stayed in business only through its non-gasoline revenues.
According to Rebel's expert affidavits, when the alleged predation ended in 1989 ARCO had captured 54 percent of the market for self-serve, cash-only gasoline. The experts contend that ARCO then engaged in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc.
...Qualcomm could charge its CDMA adder without price discipline is evidence of Qualcomm's market power. See Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (defining market power as the ability "to increase prices above competitive levels, and sustain them for a......
-
City of Moundridge, Ks. v. Exxon Mobil Corp
...In determining monopoly power, courts typically assess a defendant's aggregate market share. See e.g., Rebel Oil Co., v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1437 (9th Cir.1995) (applying the aggregate market share number to an attempt to monopolize claim); Brager & Co. v. Leumi Sec. Corp., 42......
-
PLS.com, LLC v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors
...use, and when competitive price and quality are assured to the consumer, consumer welfare is maximized. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) ; accord National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City , 452 U.S. 378, 387–88 &......
-
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.
...is presumptively insufficient to establish" the requisite level of market power under a Section 2 claim. Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).593 By contrast, Section 1 claims can be satisfied with less market power. For instance, the Ninth Circuit ......
-
Clearance: Proskauer's Quarterly Antitrust Update - Winter 2013
...Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Id. at 1347. Id. at 1347-48. Id. at 1348 (citing Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1435 (9th Cir. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sough......
-
The FTC Expands Scope Of Unfair Methods Of Competition Enforcement
...efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality." Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 5. FTC Rescinds 2015 Policy that Limited Its Enforcement Ability Under the FTC Act, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Jul. 1, 2021, ......
-
Summary Judgment Dooms Attempted Monopolization Claim In Small Container Trash Hauling Market
...function of the height of entry barriers, and the dynamics of change within a given market. See, Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. While the court was correct in dismissing the "contract power" arguments also presented by plaintiffs, it also noted that the mark......
-
Failure To Adequately Allege Lack Of Supply Cross-Elasticity Dooms Attempted Monopolization Action To 'Quick Look' Dismissal
...as to the capacity and marketing flexibility of the picklers and oilers. Not to worry. Citing Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1436 (9th Cir. 1955), the court points out defining a market on the basis of demand considerations alone is erroneous. A reasonable market def......
-
Table Of Cases
...173 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999), 100. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 29. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995), 101. In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2005), 102. In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp......
-
Deposing & examining the labor market expert
...facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s verdict.” Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 51 F.3d 1421, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 509 U.S. 209, 242, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1......
-
Table of Cases
...(1993), 190 Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990), 55 Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995), 13, 64-65, 67, 79-81, 215, 223 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), 104 Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading,......
-
State Price Discrimination Law
...will result in more competition.”). 175. State ex rel. Nixon , 133 S.W.3d at 37. 176. See, e.g. , Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995). 177. See ALA. CODE § 8-22-4(18); FLA. STAT. §§ 526.303(15), 526.305(1)(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-611(b); MO. REV. ......