Goldblum v. Klem

Decision Date30 November 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-1138.,06-1138.
Citation510 F.3d 204
PartiesCharles J. GOLDBLUM, Appellant v. Edward J. KLEM, Superintendent, SCI Mahanoy; District Attorney of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

David Rudovsky (argued), Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, Philadelphia, PA, Lee Markovitz, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellant.

Stephen A. Zappala, Jr., District Attorney, Michael W. Streily, Deputy District Attorney, Ronald M. Wabby, Jr. (argued), Assistant District Attorney, Office of the District Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.

Before: SMITH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge*.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on Charles J. Goldblum's appeal from the denial of his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Goldblum, who is currently serving a life sentence following his conviction for first-degree murder, filed his second petition after receiving our authorization to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The district court, in adopting a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, dismissed the second petition based on Goldblum's failure to satisfy the requirements applicable to second petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4) and its predecessor, the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, which as we will discuss, was implicated because Goldblum filed his first habeas corpus application before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").

Goldblum believes that the magistrate judge erred in three ways: she (1) was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he abused the writ; (2) applied the wrong legal standard under the "cause" element of the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine; and (3) wrongly found that Goldblum is not "actually innocent" of the murder for which he has been convicted, which actual innocence would have excused his noncompliance with the procedures ordinarily required for habeas corpus proceedings to avoid his petition being barred by the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. We find Goldblum's arguments unpersuasive and thus will affirm the order of the district court, thereby upholding the dismissal of his second habeas application.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The events and procedural history leading up to this appeal are quite complicated and lengthy. We therefore will discuss them only as they relate to this appeal.

A. The Underlying Convictions

At Goldblum's Pennsylvania state-court trial on charges of murder, arson, and insurance fraud, the prosecution put forth the following facts. In 1974, Clarence Miller met George Wilhelm. At that time, they discussed Wilhelm's interest in purchasing land in North Carolina on which Wilhelm planned to search for semiprecious stones and gemstones. Miller discovered that the land that Wilhelm was interested in purchasing was federal forest land and was not for sale. Miller, however, told Wilhelm that he would use his "political connections" to assist him to purchase the land. Miller, however, did not have these so-called "political connections." Instead, he devised a scheme to defraud Wilhelm in which he planned to tell Wilhelm that he would work out a special political deal with the help of a United States senator to obtain the government-owned land.1

Miller contacted Thaddeus Dedo and Goldblum to assist him in executing this fraud. Dedo, under Goldblum's guidance, impersonated an actual member of the senator's staff, Ken Manella, and made several phone calls to Wilhelm confirming the deal leading Wilhelm to give Miller a series of payments totaling approximately $20,000 for the consideration to put through the purchase. In exchange, Miller gave Wilhelm fake deeds to land in North Carolina that Goldblum apparently drafted.

The scheme began to unravel when Wilhelm went to the senator's office to meet with "Ken Manella." Wilhelm immediately became suspicious that he had been defrauded when the real Ken Manella appeared. Wilhelm reported his suspicions to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI, however, terminated its investigation when Goldblum and Miller persuaded Wilhelm to withdraw his complaint in exchange for Goldblum's and Miller's promise that Wilhelm would get his money back. Wilhelm did withdraw it by asserting to the FBI that his complaint was a hoax.

The plot then thickened as the money to repay Wilhelm was not readily available. In order to raise the money, Wilhelm agreed with Goldblum to participate in an insurance fraud scheme in which Wilhelm would set fire to a restaurant Goldblum leased and operated, but Goldblum's parents owned. In return, Goldblum was to pay Wilhelm $3,500 in addition to the money taken from him in the land fraud. The restaurant burned to the ground as a result of arson on November 30, 1975. Goldblum paid Wilhelm $100, but when no one paid Wilhelm the remaining money, Wilhelm, who surely was not short of nerve, began pressing Goldblum for payment and threatening him that he would go to the authorities.

