Greene v. Solano County Jail

Citation513 F.3d 982
Decision Date22 January 2008
Docket NumberNo. 06-16957.,06-16957.
PartiesDarin D. GREENE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOLANO COUNTY JAIL, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Fred Norton, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Oakland, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.

Martha M. Stringer, Sacramento, CA, for defendant-appellee, Rourk.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-04-0917 MCE.

Before: ALARCON, DAVID R. THOMPSON, and RICHARD C. TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

THOMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Darin D. Greene ("Greene"), a former maximum security prisoner at the Claybank facility of the Solano County jail ("the Claybank jail"), appeals the district court's summary judgment as to all claims in favor of the defendant, Solano County Sheriffs Lieutenant Peggy Rourk ("Rourk").

In his civil rights action against Rourk, Greene alleged that the Claybank jail's policy of prohibiting maximum security prisoners from participating in group worship was a violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq., under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under California Penal Code section 4027("Penal Code section 4027").1 Rourk moved for summary judgment on portions of Greene's RLUIPA claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rourk on the entire RLUIPA claim and, sua sponte, granted summary judgment in favor of Rourk on Greene's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") claims for alleged violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as for his claim under Penal Code section 4027, and dismissed the case. Greene appeals.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294. Because disputed issues of material fact exist with regard to Greene's RLUIPA claim, we reverse the district court's summary judgment in favor of Rourk on that claim and remand it to the district court for further proceedings. Because Rourk did not meet her burden on summary judgment as to Greene's section 1983 claims, or as to his Penal Code section 4027 claim, and because Greene was not given notice and an opportunity to oppose summary judgment as to those claims, we vacate the district court's summary judgment in favor of Rourk on those claims, and remand them to the district court as well.

I. BACKGROUND

While Greene was awaiting trial on charges of terrorist threats and false imprisonment, he was housed in the maximum security area at the Claybank jail for approximately three months, from June 30, 2003 to October 9, 2003. Greene alleged, and Rourk confirmed, that numerous times while at the Claybank jail, Greene requested, and was denied, the opportunity to attend group religious worship services. Greene attempted to conduct Bible studies and morning prayer with a number of other inmates by "yelling through the corner edge of the cell door" but was ordered to stop because it was bothering other prisoners, including those who "were not able to hear the television without being disturbed." On September 12, 2003, Greene submitted a grievance, signed by 42 other inmates, requesting that group religious services be provided for maximum security inmates. Rourk denied the request, but offered to send a chaplain to visit Greene.

Greene filed a second grievance requesting that a classroom at the Claybank jail be provided at least once per week to inmates in maximum security for group religious services. This request was denied, but once again a religious visit was offered. Greene never accepted that offer. He requested, and was given, a Bible and a copy of "The Daily Bread," a religious periodical.

Greene, then acting pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, and Greene amended his complaint, naming Rourk as the sole defendant. In his amended complaint, Greene alleged that Rourk's refusal to allow group religious worship by maximum security prisoners at the Claybank jail was a violation of his rights.

Rourk moved for summary judgment. Her "Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment" stated that she was "entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the claim for relief under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983...." In her Memorandum of Points and Authorities, however, Rourk focused on Greene's RLUIPA claim and omitted any discussion as to Greene's other claims. Greene filed his pro se response, which was dedicated almost entirely to Rourk's RLUIPA arguments.2

The magistrate judge recommended summary judgment be granted in favor of Rourk on Greene's RLUIPA claim. He also recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of Rourk on Greene's section 1983 claims as well as his claim under Penal Code section 4027, even though neither party had briefed those claims. In addition, he recommended that the action be dismissed. On September 18, 2006, the district court followed the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment in favor of Rourk and dismissed the action. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION
A. The RLUIPA Claim

RLUIPA provides in relevant part, that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution .... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless the government establishes that the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest," and does so by "the least restrictive means." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir.2005).

The Supreme Court has recognized RLUIPA as "the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens...." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). The statute itself reflects this intent stating, "This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). See also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995.

Congress effectuated this intent by distinguishing RLUIPA from traditional First Amendment jurisprudence in at least two ways.3 First, it expanded the reach of the protection to include any "religious exercise," including "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or central to, a system of religious belief." Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). In fact, RLUIPA "bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is `central' to a prisoner's religion." Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Second, as opposed to the deferential rational basis standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), RLUIPA requires the government to meet the much stricter burden of showing that the burden it imposes on religious exercise is "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). See also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 717, 125 S.Ct. 2113; Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994.

1. Substantial Burden/Religious Exercise

The district court awarded summary judgment to Rourk on Greene's RLUIPA claim because, in the district court's view, denying Greene the ability to participate in group worship would not "substantially burden his ability to exercise his religion" because he "was not required to act contrary to their [sic] religious beliefs. Moreover ... alternative means for exercising his religion remained available to plaintiff." (internal citations omitted). We disagree with the district court's analysis and its conclusion.

In any RLUIPA claim, we must begin by identifying the "religious exercise" allegedly impinged upon. Next, we must ask whether the prison regulation at issue "substantially burdens" that religious exercise.

Rourk urges an expansive interpretation of "religious exercise." In her view, "religious exercise" is, in effect, the general practice of one's religion, rather than any particular practice within one's religion. For example, she argues that Greene's ability to engage in group worship is not, by itself, his religious exercise, but rather, is one component of his religious exercise. Applying Rourk's definition, she may, without violating RLUIPA, impose outright bans on particular aspects of an inmate's religious exercise, so long as, in the aggregate, those bans do not amount to a substantial burden.

Rourk's definition of "religious exercise" is supported neither by the plain language of RLUIPA, nor by the caselaw interpreting it. As noted above, RLUIPA specifically defines "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis added). In Cutter, the Court noted that, "[T]he `exercise of religion' often involves not only the belief and profession but the performance of ... physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service [or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine." 544 U.S. at 720, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990)).

In San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.2004), we considered the meaning of "religious exercise" in the context of a city's zoning process....

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