Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.

• Decision Date: 17 August 1987
• Docket Number: No. 62251,62251
• Citation: 117 Ill.2d 230,111 Ill.Dec. 302,512 N.E.2d 691
• Parties: , 111 Ill.Dec. 302, 56 USLW 2122 Janice L. SIEMIENIEC et al., v. LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL et al. (Lutheran General Hospital et al., Appellants).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 691

512 N.E.2d 691

117 Ill.2d 230, 111 Ill.Dec. 302, 56

USLW 2122

Janice L. SIEMIENIEC et al., v. LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL et al. (Lutheran General Hospital

et al., Appellants).

No. 62251.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Aug. 17, 1987.

Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant Michael Reese Hosp.; Harold L. Jacobson, Patricia J. Foltz, Hugh C. Griffin, of counsel.

Cassiday, Schade & Gloor, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant Lutheran Gen. Hosp.; Rudolf G. Schade, Jr., John P. Stansbury, of counsel.

Kenneth L. Cunniff, Patrick J. Rocks, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees, Janice L. Siemieniec and Thomas E. Siemieniec.

Justice RYAN delivered the decision of the court.

This Cook County medical malpractice action involves interrelated issues dealing with the rights of parents and children to recover damages against health-care providers for what are commonly known as "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life" causes of action.

Janice Siemieniec conceived a child in February 1980. Mrs. Siemieniec's family history revealed that two of her deceased cousins had been afflicted with hemophilia. For purposes of general and descriptive information only, hemophilia is a genetic disorder caused by the deficiency or inactivity of coagulation factors needed for blood clotting. The hemophilias include both hemophilia A, or "classic hemophilia," in which the patient's plasma is deficient in factor VIII clotting activity, and hemophilia B, or "Christmas Disease," in which the patient's plasma is deficient in factor IX coagulation activity. Both types are transmitted as a sex-linked recessive trait on the X chromosome. The usual familial pattern shows that only males are affected, that these individuals are related only via their mothers, and that their mothers are unaffected. See Bachman, Recognition of Congenital Bleeding Disorders, in Hemophilia (D. Green ed. 1973); A. Bloom, The Hemophilias 5-9 (1982); Kasper, Hematologic Care, in Comprehensive Management of Hemophilia 3-6 (D. Boone ed. 1976).

Concerned with a possible occurrence of this inherited coagulation disorder in her already conceived child, Mrs. Siemieniec, during the first trimester of her pregnancy, sought genetic counseling at Lutheran General Hospital to determine the likelihood of this contingency. Dr. Carol Booth, the director of the Department of Genetics at Lutheran General, advised Mrs. Siemieniec of the availability of prenatal genetic diagnostic tests (amniocentesis and fetal blood sampling) to determine the risk of her child being afflicted with hemophilia. Mrs. Siemieniec purportedly informed Dr. Booth of her desire to terminate the pregnancy by abortion if there was a substantial risk of her bearing a hemophilic child.

Dr. Booth referred Mrs. Siemieniec to Dr. Juan Chediak, a staff physician in the Division of Hematology/Oncology at Michael Reese Hospital. Dr. Chediak supplied Mrs. Siemieniec with similar information regarding genetic diagnostic and prenatal testing procedures. Dr. Chediak also promised to check on whether Mrs. Siemieniec's cousins were registered hemophiliacs and to examine her deceased cousin's death certificate.

Two weeks later, Dr. Chediak sent a letter to Dr. Booth opining that the risk of Mrs. Siemieniec being a carrier of classic hemophilia was "very low." Dr. Booth then sent a copy of this letter to Mrs. Siemieniec. Based upon this information, the Siemieniecs exercised a conscious choice to proceed with the pregnancy. As a result, Adam Siemieniec was born on October 17, 1980, and after a bleeding episode, was diagnosed as a hemophiliac of the B type (Christmas Disease).

On the basis of these facts, Thomas and Janice Siemieniec, on their own behalf and on behalf of their son, Adam, filed a four-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against Dr. Booth, Dr. Chediak, Lutheran General Hospital, and Michael Reese Hospital. The complaint alleged that, as a direct and proximate result of the negligent diagnosis by the defendants and their failure to accurately advise Mrs. Siemieniec of the risk of the child's being born a hemophiliac, Adam Siemieniec was not aborted, to his personal injury and to the financial injury of his parents. The complaint sought damages for the extraordinary medical expenses the Siemieniecs will incur in caring for and treating Adam's hemophilic condition during his minority, for the extraordinary expenses Adam will incur for the care and treatment of his impaired physical condition after he reaches majority, and for the alleged emotional distress and mental anguish sustained by the Siemieniecs attendant to the raising and caring of a hemophiliac.

