Jacob Strader, James Gorman, and John Armstrong, Plaintiffs In Error v. Christopher Graham

Decision Date01 December 1850
Citation13 L.Ed. 337,51 U.S. 82,10 How. 82
PartiesJACOB STRADER, JAMES GORMAN, AND JOHN ARMSTRONG, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

51 U.S. 82
10 How. 82
13 L.Ed. 337
JACOB STRADER, JAMES GORMAN, AND JOHN ARMSTRONG,
PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM.
December Term, 1850

Page 83

IN error to the Court of Appeals for the state of Kentucky.

The defendant in error, who was a citizen of Kentucky, filed his bill in the Louisville Chancery Court, against Jacob Strader and James Gorman, who were citizens of Ohio, and owners of the steamboat Pike, which plied between Louisville, Kentucky, and Cincinnati, Ohio, and John Armstrong, who was the captain of said steamboat.

The bill alleged that the complainant was the owner of three negro slaves, George, Henry, and Reuben, of the value of about fifteen hundred dollars each, who had left his residence at Harrodsburg, Kentucky, and made their way to Louisville, whence they were taken on board of said steamboat Pike, and carried to Cincinnati, from which place they escaped to Canada, and were lost to their owner. Complainant averred that he had a lien on said boat by reason of the asportation of said slaves, for the damages he had sustained, and prayed an attachment and sale of said boat, and general relief.

An attachment was ordered and served, but the boat was relieved upon bond being given to perform all orders of the court, or to have the boat forthcoming.

Two of the defendants in the court below (Strader and Gorman), in their answer, stated that they were not on board the boat at the time of the alleged transportation, had no knowledge of such transportation, and they therefore denied it. They alleged that the boat was under the command of the defendant Armstrong, her captain, and that the negroes in question had been permitted by the complainant to travel out of the Commonwealth as if free; and in an amended answer, they averred that, long before the alleged transportation, the said negroes had actually become free. The answer of Armstrong was substantially to the same effect. There were various proceedings had in the state courts, the case having been twice carried to the Court of Appeals, when Graham finally succeeded in obtaining a decree in the Louisville Chancery Court for $3,000 damages, to be paid before a day named, or the boat, her furniture, tackle, & c., to be sold if forthcoming, and if not forthcoming, the court to make the necessary order against the obligors, in said forthcoming bond; which decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. To reverse the decree of affirmance, this writ of error was sued out.

By the statute of Kentucky approved 7th January, 1824, any master or commander of a steamboat or other vessel, who shall hire or employ, or take as passengers on board of such

Page 84

steamboat or other vessel, or suffer it to be done, or otherwise take out of the limits of the Commonwealth, any slave or slaves, without permission of the master of such slave or slaves, shall be liable to damages to the party aggrieved by such removal; and the steamboat or other vessel on board of which such offence was committed shall be liable, and may be proceeded against in chancery, and may be condemned and sold to pay such damages and costs of suit.

The amended act, approved 12th February, 1828, extends the remedies given by the former act, so as to embrace the owners, mate, clerk, pilot, and engineer, as well as the master, and they are declared to be liable to the action of the party aggrieved, 'either jointly with the masters, or severally, and either at law or in chancery.'

It appeared in evidence, that the negroes were the slaves of Graham, and that they were musicians; that, for their improvement in music two of them were placed under the care of one Williams, who was a skilful performer and leader of a band, and were permitted to go with him to Louisville, and other places, and play with him at public entertainments. The following permit was filed as an exhibit, and proved.

'Harrodsburg, August 30th, 1837.

'This is to give liberty to my boys, Henry and Reuben, to go to Louisville, with Williams, and to play with him till I may wish to call them home. Should Williams find it his interest to take them to Cincinnati, New Albany, or any part of the South, even so far as New Orleans, he is at liberty to do so. I receive no compensation for their services, except that he is to board and clothe them.

'My object is to have them well trained in music. They are young, one 17 and the other 19 years of age. They are both of good disposition and strictly honest, and such is my confidence in them, that I have no fear that they will ever [act] knowingly wrong, or put me to trouble. They are slaves for life, and I paid for them an unusual sum; they have been faithful, hard-working servants, and I have no fear but that they will always be true to their duty, no matter in what situation they may be placed.

C. GRAHAM, M. D.

P. S. Should they not attend properly to their music, or disobey Williams, he is not only at liberty, but requested, to being them directly home.

C. GRAHAM.'

Under this permission, Williams, in the year 1837, made several excursions with his band, including the slaves Reuben and Henry, to Cincinnati, Ohio, and New Albany and Madison,

Page 85

Indiana, for the purpose of playing at balls or public entertainments; after which he returned to Louisville, his place of residence, said slaves returning with him; from which time to the time of their escape in 1841, they had remained within the state of Kentucky.

The case was argued by Mr. Jones, for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Crittenden, Attorney-General, for the defendants in error.

Mr. Jones, for the plaintiffs in error.

The owner of the slaves in question placed them under the care of a person to learn music, who carried them out of the state of Kentucky into an adjoining free state to play at balls and parties for hire. As soon, then, as they touched the soil of Indiana or Ohio, with the consent of their master, the quality of freedom attached to their persons, and could never afterwards be dissociated from them; and it made no difference whether they went permanently, or as mere temporary sojourners. There was no distinction, either in reason or in law, to be drawn from the mere duration of commorancy, if the removal to a free state was voluntary on the part of the slave and with the permission of the master. The Ordinance of 1787 declares that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist in the Northwest territory. The laws of Ohio and Indiana only reiterate the provisions of that Ordinance. The instant, therefore, the slave came within the boundaries of such states, the laws of those states took effect upon his condition, and eo instanti he became clothed with every attribute of freedom.

Mr. Jones concluded the opening argument by reading from the brief of Mr. Duncan, filed in the case, as follows:——

The Ordinance of 1787 was made after Somerset's case, and after several of our states had passed laws, whose object was to put an end to slavery within their jurisdictions, by operating on the post nati. It has been claimed to be a solemn compact, as well as an ordinance. Its provisions are as broad and comprehensive as they could be made, inhibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, except for crime, within the Northwest Territory.

That the courts of Kentucky are bound to take notice of this Ordinance, and to know judicially that slavery is forbidden in this Northwest Territory, are propositions long since settled by the Appellate Court of Kentucky. See Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A. K. Marsh, (Ky.), 467.

When Ohio and Indiana were permitted to make their constitutions, and were admitted into the Union by acts of Congress, the courts of Kentucky were still bound to know, judicially,

Page 86

that slavery was prohibited there by the fundamental law of each of those states. It will not be forgotten, that all this territory and Kentucky were component parts of Virginia when the Ordinance was made.

By force of the Ordinance and of the Constitution of the United States, and the acts of Congress for the admission of Ohio and Indiana as states, those states stand as to the subject of slavery like England, excepting only the cases provided for by the Constitution of the United States, and fairly embraced within its provisions.

For national purposes, all of our states are governed by the same laws, and constitute one government; for other purposes, they are separate and independent sovereignties, with laws and institutions altogether different. 2 Pet., 590. And with respect to their municipal regulations the several states are to each other foreign. 2 Wash., 298. Slavery has been decided to be local, and to depend upon the local law. Somerset's case, State Trials; 1 Lofft, 1; 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.), 470-472; 3 Bos. & P., 69; 2 Barn. & C., 448; 2 Mart. (La.), N. S., 403.

In the case last cited, Lunsford v. Coquillon, the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided, that by removing a slave to Ohio that slave became instantly free by operation of law, and being once free there, the slave was...

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