U.S. v. Crocker, No. 74--1372

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
Citation510 F.2d 1129
Docket NumberNo. 74--1372
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Barbara CROCKER, aka Barbara Stafford, Defendant-Appellant.
Decision Date18 February 1975

John E. Green, Asst. U.S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl. (William E. Burkett, U.S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl.), for plaintiff-appellee.

Mark H. Price, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant-appellant.

Before HILL, SETH and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge.

Barbara Crocker, a/k/a Barbara Stafford (hereinafter referred to as Crocker, or appellant), appeals from a jury verdict of guilty and sentence. She was convicted of charges under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and § 472, to-wit: That on or about November 12--13, 1973, Crocker did conspire with Jackie Wayne Blankenship and Kelly Mack Lambeth, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, the United States, by concealing and possessing falsely made, forged, and counterfeit $10.00 Federal Reserve Notes, and that she did utter and pass one of said notes in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on November 12, 1973.

Crocker testified substantially as follows both in support of her Motion to Suppress her statements of confession, and at trial: She met Blankenship and Lambeth in a bar at Dallas, Texas, on November 11, 1973; she had known Blankenship slightly prior thereto; the three consumed considerable beer before driving to Oklahoma City, where they checked into a motel in the early morning of November 12th; that afternoon Crocker learned for the first time that Blankenship and Lambeth possessed counterfeit money, which they displayed to her; that when she was asked to drive to a restaurant to bring food back to the motel rooms after noon, that she told her male companions she would have nothing to do with the counterfeit money and that Lambeth then gave her 'legitimate' money; that thereafter the three went to several bars; that at the After Five Club she asked Lambeth for money to buy cigarettes; that he gave her a $10.00 bill which she believed to be genuine and not counterfeit because Lambeth had previously told her he would not give her counterfeit money; that the change she received from the $10.00 bill after purchasing the cigarettes was given to Lambeth; that she was pretty intoxicated when she arrived at the club; that the three were arrested by two Oklahoma City detectives about 12:30 p.m. and taken to the county jail about 3:30 a.m.; that she was first questioned about 7:00 a.m. on November 13th, when she was taken from her cell to a meeting room where she met two Secret Service agents; that she did not feel well because of the drinking and lack of sleep for a couple of days; that without coffee or breakfast she was interrogated by Secret Service Agent Clark and another agent after Clark read her 'my rights' which she thereafter acknowledged by her signature after personally reading the Miranda warnings document; that immediately thereafter she told Clark 'that I wanted an attorney'; that even though she had requested an attorney, Clark asked her some personal questions about her parents, her children, etc., and that he stated that he and the other agent would like to help her out of the trouble she was in; that Clark then inquired of her about her acquaintance with Blankenship and Lambeth and whether she had seen anyone pass any counterfeit money; that she did not respond to these questions; and that Clark then advised her to get some sleep and stated that someone would question her in the afternoon.

Crocker testified that when she signed the Miranda form she was 'half asleep', not feeling well, and that neither agent said anything to her about providing her with an attorney. She further related that she was returned to her cell about 8:00 a.m. and that about 3:30 that afternoon, Agent Clark and a couple of other Secret Service agents, including a Mr. Skiles, took her to the Federal Building; that Agent Skiles read her 'my' rights before any questioning was undertaken; that after some one-half hour of interrogation she was fingerprinted and photographed that about 5:00 p.m. she was returned to a conference room where Agent Skiles first presented her a written Miranda 'rights' document which she read and signed, and that at that time she also signed the statement of confession prepared by Skiles after she 'skimmed' through it; that although she asked for an attorney during the morning session she did not again request counsel; that although the two waiver forms which she signed (both of which were admitted in evidence without objection) state that 'If you want a lawyer, a lawyer will be appointed for you', and both of which contain her written statement that 'I do not want a lawyer', that she nevertheless 'didn't know that the statement said 'I didn't want a lawyer"; that she did not reiterate her request for an attorney after the morning statement to Agent Clark and that it was not until she appeared before Judge Eubanks on the morning of November 14th, that she was told an attorney would be appointed to represent her; that she is 36 years of age, has an 11th grade education, and can read and write the English language; that none of the officers made any promises or threats to get her to talk to them, and that they treated her courteously; that she was convicted in Texas in 1965 of the felony of forging a prescription and money orders and sentenced to serve three years.