The circuit court denied the respective motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. Recognizing, however, that issues of law were present as to which there were substantial grounds for difference of opinion, the circuit court certified for appellate review three questions: (1) whether the child has a cause of action on his own behalf for extraordinary medical expenses during the age of majority; (2) whether the parents have a cause of action for the extraordinary medical expenses of the hemophilic child during his minority; and (3) whether the parents have a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The appellate court answered the first certified question in the affirmative: Adam has a cause of action in his own behalf for extraordinary medical expenses during his majority. (134 Ill.App.3d 823, 831-32, 89 Ill.Dec. 484, 480 N.E.2d 1227.) The appellate court also answered the second certified question in the affirmative: Adam's parents have a cause of action to recover extraordinary medical expenses during his minority. (134 Ill.App.3d 823, 826-30, 89 Ill.Dec. 484, 480 N.E.2d 1227.) Finally, in answer to certified question No. 3, the appellate court held that, "absent allegations and proof of intentional and outrageous conduct, or that [Adam's parents] were at a high risk to themselves of physical impact resulting in their physical injury or illness by reason of the emotional distress caused by a defendant's negligence, [Adam's parents] have no cause of action for emotional distress damages." (134 Ill.App.3d 823, 831, 89 Ill.Dec. 484, 480 N.E.2d 1227.) We allowed the defendants' petition for leave to appeal pursuant to our Rule 315 (94 Ill.2d R. 315).

We emphasize at the outset the procedural posture in which this case is now before this court. The question presented for review is not whether the plaintiffs should ultimately prevail in this litigation, but rather, more narrowly, whether the complaint states legally cognizable causes of action. Since our review is limited to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the complaint, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts. (See Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co. (1982), 89 Ill.2d 273, 280, 60 Ill.Dec. 456, 433 N.E.2d 253; Sierens v. Clausen (1975), 60 Ill.2d 585, 589, 328 N.E.2d 559; O'Fallon Development Co. v. Ring (1967), 37 Ill.2d 84, 88, 224 N.E.2d 782.) Accordingly, we accept, without expressing any opinion as to the defendants' liability, the allegations that the defendants failed to adequately inform Mrs. Siemieniec about various types of hemophilia, for one of which, the type with which Adam is afflicted, Christmas Disease, there is no reliable test; failed to inquire adequately into Mrs. Siemieniec's own medical and health background; and failed to obtain the death certificate of Mrs. Siemieniec's cousin, which would have disclosed that he had a factor IX clotting disorder, the same as Adam. We further accept the allegation that if Mrs. Siemieniec had been accurately advised of the chances that her already conceived child would be afflicted with hemophilia, then she would have terminated the pregnancy by abortion.

We turn now to the issues before us, whether actions for wrongful life and wrongful birth should be recognized in Illinois. The terms "wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" have been applied to a wide variety of medical malpractice actions brought by parents or by infants for damages growing out of unexpected or unwanted birth, or out of birth under conditions of disability or disadvantage. Because the courts and the commentators have been less than precise in their utilization of these terms, the legal and theoretical distinctions between the torts often have been blurred. Hence, thoughtful analysis of the validity of wrongful birth and wrongful life as emerging legal concepts requires, in the first instance, a clear understanding of the alleged wrong upon which the cause of action is predicated.

"Wrongful birth" refers to the claim for relief of parents who allege they would have avoided conception or terminated the pregnancy by abortion but for the negligence of those charged with prenatal testing, genetic prognosticating, or counseling parents as to the likelihood of giving birth to a physically or mentally impaired child. The underlying premise is that prudent medical care would have detected the risk of a congenital or hereditary genetic disorder either prior to conception or during pregnancy. As a proximate result of this negligently performed or omitted genetic counseling or prenatal testing, the parents were foreclosed from making an informed decision whether to conceive a potentially handicapped child or, in the event of a pregnancy, to terminate the same. See Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 14 Fam.L.Q. 15, 16-17 (1980); Comment, Damages For Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Pregnancy in Illinois, 15 Loy.U.Chi.L.J. 799, 799-800 (1984); Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action--Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 Marq. L. Rev. 611, 621-23 (1980); Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to be Born, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 480, 484-85 (1980); see generally 1 Dooley, Modern Tort Law sec. 14.06 (1982).

The corresponding action by or on...