Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde

Decision Date15 May 1995
Docket Number9423,943
Citation131 L.Ed.2d 820,514 U.S. 749,115 S.Ct. 1745
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
PartiesREYNOLDSVILLE CASKET CO., et al., Petitioners v. Carol L. HYDE
Syllabus *

More than three years after respondent Hyde was in an accident in Ohio with a truck owned by a Pennsylvania company, she filed suit in an Ohio county court against the company and the truck's driver, petitioners herein. The suit was timely under an Ohio provision that tolls the running of the State's 2-year statute of limitations in lawsuits against out-of-state defendants. However, while her case was pending, this Court, in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 108 S.Ct. 2218, 100 L.Ed.2d 896, held that the tolling provision places an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. The county court dismissed her suit as untimely, but it was ultimately reinstated by the State Supreme Court, which held that Bendix could not be applied retroactively to bar claims that had accrued prior to the announcement of that decision.

Held: The Supremacy Clause bars Ohio from applying its tolling statute to pre-Bendix torts. Pp. __.

(a) Hyde acknowledges that this Court, in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2510, ----, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 held that, when it decides a case and applies the new legal rule of that case to the parties before it, then it and other courts must treat the same rule as "retroactive," applying it, for example, to pending cases, whether or not they involve predecision events. She thereby concedes that Bendix applies to her case and retroactively invalidated the tolling provision that makes her suit timely. She argues instead that the issue here is not one of retroactivity, and that the Ohio Supreme Court's action is permissible because all that court has done is to fashion a remedy that takes into consideration her reliance on pre-Bendix law. Pp. __.

(b) There are serious problems with Hyde's argument. The Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus (the legally authoritative statement of its holding) speaks, not about remedy, but about retroactivity. That court's refusal to dismiss her suit on the ground that she may have reasonably relied upon pre-Bendix law is the very sort of justification that this Court, in Harper, found insufficient to deny retroactive application of a new legal rule. She correctly notes that, as courts apply "retroactively" a new rule of law to pending cases, they may find instances where the new rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case. However, this case involves no instance or special circumstance that might somehow justify the result she seeks. It does not concern (1) an alternative way of curing the constitutional violation; or (2) a previously existing, independent legal basis for denying relief, see, e.g., McKesson Corp v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 40-41, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 2252-2253, 110 L.Ed.2d 17; or (3) a well-established general legal rule, such as qualified immunity, that trumps the new rule of law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy justifications, see, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396; or (4) a principle of law that limits the principle of retroactivity itself, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334. Hyde has offered no more than simple reliance as a basis for creating an exception to Harper's retroactivity rule and has conceded that Harper governs this case. Her concession means that she cannot prevail. Pp. __.

68 Ohio St.3d 240, 626 N.E.2d 75, reversed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined.

William E. Riedel, Ashtabula, OH, for petitioners.

Timothy B. Dyk, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 108 S.Ct. 2218, 100 L.Ed.2d 896 (1988), this Court held unconstitutional (as impermissibly burdening interstate commerce) an Ohio "tolling" provision that, in effect, gave Ohio tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state) defendants. Subsequently, in the case before us, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, despite Bendix, Ohio's tolling law continues to apply to tort claims that accrued before that decision. This holding, in our view, violates the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. We therefore reverse the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment.

The accident that led to this case, a collision between a car and a truck, occurred in Ashtabula County, Ohio, on March 5, 1984. More than three years later, on August 11, 1987, Carol Hyde (respondent here) sued the truck's driver, John Blosh, and its owner, Reynoldsville Casket Company (petitioners). All parties concede that, had Blosh and Reynoldsville made their home in Ohio, Ohio law would have given Hyde only two years to bring her lawsuit. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 (1991). But, because petitioners were from Pennsylvania, a special provision of Ohio law tolled the running of the statute of limitations, making the lawsuit timely. See § 2305.15(A) (tolling the statute of limitations while a person against whom "a cause of action accrues" is "out of" or "departs from" the State).

Ten months after Hyde brought her suit, this Court, in Bendix, supra, held that the tolling provision on which she relied, § 2305.15(A), places an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. Soon thereafter, the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, finding this case indistinguishable from Bendix, held that the tolling provision could not constitutionally be applied to the case, and dismissed the lawsuit as untimely. The intermediate appellate state court affirmed the dismissal. However, the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the suit. Its syllabus, which under Ohio law sets forth the authoritative basis for its decision, see Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions Rule 1(B) (1994-1995); Akers v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 78, 79, n. 1, 508 N.E.2d 964, 965, n. 1 (1987), simply says, "Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.. . . . may not be retroactively applied to bar claims in state courts which had accrued prior to the announcement of that decision. (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution, applied.)" 68 Ohio St.3d 240, 240-241, 626 N.E.2d 75, 75 (1994). We granted certiorari to decide whether the Federal Constitution permits Ohio to continue to apply its tolling statute to pre-Bendix torts. And, as we have said, we conclude that it does not.

Hyde acknowledges that this Court, in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), held that, when (1) the Court decides a case and applies the (new) legal rule of that case to the parties before it, then (2) it and other courts must treat that same (new) legal rule as "retroactive," applying it, for example, to all pending cases, whether or not those cases involve predecision events. She thereby concedes that, the Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus to the contrary notwithstanding, Bendix applies to her case. And, she says, as "a result of Harper, there is no question that Bendix retroactively invalidated" the tolling provision that makes her suit timely. Brief for Respondent 8.

Although one might think that is the end of the matter, Hyde ingeniously argues that it is not. She asks us to look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done, not through the lens of "retroactivity," but through that of "remedy." States, she says, have a degree of legal leeway in fashioning remedies for constitutional ills. She points to Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), in which this Court applied prospectively only its ruling that a 1-year statute of limitations governed certain tort cases—primarily because that ruling had "effectively overruled a long line of decisions" applying a more generous limitations principle (that of laches), upon which plaintiffs had reasonably relied. Id., at 107, 92 S.Ct., at 356. She concedes that Harper overruled Chevron Oil insofar as the case (selectively) permitted the prospective-only application of a new rule of law. But, she notes the possibility of recharacterizing Chevron Oil as a case in which the Court simply took reliance interests into account in tailoring an appropriate remedy for a violation of federal law. See Harper, supra, at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2536-2537 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 218-225, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2352-2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). And, she quotes Justice Harlan, who, before Chevron Oil, pointed out that "equitable considerations" such as "reliance" might prove relevant to "relief." United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296-297, 90 S.Ct. 1033, 1039, 25 L.Ed.2d 312 (1970) (concurring opinion).

Thus, Hyde asks, why not look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done in this case as if it were simply an effort to fashion a remedy that takes into consideration her reliance on pre-Bendix law? Here, the remedy would actually consist of providing no remedy for the constitutional violation or, to put the matter more precisely, of continuing to toll the 2-year statute of limitations in pre-Bendix cases, such as hers, as a state law "equitable" device for reasons of reliance and fairness. She claims that use of this device violates no federal constitutional provision (such as the Due Process Clause) and is therefore permissible.

One serious problem with Hyde's argument lies...

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