Palacio v. State, 24884.
| Citation | 333 S.C. 506,511 S.E.2d 62 |
| Decision Date | 18 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 24884.,24884. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | Wilson A. PALACIO, Respondent, v. STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner. |
Attorney General Charles M. Condon; Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh; Assistant Deputy Attorney General Teresa A. Knox; and Assistant Attorney General Matthew M. McGuire, all of Columbia, for petitioner.
Thomas J. Quinn, of Beaufort, for respondent.
In this application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), the PCR court granted the applicant a new trial, finding ineffective assistance of counsel. We reverse.
On the morning of October 30, 1991, Charleston detectives Vanhorn and Warren followed a woman named Kerri Johnson to the Amtrak station in North Charleston. Police initiated the surveillance of Johnson as a result of a tip from a phone call received by police earlier that morning. At the Amtrak station, police followed Johnson into the train depot. At approximately 7:15 a.m., a train arrived from New York. Police observed Johnson greet Wilson Palacio ("Defendant") as he departed the train.
The detectives approached Johnson and Defendant after they exited the train depot. Detective Vanhorn identified himself as a police officer and told Defendant that he suspected Defendant was transporting illegal narcotics. Vanhorn asked permission to search Defendant's person and luggage. Vanhorn testified that Defendant said "yes" to the search. Defendant was not yet under arrest.
Detective Warren uncovered a boot while searching Defendant's luggage. According to Vanhorn, when the detective picked up the boot, Defendant stated, "you got it." Detective Warren pulled out an aluminum foil bundle containing cocaine. Defendant was immediately placed under arrest.
After police arrested Defendant, he repeatedly told them that Johnson was his girlfriend, and she knew nothing about the drugs. At the police station, Defendant was advised of his Miranda1 rights. The detectives told Defendant that they could not let Johnson go unless he gave them a written statement. Defendant subsequently waived his Miranda rights and dictated a statement to Detective Vanhorn. In the statement, Defendant explained he picked up nine ounces of cocaine in New York and was to be paid $1500 upon arriving in Charleston.2 Defendant signed the statement.
In 1993, Defendant was indicted for trafficking more than 100 grams of cocaine and for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. The State later dismissed the conspiracy charge, leaving only the trafficking charge. A jury found Defendant guilty of trafficking cocaine under S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-370 (Supp. 1997).3 Defendant was represented by Tara Anderson ("Attorney") at trial. The trial judge sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years in prison and a $50,000 fine. See S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e)(2)(c) (Supp.1997).4
Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict and sentence. State v. Palacio, 95-UP-209 (Ct.App.1995).5 On December 12, 1995, Defendant submitted his application for PCR. The PCR court granted the application, finding ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court ordered a new trial. We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the following issues:
In PCR proceedings, the applicant has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are made, the question becomes, whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Id.
Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court applies the following two-pronged test when considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) the applicant must show his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability the result at trial would have been different. Jackson v. State, 329 S.C. 345, 495 S.E.2d 768 (1998). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of trial. Id. In reviewing a PCR grant, we are concerned only with whether there is any evidence of probative value to support the PCR judge's decision. If any evidence of probative value is found, this Court must affirm the ruling of the PCR court. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).
The State argues that the PCR court erred in finding Attorney ineffective for failing to obtain all necessary documents before trial. We agree.
The PCR court found that the solicitor supplied Attorney with documents at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday before the trial began on Monday. Attorney also did not receive certain documents until the morning of the trial. These documents included receipts and witnesses' statements. Additionally, the PCR court found that on the morning of the trial, the solicitor informed the trial court that there were witnesses' statements in his file that he was not going to turn over to the defense. Attorney moved for a continuance so that she could review the materials. In arguing for a continuance, Attorney emphasized to the trial judge that on September 15, 1993, she made a motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 5, SCRCrimP and Brady v. Maryland.6 She had also filed a supplemental discovery request on October 8, 1993, because she believed there was a history of Charleston solicitors not providing complete discovery. The trial court denied the continuance.
At the PCR hearing, Attorney conceded she failed to make a request for the trial court to conduct an in camera review of any of the documents. She stated at the PCR hearing, "All I did was make the motion for a continuance and/or dismissal based on the lack of evidence being provided to me and the lack of compliance to the Brady and discovery motion." The PCR court held that Attorney was ineffective for failing to obtain the documents in a more timely fashion or in requesting that the trial court review the unproduced documents to determine if they were, in fact, discoverable. We disagree.
It is undisputed that Attorney made several discovery motions weeks before the trial and argued at length for a continuance. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not err in denying the continuance. The court stated it could not determine whether the evidence was material because it was not produced in the record. The court nonetheless held that based on the solicitor's descriptions of the documents to the trial court, the documents appear to have involved only inculpatory evidence. As for the witnesses' statements that were allegedly never turned over by the solicitor, the Court of Appeals held these statements were not subject to discovery under Rule 5, SCRCP. We therefore find no evidence indicating Attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Yet, even if Attorney were deficient in this regard, Defendant has failed to satisfy the second prong of Strickland. The second prong of Strickland requires a showing that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Jackson, supra.
Since the contents of these documents were never revealed at the PCR hearing, Defendant has failed to present any evidence of probative value demonstrating how the failure to obtain the unproduced statements or acquire the other documents in a more timely fashion prejudiced the defense. Id. ().
We therefore reverse the PCR court on this issue, finding no evidence of probative value to support the PCR court's decision. See Cherry, supra.
The State argues that the trial court erred in finding Attorney ineffective for failing to challenge the search of Defendant at the train station. We agree.
The PCR court found that Attorney failed to raise "to the trial court by motion or argument the question of what probable cause or, if the circumstance had been appropriate, reasonable suspicion, provided police grounds to detain or search Defendant." The PCR court noted there was nothing in the trial transcript to allow the trial judge to assess the reasonableness of the search or whether the information relied upon by the police was credible. The PCR court concluded Attorney's failure to challenge the search denied Defendant a full and fair trial.
Detective Vanhorn testified at trial that Defendant provided consent to search his luggage at the train station. Further, Defendant signed a written statement stating he consented to the search.
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived by valid consent. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Warrantless searches and seizures are reasonable...
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