International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Nix

• Decision Date: 28 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-1659,74-1659
• Parties: 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2154, 76 Lab.Cas. P 10,848 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Franklin W. NIX, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 125

512 F.2d 125

89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2154, 76 Lab.Cas. P 10,848

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS

et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Franklin W. NIX, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 74-1659.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 28, 1975.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1975.

Franklin R. Nix, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

J. R. Goldthwaite, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before GEWIN and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges, and NICHOLS, ^* Associate Judge.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves a crucial issue of federalism: under what circumstances may a federal court enjoin a proceeding in a state court? Our analysis turns on the applicability to the suit before us of the pivotal law in this area, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

This court has reviewed various aspects of the dispute between Nix and his Union and local lodge on four separate occasions. Nix v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024, 94 S.Ct. 449, 38 L.Ed.2d 316 (1973); Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, 452 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946, 92 S.Ct. 2044, 32 L.Ed.2d 332 (1972); Nix v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1969); Fulton Lodge No. 2 v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969). While our earlier opinions have exhaustively analyzed the facts of this continuing litigation, the importance in the present suit of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel necessitates a careful recitation of the precise facts and holdings of the earlier cases.

I. Facts

This litigation is complicated by Nix's dual status as an employee and rank-and-file member of the Internal Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union). While employed as a press representative of the Union in 1965, he attempted to organize his fellow staff employees, theretofore unrepresented, into an independent bargaining unit. In this capacity he founded the IAM Representative Association. The Union, abandoning its customary posture, stauchly resisted its employees' organizational efforts, but by 1966 the Representatives Association had won an election and secured NLRB certification as bargaining representative of all staff employees.

Shortly after the Board's certification of the new representative, the Union discharged Nix, alleging simply that it had no work for him. In response, Nix filed Section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. The Union, in turn, offered as an additional reason for Nix's discharge that he had pilfered the confidential papers of his immediate superior, a Union regional vice-president. Nix freely admitted taking the papers but claimed that he did so to prove that the vice-president was defrauding the Union. His action, he argued, was therefore consistent with his duty as a Union member to protect Union funds. The NLRB held that Nix was discharged for pilfering documents from his superior and not because of his organizational activity. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Nix, 172 NLRB No. 239, 1968-2 CCH NLRB P 20,187. We affirmed in Nix v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1969), stating:

We hold that substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole supports the Board's finding that IAM's (employee Nix was) . . . discharged for cause and not because of (his) union membership and activity. Nix's discharge for pilfering his superior's personal papers . . . (was) legitimate grounds for discharge. The Board properly concluded that the General Counsel failed to sustain his burden of proof that the discharge of . . . Nix . . . was only a pretext to conceal dismissal for membership and activities in IAM's staff representatives' Association.

The next spate of litigation arose from the Union's efforts to oust Nix from membership. Shortly after the Board's certification of the Representatives Association, the Union and the local lodge expelled Nix, claiming that he had slandered a Union official during the course of the representation campaign. Nix filed suit in federal district court based on the right to the exercise of free speech, protected by the union member's "Bill of Rights" of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 411. The district court's order enjoining Nix's expulsion from the Union and Lodge and any further interference with the exercise of free speech, Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAM, 262 F.Supp. 1000 (N.D.Ga.1967), was affirmed in part ¹ by this court. 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969).

At this point, Nix sought to gain reinstatement as an employee via the LMRDA, having failed to secure such relief in the unfair labor practice action before the NLRB. As the LMRDA protects union members, not employees, Nix was compelled to characterize his discharge as an infringement on union membership status, not merely on the rights of an employee. He therefore initiated a new action in the district court, arguing that under the LMRDA he had both a right and a duty to expose the corrupt Union vice-president. The Union, he urged, violated Section 609 of the LMDRA, 29 U.S.C. § 529, ² in discharging him from employment for an act which was no more than the fulfillment of a Union duty. Nix further sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all union members on the theory that the provisions of the Union constitution permitting disciplinary action against members for false or malicious statements against other members conflicted with the LMRDA provisions safeguarding the right of free expression.

The district court rejected Nix's contention that his right to employment as a union member was in any way distinctive from his right to continued employment under the Labor Management Relations Act,29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., and therefore concluded that the controlling issue of fact concerning the discharge had already been litigated before the NLRB. This court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that principles of res judicata barred further litigation on the issue of Nix's discharge. Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, 452 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946, 92 S.Ct. 2044, 32 L.Ed.2d 332 (1972). ³

Nix now seeks in state court the remedy which three federal tribunals the NLRB, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and this court have already denied. Nix presses his state court action for reinstatement in his job on a contract theory, contending that the Union and the Lodge breached the contract of union membership by firing Nix for performing a legitimate union duty. The Union and Lodge initially sought to avoid litigation in the state forum by removing the suit to federal district court, but the district court, finding neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction, granted Nix's motion to remand the case to the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia. The Union and Lodge then filed the instant suit in federal district court to enjoin the state court proceedings pursuant to the explicit exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. Specifically, the Union argues that an injunction against the state court action is necessary both to protect the jurisdiction of the federal court and to effectuate its judgments since the issue under consideration in state court has already been litigated and resolved in several federal forums. The relitigation of the issues presented in the state court claim, the Union asserts, is barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

The district court, concluding that three of the five issues ⁴ raised in the state court complaint, all relating to Nix's discharge from employment, were governed by the rules of res judicata, issued a partial injunction against further proceedings in state court. The district court did not enjoin state court litigation of Nix's remaining two issues, namely whether the Union and Lodge are required to assist Nix in obtaining work and whether the continuing attack by the Lodge on Nix's union membership rights constitutes a breach of the Lodge's contractual duty. Because we find that issues vital to some of Nix's state court claims have been thoroughly litigated and finally decided in prior actions in various federal forums, we affirm the district court's injunctive order. ⁵

II. The Relitigation Exception

In view of the clear considerations of federalism supporting the Anti- Injunction Act, federal courts must proceed with caution in enforcing injunctions against state court proceedings. See American Radio Assoc. v. Mobile Steamship Assoc., Inc., 483 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1973). The purpose of § 2283 is to "avoid unseemly conflict between the state and the federal courts." NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 146, 92 S.Ct. 373, 378, 30 L.Ed.2d 328, 335 (1971). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4, 60 S.Ct. 215, 84 L.Ed. 537 (1940); Signal Properties, Inc. v. Farha, 482 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1973); Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1971); Euge v. Smith, 418 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.): The Act does not embody a mere "principle of comity" but rather mandates an express and unequivocal limitation on the power of federal courts. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 75 S.Ct. 452, 99 L.Ed. 600 (1955). Furthermore, the sensitive nature of federal interference with state court proceedings requires that the...