Goldblum, understandably in view of Wilhelm's previous contact with the FBI, obviously took Wilhelm's threats seriously for on February 8, 1976, he told Miller that he intended to beat Wilhelm up to discourage him from pressing him for the debt payment or going to the authorities. Miller agreed to assist in this plan by luring Wilhelm to the top floor of a parking garage in exchange for $50 and Miller did so by telling Wilhelm that Goldblum had the money he was due. On February 9, 1976, the three of them, with Wilhelm driving, Miller sitting in the front passenger seat, and Goldblum sitting in the back seat behind the driver, drove to the top floor of a parking garage in downtown Pittsburgh.

This case revolves around what happened next, a matter in some dispute. Miller contended at Goldblum's trial that Goldblum struck Wilhelm in the back of the head with a wrench and Wilhelm fell out the car, at which time Goldblum began stabbing him with a grass shear blade and Wilhelm fell over a wall. Goldblum, on the other hand, claims that Miller and Wilhelm got into a fight while in the car, leading to the stabbing, following which Wilhelm opened his door to the car and fell to the ground, at which time Miller flipped him over the wall. In any event, Goldblum and Miller left the scene together and agreed that they would say that they only had seen Wilhelm earlier in the evening, but they were not with him at the time of the murder.

Wilhelm was found later that night, crying for help. When police arrived at the scene, Wilhelm said to them, "Clarence Miller did this to me." Wilhelm died a few hours later. The police arrested Miller and when he, in turn, implicated Goldblum, police arrested Goldblum as well. Goldblum was released on bail. The police, however, fortunately engaged in a surveillance of Goldblum, during which he was observed arranging for Miller's murder with an undercover detective. Consequently, they arrested Goldblum on a charge for that new offense and returned him to jail.

The authorities filed a complaint against Goldblum in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County charging him with murder and voluntary manslaughter of Wilhelm, criminal conspiracy in relation to the fraudulent land deal, and arson and criminal solicitation to commit arson of the restaurant.2 They also charged Miller in the stabbing death of Wilhelm.

Goldblum proceeded to trial. The prosecution argued that Goldblum killed Wilhelm with the motive to silence him regarding the arson that they had committed. Goldblum, on the other hand, argued that he was not guilty of anything.3 The defense focused on Miller's obviously suspect credibility, as he was the prosecution's central witness, as well as the physical evidence that, according to Goldblum, tended to establish that Miller did the stabbing. In particular, Goldblum's attorney argued to the jury that while blood was found on Miller's overcoat, no blood was found on Goldblum's clothes. He also introduced circumstantial evidence relating to the pattern of the blood spatter on the dashboard of the car that the three men had occupied, which suggested that the person sitting to the right of Wilhelm, i.e., Miller, not the person in the back seat, i.e., Goldblum, did the stabbing. His attorney also introduced into evidence Wilhelm's dying declaration that "Clarence Miller did this to me."

The court instructed the jury both on the theory that Goldblum was guilty of murder in the first degree for the direct assault and the theory that he was an accomplice to murder in the first degree. On August 30, 1977, a jury found Goldblum guilty of murder in the first degree for the death of Wilhelm, as well as conspiracy to commit theft by deception, arson, and criminal solicitation to commit arson.4 The court did not ask the jury to determine whether Goldblum directly participated in the assault or was an accomplice to Miller's action, and the jury did not make a finding on this point. The court sentenced Goldblum to life in prison on the murder conviction and an additional 15 to 30 years imprisonment for the other offenses.

Goldblum was unsuccessful on his direct appeal during which he argued that Miller suffered from organic brain damage that impacted on his ability to distinguish fact from fiction. See Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 287 Pa.Super. 544, 427 A.2d 258 (1980) (Superior Court affirming convictions except conspiracy count), rev'd in part, 498 Pa. 455, 447 A.2d 234 (1982) (Supreme Court reversing Superior Court on conspiracy count and affirming other convictions). The state courts similarly denied his petition for post-conviction relief.

B. Goldblum's First Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

Goldblum subsequently sought relief in the federal courts, filing his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court on July...

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