513 U.S. 251 (1995), 93-1612, NationsBank of N. C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.
|Docket Nº:||No. 93-1612|
|Citation:||513 U.S. 251, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740, 63 U.S.L.W. 4076|
|Party Name:||NATIONSBANK OF NORTH CAROLINA, N. A., et al. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE CO. et al.|
|Case Date:||January 18, 1995|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued December 7, 1994
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner national bank and its brokerage subsidiary applied to the Comptroller of the Currency, charged by Congress with superintendence of national banks, to allow the subsidiary to act as an agent in the sale of annuities. Under the proposed plan, bank customers could purchase a "variable annuity" which invests payments in a designated way and yields income that varies with investment performance a "fixed" annuity which yields income that does not vary or a hybrid account. Granting the application, the Comptroller typed the annuity sales "incidental" to "the business of banking" under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh. The Comptroller further concluded that annuities are not "insurance" within the meaning of § 92; that provision, by expressly authorizing banks in towns of no more than 5,000 people to sell insurance, arguably implies that banks in larger towns may not sell insurance. Respondent Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC), which sells annuities, filed a suit challenging the Comptroller's decision. The District Court upheld the Comptroller's conclusions as a permissible reading of the Act. Reversing the District Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals held that § 92 bars banks not located in small towns from selling insurance, and rejected the Comptroller's conclusion that annuities are not insurance under § 92.
The Comptroller's determination that national banks may serve as agents in the sale of annuities is a reasonable construction of the Act and therefore warrants judicial deference. Pp. 256-264.
(a) If a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue, the reviewing court must determine whether the answer reached by the agency charged with the statute's enforcement is based on a permissible construction. If an expert administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of
Congress' revealed design, the administrator's judgment is given controlling weight. Pp. 256-257.
(b) The Court respects as reasonable the Comptroller's conclusion that brokerage of annuities is an "incidental powe[r]. . . necessary to carry on the business of banking" under § 24 Seventh. In interpreting "the business of banking" to include brokerage of financial investment instruments, the Comptroller better comprehends the Act's terms than does VALIC, whose reading confines national banks to the five activities listed in § 24 Seventh's first sentence and endeavors incidental thereto: discounting and negotiating evidences of debt; receiving deposits; buying and selling money; making loans; and obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes. The section's second sentence, which limits banks' "dealing in securities," recognizes that banks otherwise have the authority the sentence addresses, even though that authority is not specifically enumerated; Congress thus evidenced its intent to accord banks authority "to carry on the business of banking" through customer services not circumscribed by the five listed activities. The Comptroller therefore has discretion, within reasonable bounds, to permit banking activities beyond those the statute sets forth as exemplary. Here, the Comptroller reasonably concluded that the authority to sell annuities qualifies as part of the authority to purchase and sell financial investment instruments. Modern annuities, though more sophisticated than the standard savings bank deposits of old, answer essentially the same need. By providing customers with the opportunity to invest in one or more annuity options, banks are essentially offering financial investment instruments of the kind congressional authorization permits them to broker. Pp. 257-260.
(c) The Court further defers to the Comptroller's determination that annuities are properly classified as investments, not "insurance" within § 92's meaning. The Comptroller's classification of annuities, based on the tax deferral and investment features that distinguish them from insurance, is at least a reasonable interpretation of the controlling legislation. A key feature of insurance is that it indemnifies loss. As the Comptroller observes, annuities serve an important investment purpose and are functionally similar to other investments that banks typically sell. And though fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance than do variable annuities, fixed annuities too have significant investment features and are functionally similar to debt instruments. Moreover, mindful that fixed annuities are often packaged with variable annuities, the Comptroller reasonably chose to classify the two together. In light of the foregoing, the Court need not reach the question whether § 92, by negative implication, precludes
national banks in places more populous than 5,000 from selling insurance. Pp. 260-264.
998 F.2d 1295, reversed.
Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for petitioners in No. 93-1613. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Mark B. Stern, Jacob M. Lewis, Julie L. Williams, L. Robert Griffin, and Yvonne D. McIntire. Steven S. Rosenthal argued the cause for petitioners in No. 93-1612. With him on the briefs were Robert M. Kurucza and Robert G. Ballen.
David Overlock Stewart argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Alan G. Priest, Raymond C. Ortman, Jr., and William A. Wilson.[- ]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
These consolidated cases present the question whether national banks may serve as agents in the sale of annuities. The Comptroller of the Currency, charged by Congress with superintendence of national banks, determined that federal law permits such annuity sales as a service to bank customers. Specifically, the Comptroller considered the sales at issue "incidental" to "the business of banking" under the National Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5136, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Comptroller further concluded that annuities are not "insurance" within the meaning of § 92; that provision, by expressly authorizing banks in towns of no more than 5,000 people to sell insurance, arguably implies that banks in larger towns may not sell insurance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas upheld the Comptroller's conclusions as a permissible reading of the National Bank Act, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. We are satisfied that the Comptroller's construction of the Act is reasonable and therefore warrants judicial deference. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner NationsBank of North Carolina, N. A., a national bank based in Charlotte, and its brokerage subsidiary sought permission from the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to 12 CFR § 5.34 (1994), for the brokerage subsidiary to act as an agent in the sale of annuities. Annuities are contracts under which the purchaser makes one or more premium payments to the issuer in exchange for a series of payments, which continue either for a fixed period or for the life of the purchaser or a designated beneficiary. When a purchaser invests in a "variable" annuity, the purchaser's money is invested in a designated way and payments to the purchaser vary with investment performance. In a classic "fixed" annuity, in contrast, payments do not vary. Under
the contracts NationsBank proposed to sell, purchasers could direct their payments to a variable, fixed, or hybrid account, and would be allowed periodically to modify their choice. The issuers would be various insurance companies. See Letter from J. Michael Shepherd, Senior Deputy Comptroller, to Robert M. Kurucza (Mar. 21, 1990), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 93-1612, pp. 35a-36a (Comptroller's Letter).
The Comptroller granted NationsBank's application. He concluded that national banks have authority to broker annuities within "the business of banking" under 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh. He further concluded that § 92, addressing insurance sales by banks in towns with no more than 5,000 people, did not impede his approval; for purposes of that provision, the Comptroller explained, annuities do not rank as "insurance." See Comptroller's Letter 41a-47a.
Respondent Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC), which sells annuities, challenged the Comptroller's decision. VALIC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Comptroller and NationsBank. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F.Supp. 639 (1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (1993). Relying on its decision in Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (1968), the Fifth Circuit first held that § 92 bars banks not located in small towns from selling insurance, and then rejected the Comptroller's view that annuities are not insurance for purposes of § 92. See 998 F.2d, at 1298-1302.
Four judges dissented from the failure of the court to grant rehearing en banc. The dissenters maintained that the panel had not accorded due deference to the Comptroller's reasonable statutory interpretations. Variable Annuity
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