Gilles v. Repicky
| Decision Date | 21 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 06-1272-cv. |
| Citation | 511 F.3d 239 |
| Parties | Marie GILLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Guy. J. REPICKY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Russell A. Schindler, Kingston, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Charlene M. Indelicato, Westchester County Attorney, for Stacey Dolgin-Kmetz, Chief Deputy County Attorney (Mary Lynn Nicolas, of counsel), White Plains, New York, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: CALABRESI and WESLEY, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS, District Judge.*
Plaintiff-appellant Marie J. Gilles brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant-appellee Guy J. Repicky seeking damages for violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. She appeals from a February 16, 2006 judgment of the district court (Brieant, J.) granting Repicky's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her claim. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the decision and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On August 11, 2004 at approximately 8:30 a.m. Marie Gilles, a fifty-year old United States citizen of Haitian descent, was traveling southbound through Westchester County on the Taconic State Parkway. She was driving a 1994 white Dodge cargo van, owned by her brother. She was transporting approximately ten packed fifty-five gallon cardboard barrels to a shipping facility in Mount Vernon, New York. Gilles owned the Adonai Community Store, a grocery store, in Poughkeepsie, New York. As part of her business she provided a shipping service for her customers to send supplies to relatives overseas. Gilles did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the barrels, but had the shipping invoices with her. According to the invoices, the barrels contained food and clothing to be shipped to destinations in Jamaica and Haiti.
On his way to work Detective Guy Repicky noticed Gilles' van, driving approximately 65 m.p.h. and apparently heavily laden. Repicky observed some barrels, partly covered by a blanket. He also noticed that the van slowed and moved abruptly into the right lane when passed by a marked police car.1
Repicky has been employed with the Westchester County Department of Public Safety since October 1990, and has been a detective since 1997. In November 2003 he was assigned to the department's Counter-Terrorism Unit. As part of his responsibilities he was advised by the New York State Police Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center of all terrorism alerts and activities relevant to Westchester County. In August 2004, as a result of the Republican National Convention which was scheduled to start on August 30, the Department had been put on alert for "vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices" (VBIEDs) which could possibly be used in the New York metropolitan area. Vans were specifically indicated as capable of carrying such devices. Repicky was aware of this alert.
Repicky called his dispatcher and requested that she run the van's license plate. His dispatcher informed him that the plate had been reported as stolen.2
Repicky requested state police assistance to stop the van, and was present when several New York State Police marked patrol cars stopped the van at approximately 8:45 a.m. Repicky approached the passenger side of the van, and a state trooper approached the driver's side of the van. Both officers approached the van with their guns drawn. Gilles testified that Repicky screamed at her, pointed his gun at her and threatened to shoot her if she moved. The state trooper ordered Gilles out of the van, and placed her in handcuffs. She was placed in the rear of the marked police car, with her hands cuffed behind her back.
Gilles and Repicky disagree about what happened next. Gilles asserts that she was asked for her driver's license and she responded that it was in her car. She kept asking "what did I do?" She told Repicky that the barrels contained food, clothing and school supplies. Repicky asserts that Gilles initially didn't answer his questions and that she was very upset and crying, that after about five to ten minutes she became "responsive," but repeatedly told Repicky that she did not know what was in the barrels.
After the van was pulled over, a bomb-sniffing dog was brought to the scene, but did not alert. Repicky then requested a narcotics dog. While the narcotics dog was at the scene, Repicky was informed that the reported stolen license plate was an error. The narcotics dog also did not alert.
Gilles and Repicky again disagree about what happened next. Repicky contends that after he learned about the stolen license plate error, he asked another officer on the scene to remove Gilles' handcuffs, approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after the initial stop. Gilles contends that she was held in handcuffs for more than one hour.
The officers searched the van and recovered Gilles' driver's license and the shipping invoices. They did not discover any explosive devices or materials that could be used to create such a device. Gilles maintains that she explained that her customers bought quantities of food and clothing items on sale in this country to send to their relatives in Jamaica and Haiti. Repicky claims that Gilles continued to disavow knowledge of the contents of the containers.
According to Repicky, at approximately 10:00 a.m. he requested that Gilles accompany him to headquarters, but told her "I can't just let you go." Repicky testified that his motive for asking her to "come voluntarily" to headquarters was to enable her to use the bathroom to clean up because it was evident that she had begun to menstruate heavily. According to Gilles, Repicky ordered her to follow them back to headquarters. Gilles acknowledged that she had begun to bleed, but testified that Repicky never asked her to come to headquarters or gave her any reason other than that he had to complete his investigation. Gilles was permitted to drive her van, with a police vehicle in front of her and a police vehicle behind her. She did not feel free to leave, and Repicky testified that she was detained at that point, although not under arrest.
At police headquarters, Repicky eventually spoke to someone at the shipping company, who confirmed that Gilles had an ongoing business relationship with them. Repicky spoke with his supervisors and then informed Gilles that she was free to leave, at 11:30 a.m.
Gilles filed a civil rights action against Repicky, asserting that her continued detention violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. In an unpublished decision, the district court granted summary judgment to Repicky, finding that Repicky was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. Gilles v. Repicky, No. 05 Civ. 374(CLB), 2006 WL 360171, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.15, 2006). Specifically, the district court concluded "that it was objectively reasonable for Detective Repicky to have believed that his actions were lawful at the time of the stop and detention of Plaintiff." Id. The district court dismissed Gilles' contention that her continued detention was unreasonable: "the fact that more time was taken than necessary in connection with otherwise reasonable police conduct is not in itself a basis for a civil rights violation." Id.
"`We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.'" Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir.) (quoting Hoyt v. Andreucci, 433 F.3d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 109, 169 L.Ed.2d 24 (2007). We accept Gilles' evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id.; see also Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, we will affirm the district court only if no rational trier of fact could conclude that the facts established that Repicky violated Gilles' constitutional rights and was unprotected by qualified immunity. See Russo, 479 F.3d at 203.
Qualified immunity protects officials from liability for civil damages as long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). A right is "clearly established" if "[t]he contours of the right ... [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
When a defendant officer charged with violations of federal constitutional rights invokes qualified immunity to support a motion for summary judgment, a court must first consider a threshold question: Do the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 154 (2d Cir.2007). If the facts, viewed in that light, do not establish a violation of a constitutional right, "`there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity,'" and the officer is entitled to summary judgment. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).
If, however, the facts could establish a violation of a constitutional right, then "the next ... step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. In determining whether a right was clearly established, a court asks "`whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in...
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