When questioned by the Court, she stated that although both of the 'warning' documents which she signed state that she is entitled to a lawyer and that one will be appointed for her, and that she did not want a lawyer, that she 'didn't read that part' even though she acknowledged it was read to her and that it stated unequivocally that 'I do not want a lawyer at this time.'

Both at the hearing on the motion to suppress and at trial, Special Agent Clark testified that at about 8:00 a.m. on the morning of November 13, 1973, he spoke with Crocker after he and Agent Don Snyder had produced their credentials and identified themselves; that he provided her with a standard warning and waiver of rights document which she read, and that he also read one completely to her; that the document is in two parts, the first containing each of the Miranda rights and warnings, and the second consisting of a waiver of those rights; that after she read the form and after he read it aloud to her Agent Clark inquired of her whether she had any questions concerning it; that she stated that she did not; that she then signed the waiver; that at no time during the interrogation, which lasted about 30 minutes, did Crocker ask for an attorney, and that had she done so, he would simply have obtained personal data, i.e., name, age, residence, occupation, education, parents, etc.; that he did question Crocker about the counterfeit money but that she made no admissions or statements relative thereto; that it is possible, although beyond his recollection, that Crocker made some remark about an attorney, but that she did not state that she wished to have an attorney present; and that Crocker did have a fatigued appearance.

When Clark was asked whether it is possible that Crocker could have asked for an attorney during the interview, he acknowledged that it was possible, but that he had no such recollection. He stated that the procedure followed by the Service when one asks for counsel is to terminate the questioning. He stated that Crocker definitely did not request that an attorney be present. The testimony of Agent Clark was fully corroborated by Agent Don Snyder. He testified, when questioned by the Court, that Crocker made no reference about an attorney, and that if it had been made the procedure of the Service is to terminate questioning.

Agent Skiles testified that about 4:30 p.m. on November 13th, he interrogated Crocker after first orally advising her of her rights and then handing her a printed copy of the Miranda rights document which she read and which he read aloud to her from another copy; that he then inquired of Crocker if she had any questions; that she had none; that she did not request an attorney; that she then signed the waiver of rights form and thereafter signed the confession statement in his presence and that of Agent Clark. While there is no discrepancy about the fact that Agent Skiles first orally advised Crocker of her rights prior to any interrogation, there is a conflict in the testimony of Skiles and Clark as to the time when Crocker executed the written waiver. Skiles recalls that she executed it at about 5:00 p.m. Clark recalls that she executed it concurrent with her execution of the confession statement about 8:00 p.m., even though the time on the document appears as of 5:00 p.m. We attach no particular significance to this difference in recollection. There is no showing that it prejudiced Crocker's rights. The different recollections were presented and argued to the jury, insofar as they may have related to credibility.

The agents testified that Crocker was not taken before a magistrate on November 13th because none was available and further, upon inquiry, they learned that none of the judges were available. Agent Clark testified that the waiver document executed by Crocker in the morning could not be located by him when the evening interview was commenced, and that this necessitated the need for the additional warning-waiver form. Thereafter, however, Agent Clark did locate the form executed that morning.

The suppression motion was directed both to the oral statement made by Crocker during the morning interview and the written statement executed following the afternoon interview.

In ruling on the motion to suppress, the Trial Court held that Crocker voluntarily gave the oral statement after being fully informed of and then voluntarily waiving her rights, and that even though she testified that she did not realize what she was...

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