U.S. v. Jones
| Decision Date | 05 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 05-00386 (ESH). |
| Citation | 511 F.Supp.2d 74 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Antoine JONES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
A. Eduardo Balarezo, Law Offices of A. Eduardo Balarezo, Brian Keith McDaniel, McDaniel & Associates, Elita C. Amato, Shaffer, Boch And Antonopolos, Diane S. Lepley, H. Heather Shaner, Charles F. Daum, Washington, DC, Fred A. Kowalski, Brownsville, TX, for Defendants.
Rachel Carlson Lieber, John V. Geise, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
Before the Court are a series of motions filed by defendants Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard. Jones's previous trial ended in his acquittal on seventeen counts of using a communication facility to facilitate a drug trafficking offense and a hung jury with respect to thirteen similar counts and one count of conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Both defendants here have moved for reconsideration of this Court's denial of Jones's prior motion to suppress evidence from the government's interception of various wire and electronic communications. See United States v. Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d 71, 75-84 (D.D.C. 2006).1 In addition, Maynard has moved for severance, and Jones has moved for leave to file various pro se motions; to exclude evidence related to his prior acquitted conduct; and to compel the production of evidence obtained through the use of pen registers or to preclude its use at trial.2
Jones and Maynard are charged in a superseding indictment ("Indictment") with one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.3 As alleged in the Indictment, from at least sometime in 2003 through October 24, 2005, defendants and their coconspirators acquired, repackaged, stored, processed, sold, and redistributed large quantities of cocaine and cocaine base in the District of Columbia, Maryland, Texas, Mexico, and elsewhere. It is further alleged that Jones was the primary supplier of cocaine and cocaine base to members of the conspiracy who in turn distributed the cocaine to purchasers in the District of Columbia and in Maryland.
When investigating the alleged conspiracy, law enforcement agents used a variety of investigative techniques, including surveillance, informants, an electronic tracking device installed on Jones's vehicle, search warrants issued to electronic communication service providers for text messages to or from cellular telephones used by Jones and other conspirators, and a Title III wire intercept. The covert portion of the investigation ended on October 24, 2005, with searches pursuant to warrants and arrests. At that time, drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and significant quantities of cash were seized from the homes of a number of the defendants, as well as from a "stash house" in Fort Washington, Maryland, where 97 kilograms of cocaine, 549 grams of crack cocaine, and over $850,000 was found. (Indictment ¶ 145.) The evidence that the government intends to introduce at trial includes, inter alia, items seized on October 24, 2005, numerous conversations intercepted pursuant to Title III wiretap orders, and testimony from alleged coconspirators.
As the government has correctly argued, Jones's motion for reconsideration is "an essentially verbatim repetition" of his original motion. (Response at 6.) Although Jones has added a few citations to the trial record and discussed one additional case,4 he has failed to raise any new facts or arguments that would cause the Court to revise its prior Order. The Court has already considered and addressed Jones's arguments at length, and nothing in his motion for reconsideration or in his reply affects the Court's prior analysis. See Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d at 75-79 (); id. at 79-84 (approving the Title III affidavit).
The only new challenge is raised by Maynard, who contends that the Court should hold a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), regarding the failure of FBI Special Agent Stephanie Yanta's Title III affidavit to discuss the possibility of using Harold Holden as a confidential informant.5 (See Mot. to Adopt at 4-8.) As this Court has previously explained:
"[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if his attack on the accuracy of the affidavit is `more than conclusory' and is accompanied by `allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.'" Furthermore, even if the defendant makes the requisite preliminary showing, a hearing is not required unless the alleged misstatement was material to the finding of probable cause.
Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d at 78 (quoting United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77, 80 (D.C.Cir.2004) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674)). Here, Maynard offers conclusory allegations that Holden entered a cooperation plea focusing on Jones; that Holden would have been able to assist significantly in the investigation; and that Special Agent Yanta was aware of these facts but, to assure that she would obtain a warrant, deliberately omitted them from her Title III affidavit. Having offered no proof of his allegations, however, Maynard has failed to make the preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing. In addition, as the government has argued; the failure to mention Holden would not have been material since the investigation targeted individuals beyond "Jones and his immediate network" and the affidavit outlined "in considerable detail why informants and/or an undercover operation were unlikely to be able to expose the full scope of the Jones organization in a fashion that would likely lead to a successful prosecution of the entire organization."6 (Response at 13.) Thus, neither requirement for a Franks hearing is satisfied here. See Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d at 78.
Because neither Jones nor Maynard has presented any basis for the Court to reconsider its prior denial of a Franks hearing, defendants' motion for reconsideration will be denied.
In order "to fully protect the record," Maynard has filed a two-page motion for severance, in which he urges the Court to try him separately to ensure that the jury's ability to view his case objectively will not be compromised by the substantial evidence against Jones. (Def. Lawrence Maynard's Mot. for Rule 14 Severance at 1 n. 1; see id. at 1-2.) Although Maynard was not a defendant at Jones's first trial,7 much of the evidence at the prior trial related specifically to Maynard, and having heard this evidence, the Court is confident that there is no basis for severance. Any disparity between the amount of evidence against Maynard and the amount of evidence against Jones does not rise to the level that could "lead the jury to be either confused or prejudiced in assessing the evidence against [Maynard]." United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C.Cir.1987); see also United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 324 (D.C.Cir.1989) ( . Because Maynard will not be prejudiced by a joint trial, and because separate trials in this complex case would consume substantial prosecutorial and judicial resources, Maynard's motion for severance will be denied.
Jones has filed a motion for leave to file a series of pro se motions in which he claims that the government has engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and argues that the Court erred in denying his prior motions to suppress evidence derived from a Global Positioning System tracker and seized from the search of his Moore Street house and Jeep Grand Cherokee on October 24, 2005. The Court has already considered and rejected these arguments. See Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d at 85-88. Since Jones has alleged no new facts or arguments (except to raise ad hominem attacks against government counsel and their investigating agents), his motion for leave to file will be denied.
In this motion, Jones argues that his prior acquittal on various substantive counts of using a communication facility to facilitate a drug trafficking offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) ("the phone counts") estops the government from presenting evidence of the underlying phone calls or designating them as overt acts. (See Mot. to Exclude Evid. Related to Prior Acquitted Conduct and to Strike Overt Acts from the Indictment ["Collateral Estoppel Mot."] at 1-2.) To convict Jones of these counts, the jury would have had to find three elements: (1) knowing or intentional (2) use of a communication facility (3) "in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of [subchapters I or II of Chapter 13, Title 21 of the United States Code]." 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2006). According to Jones, the jury acquitted him based on a determination that the government had failed to prove the third element. (See Collateral Estoppel Mot. ...
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United States v. Jones
...are set forth in this Court's opinions in United States v. Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d 71, 73–74 (D.D.C.2006), and United States v. Jones, 511 F.Supp.2d 74, 77–78 (D.D.C.2007). 2. On appeal, only Jones succeeded in having his conviction vacated by the Circuit Court, and thereafter, on appeal to th......
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...Jones's motion for reconsideration added nothing new and denied it for the reasons the court had given before the first trial. 511 F.Supp.2d 74, 77 (2007). The court then denied Maynard's separate motion for a Franks hearing. Id. at 78. The appellants appeal the district court's denial of t......
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