U.S. v. Woodbury

Citation511 F.3d 93
Decision Date26 December 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-2586.,06-2586.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Justin WOODBURY, Defendant, Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Michael B. Whipple, with whom Thomas F. Hallett Law Offices, P.A. was on brief, for appellant.

Margaret D. McGaughey, Appellate Chief, with whom Paula D. Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, and SCHWARZER,* Senior District Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

On September 9, 2005, federal authorities obtained a search warrant for the home of Justin Woodbury located at 7 Leisure Lane, Windham, Maine, "believed to be" the bottom-floor left apartment. The warrant named Woodbury as the occupant and authorized a nighttime noknock entry. Federal and local authorities, directed to his second-floor apartment by the occupant of the bottom-floor apartment, executed the warrant and seized a .40 caliber pistol and drug paraphernalia. Woodbury entered a plea of not guilty to a federal indictment for a single count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and filed a motion to suppress, alleging that for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the warrant (1) lacked probable cause and (2) was insufficiently particular. Woodbury's suppression motion was denied, and he now appeals. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. Background

On May 5, 2005, Sgt. R. Michael Denbow, a state police officer, told federal agent Earnest MacVane that an informant had reported that he planned to deliver cocaine to Woodbury at an apartment on Lamb Street in Windham. Two days later, the informant stated that Woodbury had claimed to have purchased a .40 or .44 caliber pistol and even bragged that he was a convicted felon. The informant had previously provided the police with truthful information.

On September 9, 2005, Windham police office Robert Hunt stopped a speeding car. The driver was noticeably anxious and said that he had just come from Woodbury's apartment. He informed the police that Woodbury dealt in cocaine and possessed a .40 caliber handgun which he did not carry outside of his apartment. Based both on this information and that provided by the prior police informant in May, MacVane believed there was probable cause that Woodbury was trafficking at 7 Leisure Lane.

On September 9, 2005, a Maine state court judge granted MacVane's request for a search warrant. The person, place, or location to be searched read:

# 7 Leisure Lane Windham, Maine believed to be the bottom floor left apartment. Said structure is a white multi-unit dwelling with a covered front porch, and a grey shingled roof.

The warrant unmistakably identified the appellant in the warrant as "Justin WOODBURY/ DOB: 05-15-1981, White male 5'9" / 175 pound, with brown hair and blue eyes," and authorized a nighttime noknock entry.

The warrant was based on a September 9 application and affidavit submitted by MacVane. The affidavit named Woodbury as the occupant of 7 Leisure Lane, but also described Woodbury's apartment as being on Lamb Street.1 Attached to the affidavit was a black and white photograph of 7 Leisure Lane. The affidavit provided a rough physical description of Woodbury, but stipulated that it did not contain all of the information that MacVane possessed in relation to Woodbury's alleged cocaine trafficking.

That same evening, federal and local authorities attempted to execute the warrant at the location specified therein, which directed them to the bottom-floor left apartment at 7 Leisure Lane. Woodbury did not reside there. The agents were redirected by the unknown occupant of the bottom-floor left apartment to the second-floor left apartment, where the occupant believed Woodbury resided. After knocking and waiting approximately twenty to thirty seconds, the officers heard a commotion and movement inside of the apartment. The agents forced open the door and saw Woodbury run from the kitchen to the bedroom where they apprehended him. Pursuant to the warrant, the officers searched the apartment and found a .40 caliber pistol in a shoe box in the bedroom closet. The shoe box also contained a copy of a bail slip issued to Woodbury from a prior arrest which specified that one condition of his release was a prohibition on possessing firearms. Elsewhere in Woodbury's apartment, the police found drug paraphernalia laced with cocaine residue. MacVane read Woodbury his Miranda rights, which Woodbury chose to waive. Woodbury admitted to being the sole occupant of the apartment and to knowing that a gun was in his closet. He denied owning the gun but refused to disclose how he had acquired it. Woodbury was then arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon.

On March 31, 2006, Woodbury moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the search on three separate grounds: (1) the warrant did not authorize entry into the upstairs apartment that was actually searched; (2) regardless, there was no probable cause to search the Leisure Lane premises because the informants only connected Woodbury to Lamb Street; and (3) there was no probable cause because the informants' information was uncorroborated and unreliable.2

On May 24, 2006, the Magistrate Judge ("MJ") recommended that the district court deny Woodbury's motion to suppress. Addressing each argument in turn, the MJ found that (1) considered in a common sense manner, the warrant made clear that the apartment occupied by Woodbury was the target of the search; (2)"the references in the affidavit to an apartment on Lamb Street were sufficiently vague that it was reasonable to conclude that the Lamb Street apartment was the same as # 7 Leisure Lane"; and (3) a sufficient number of factors were present to permit MacVane's conclusion that the informants' information was reliable. Finally, the MJ concluded that even if the warrant was invalid, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

Woodbury then modified his suppression motion, alleging that the executing officers knowingly acted outside the scope of the warrant. In response, the MJ stated that when "most sensibly read," the warrant was "not so facially deficient that executing officers could not reasonably have presumed it to be valid." Accordingly, the MJ recommended that the motion be denied. On July 27, 2006, the district court entered an order adopting the MJ's report and recommendation. The district court's order concluded that the Leon good faith exception applied to this case and found that the warrant was legally executed.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Woodbury challenges the validity of the warrant and the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, contending that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. His argument is without merit. The warrant meets the probable cause requirement, and its execution is valid under the Leon good faith exception.

A. Standard of Review

"In this Circuit, appellate review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." United States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir.2000). We review de novo the legal conclusions of the district court, "including the determination that a given set of facts constituted probable cause." Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 282 (1st Cir.1997)). We also review the applicability of the Leon good faith exception de novo. See United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.2001). By contrast, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Charles, 213 F.3d at 18. "A clear error exists only if, after considering all of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quoting United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st Cir.1996)). "[W]e will uphold a district court's decision to deny a suppression motion provided that any reasonable view of the evidence supports the decision." Id. 213 F.3d at 18 (quoting McCarthy, 77 F.3d at 529).

B. Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is meant to protect people from unreasonable intrusion by the government into their homes. The Warrant Clause guarantees that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Any search intruding upon [an individual's] privacy interest must be justified by probable cause and must satisfy the particularity requirement, which limits the scope and intensity of the search." United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 867 (1st Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1256 (D.C.Cir.1981)). "When investigators fail to limit themselves to the particulars in the warrant, both the particularity requirement and the probable cause requirement are drained of all significance as restraining mechanisms, and the warrant limitation becomes a practical nullity." United States v. Ferreras, 192 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1999). The issuance of a warrant must satisfy two requirements for constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. "A warrant application must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been committed-the `commission' element, and (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the place to be searched-the so-called `nexus' element." United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Zayas-Díaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir.1996)). Woodbury does not challenge the commission element, so we need not address it here.

Woodbury asserts that the warrant was not supported by probable cause because there was no evidence of a nexus between his alleged criminal activities and 7 Leisure Lane. Specifically, Woodbury contends that the officers had no personal knowledge that he lived at 7 Leisure Lane, and he points to the discrepancy in...

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