Offutt v. World's Columbian Exposition Co.

• Citation: 51 N.E. 651,175 Ill. 472
• Parties: OFFUTT v. WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION CO.
• Decision Date: 24 October 1898
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

175 Ill. 472

51 N.E. 651

OFFUTT

v.WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1898.

Error to appellate court, First district. ground that plaintiff had assumed the risk.

Error to appellate court, first district.

Action by Charles F. Offutt against World's Columbian Exposition Company. The appellate court affirmed a judgment for defendant (73 Ill. App. 231), and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Henry D. Beam, William R. Rummler, and Robert W. McCulloch, for plaintiff in error.

John A. Post and John B. Brady, for defendant in error.

CARTER, C. J.

This was an action on the case to recover damages for eprsonal injuries sustained by plaintiff in error while in the employ of defendant in error. At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff the court, upon motion of the defendant, instructed the jury to find the defendant not guilty. The judge who sat in the trial having become one of the judges of the appellate court, and the other two judges being divided in opinion, the judgment was by that court affirmed, and the cause was then brought to this court on a writ of error sued out by the plaintiff. The only question in the case is, did the court err in instructing the jury to find the defendant not guilty?

An instruction to find against the party upon whom rests the burden of proof, on the ground that there is no evidence legally tending to prove his cause, or, as it is now more generally stated, on the ground that the evidence, with all the inferences which the jury could justifiablydraw from it, is so insufficient to support a verdict for such party that such verdict, if returned, must for that reason be set aside, is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, and, except as to technical methods of procedure, is governed by the same rules. The maker of the motion to so instruct admits the truth of all opposing evidence, and all inferences which may be fairly and rationally drawn from it. The motion does not involve a determination of the weight of the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses. Bartelott v. Bank, 119 Ill. 259, 9 N. E. 898, and cases cited; Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11;Railway Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132, 22 N. E. 15 It has been said in some cases that if there is any evidence, however slight, tending to prove plaintiff's cause of action, such an instruction would be erroneous, as it is the province of the jury, and not of the court, to pass upon the weight of the evidence, or its sufficiency in probative force to authorize a verdict. In Simmons v. Railroad Co., 110 Ill. 340, in delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Chief Justice Sheldon said (page 346): ‘There may be decisions to be found which hold that, if there is any evidence-even a scintilla-tending to support the plaintiff's case, it must be submitted to the jury. But we think the more reasonable rule, which has now come to be established by the better authority, is that when the evidence given at the trial, with all inferences that the jury could justifiably draw from it, is so insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff that such a verdict, if returned, must be set aside, the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but may direct a verdict for the defendant. Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 120;Randall v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 478, 3 Sup. Ct. 322; Railway Co. v. Jackson, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 193; Reed v. Inhabitants of Deerfield, 8 Allen, 524;Skellenger v. Railway Co., 61 Iowa, 714, 17 N. W. 151;Martin v. Chambers, 84 Ill. 579;Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11. In the recent case of Frazer v. Howe, 106 Ill. 563, this court recognized the rule to be: ‘If there is no evidence before the jury on a material issue in favor of a party holding the affirmative of that issue, on which the jury could, in the eye of the law, reasonably find in his favor, the court may exclude the evidence, or direct the jury to find against the party to holding the affirmative.’' This language was quoted in Bartelott v. Bank, supra, and Mr. Justice Schofield, in speaking for the court, said (page 272, 119 Ill., and page 898, 9 N. E.): ‘Since it was not intended in this case to overrule Simmons v. Railroad Co., supra, it is apparent that ‘evidence tending to prove’ means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence upon which the jury could, without acting unreasonably in the eye of the law, decide in favor of the plaintiff, or the party party producing it. It is not intended by this practice that the function of the jury to pass upon questions of fact is to be invaded, any more than it is intended that such function is to be invaded by a motion to set aside a verdict and for a new trial upon the ground of the want of evidence to sustain the verdict. In neither case is the court authorized to weigh the evidence and decide where the preponderance is.' See, also, Siddall v. Jansen, 168 Ill. 43, 48 N. E. 191, and Rack v. Railway Co., 173 Ill. 289, 50 N. E. 668. It is clear, from the cases cited, and others, that what is called the ‘scintilla rule of evidence’ is not in force in this state. Much confusion has doubtless arisen from the different meanings attached to the phrase ‘tending to prove,’ but giving it the meaning as held by this court in the Bartelott Case, above cited,-that it is ‘evidence upon which the jury could, without acting unreasonably in the eye of the law, decide in favor of the plaintiff, or the party producing it,’-most of the apparent conflict between the different cases disappears. Thus, it was said by Mr. Justice Maule in Jewell v. Parr, 13 C. B. 909: ‘Applying the maxim, ‘De minimis non curat lex,’ when we say that there is no evidence to go to the jury we do not mean that there is literally none, but that there is none which ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is established.' It is, of course, true that there are cases where there is literally no evidence in support of some material and necessary allegation, but there are many others where there may be some evidence tending in some remote degree to support every allegation, yet of too inconclusive and unsubstantial a character to be the foundation of a verdict. In either of such cases the court may, when the question is properly raised, so determine, and direct a verdict as in cases where there is no evidence. ‘A mere scintilla of evidence,’ particle of evidence,-evidence which, without further evidence, is a mere trifle; and, as the law does not regard trifles, we see no reason why, on such a motion, the court may not adjudge such evidence insufficient in law, and direct a verdict as in cases where there is no evidence. As was well said in Connor v. Giles, 76 Me. 132, ‘there is no practical or logical difference between no evidence and evidence without legal weight.’ It is true that such motions are not to be regarded with favor. The province of the jury must not be invaded (Frazer v. Howe, 106 Ill. 563), and where reasonable minds, acting within the limitations prescribed by the rules of law, might reach different conclusions, the evidence must be submitted to the jury. For a...